Irish Blood, English Heart : Gender, Modernity, and  Third Way  Republicanism in the Formation of the Irish Republic by Shonk, Jr., Kenneth Lee
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects
"Irish Blood, English Heart": Gender, Modernity,
and "Third Way" Republicanism in the Formation
of the Irish Republic
Kenneth Lee Shonk, Jr.
Marquette University
Recommended Citation
Shonk, Jr., Kenneth Lee, ""Irish Blood, English Heart": Gender, Modernity, and "Third Way" Republicanism in the Formation of the
Irish Republic" (2010). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 53.
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/53
“IRISH BLOOD, ENGLISH HEART”: 
GENDER, MODERNITY, AND “THIRD-WAY” REPUBLICANISM IN THE 
FORMATION OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Kenneth L. Shonk, Jr., B.A., M.A., M.A.T. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,  
Marquette University, 
 in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
May 2010 
  
ABSTRACT 
“IRISH BLOOD, ENGLISH HEART”: 
GENDER, MODERNITY, AND “THIRD-WAY” REPUBLICANISM IN THE 
FORMATION OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
Kenneth L. Shonk, Jr., B.A., M.A., M.A.T. 
 
 
Marquette University, 2010 
 
 
 
 Led by noted Irish statesman Eamon de Valera, a cadre of former members of the 
militaristic republican organization Sinn Féin split to form Fianna Fáil with the intent to 
reconstitute Irish republicanism so as to fit within the democratic frameworks of the Irish 
Free State. Beginning with its formation in 1926, up through the passage of a republican 
constitution in 1937 that was recognized by Great Britain the following year, Fianna Fáil had 
successfully rescued the seemingly moribund republican movement from complete 
marginalization. Using gendered language to forge a nexus between primordial cultural 
nationalism and modernity, Fianna Fáil’s nationalist project was tantamount to efforts anti-
hegemonic as well as hegemonic. At the same time that the party sought to dissolve both the 
Free State and remnants of British Colonialism, it made concerted efforts to construct a new 
nation along republican lines. 
Responding to a feminized même by its political opposition, Fianna Fáil established 
political legitimacy by forging a delayed-Enlightenment aesthetic that triumphed reason, 
democratic values, and pacifistic insurrection. Faced with the challenges of fierce opposition 
as well as those associated with the creation of a new nation, Fianna Fáil offered a corrective 
by clearly delineating that which was acceptable in terms of both tradition and modernity, 
political agency, as well as constructs of femininity and masculinity. In contrast to the public 
revolutionary feminist, Fianna Fáil established clear frameworks of appropriate womanhood 
commensurate with its republican ideology. The party offered a varied level of political 
agency to women as they were to be both consumers and physical embodiments of a Fianna 
Fáil-based republic. In contrast, yet symbiotically related, de Valera’s party confronted the 
economic challenges of the era by creating a socio-economic aesthetic that heralded the 
party’s masculine, activist economic policy. Having established what was acceptable, the 
party made a concerted effort to other, or queer, that which did not fit within its nationalistic 
aims by highlighting their opponents’ inability to fit within the party’s heteronormative 
binary. 
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Chapter One 
Irish Blood, English Heart 
 
I don't care if the fascists have to win. 
I don't care democracy's being fucked. 
I don't care socialism's full of sin. 
The unbeatable system engenders rot. 
What is exciting is the triumph of the new nation. 
 -Stereolab
1
 
 
 On 10 March 1926 party president Eamon de Valera announced his 
resignation from Sinn Féin, a republican party that had operated on the fringes of Irish 
politics since the end of the Irish Civil War as the party adamantly refused to 
participate in the recently created Free State Dáil.
2
 De Valera‟s resignation was from 
Sinn Féin not from Irish politics, for his departure marked the beginning of a new 
party to be named Fianna Fáil, which chose to abandon Sinn Féin‟s policy of 
abstention from the legally recognized Free State.
3
 Justifying his resignation, de 
Valera wrote: “Somebody has to enter into the conflict. This is the opportune time, 
                                                          
1
 Stereolab, “Jenny Ondioline,” Transient Random-Noise Bursts With 
Announcements, Elektra Records 61536-2, 1993. 
2
 The term Dáil refers to the parliamentary body of both the Free State governments, 
as well as the modern Irish Republic. The first Dáil was created in January 1919 and was 
comprised of the members of Sinn Féin who chose to abstain from taking their seats in the 
British Parliament, thereby forming a separatist government. The second Dáil was created in 
August of 1921 and was dissolved by the creation of the Free State Dáil in June of 1922. 
Many members of Sinn Féin chose to not recognize the Free State Dáil, choosing instead to 
claim legitimacy for the second Dáil. For a concise study on the political development of 
Ireland, see Alvin Jackson, Home Rule, An Irish History, 1800-2000 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) and Tom Garvin, 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy (London: Gill 
and Macmillan, 1996). 
3
 Literally, the term Fianna Fáil means “warriors/soldiers of Ireland,” alternatively 
“Warriors of Destiny.” Explaining why the name was chose, de Valera stated: “The name 
FIANNA FAIL [sic] has been chosen to symbolise a banding together of the people for 
national service, with a standard of personal honour for all who join, as high as that which 
characterised the ancient Fianna Eireann, and a spirit of devotion equal to that of the Irish 
Volunteers from 1913 to 1921.” Statement on the aims of Fianna Fáil, 17 April 1926, Eamon 
de Valera Collection UCDA, P150/2011. See John Coakley “The foundations of statehood,” 
in Politics in the Republic of Ireland, eds. John Coakley and Michael Gallgher (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 1-31. Recollections of the early years of the party can be found in Kevin 
Boland, The Rise and Decline of Fianna Fáil (Cork: Mercier Press, 1982). For a concise 
contextualization of the party‟s early history, see J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 150-57. 
2 
 
and I realise that the coming general election is the time…if [Cumann na nGaedheal 
representatives] get firmly fixed and you get the economic interests of Ireland fixed, 
there will be no place in Ireland for a national political party. These are the reasons 
that prompted me.”4 For de Valera and his followers this so-called “new departure” 
came at a time when the seemingly moribund Irish republican cause was becoming 
less vital in the wake of the relative success of the early Free State. Not only was the 
viability and effectiveness of the republican movement in question, but so too was the 
reputation of the former Sinn Féin leader, prompting a letter to The Westminster 
Gazette, which read: “Most people in Great Britain had begun to forget that Mr de 
Valera still exists, and now perhaps we may all forget, since he has since resigned.”5 
Considering that the republican cause sought to create more than just an independent 
Irish state free from the interference of Great Britain, this question regarding the 
presence of de Valera seemed all the more damning to the status of Irish 
republicanism in 1926.  
 Indeed, the formation and eventual successes of Fianna Fáil were no doubt 
remarkable, yet most unlikely was the survival of republicanism following the 
tenuous decade that had preceded the party‟s creation.6 David Fitzpatrick has written 
that “in the process of Ireland‟s political transformation between 1913 and 1921 every 
                                                          
4
 Eamon de Valera, in Speeches and Statements By Eamon de Valera, 1917-1973, ed. 
Maurice Moynihan (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980), 130. Moynihan notes that this 
particular passage was found amongst de Valera‟s papers and remained unpublished. Despite 
this, it nonetheless gives an insight into reasons for de Valera‟s “new departure.” Ibid., 129. 
Cumann na nGaedheal emerged from the Treaty debates as the most influential and important 
political party in 1920s Ireland. The party would reconstitute itself in 1933 following the 
dominance of Fianna Fáil in the 1930s. 
5
 Anonymous quote from The Westminster Gazette, in Moynihan, 129. 
6
 The republicanism that Fianna Fáil advocated was quite simply the desire to 
establish and independent Irish republic. There have been a number of republican movements 
including the Feninans—a movement with which Fianna Fáil shares an etymological 
lineage—up through the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Sinn Féin. The means by which to 
attain the republic proved to be the distinguishing characteristic between the myriad 
movements. 
3 
 
Irishman was to some extent both actor and observer.”7 As such, the events of this 
time scarred the population, resulting in a generation cognizant of the tropes and 
rhetoric associated with radical change. For some, the revolution remained unfinished 
and further violence was needed, yet for most, violent insurgency as the means best 
suited to gain a free nation was most distasteful. This most unique period—which 
should be extended to 1923 to include the formation of the Free State and its 
immediate aftermath—witnessed violent upheaval twice against Britain, a traumatic 
debate about the treaty that ended the Anglo-Irish conflict, and a civil war that that 
resulted. Peter Hart effectively summarizes these events, writing: 
In the aftermath of the Easter Rising of 1916, however, radicals did achieve 
radical change: a Sinn Féin majority in Ireland in the 1918 general election; an 
avowedly separatist parliament, Dáil Éireann, in 1919; republican local 
governments, police, and courts in 1920; the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921; and 
ultimately, in 1922, an independent Free State separate from both Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland.
8
 
 
These seminal movements were largely the result of activist bands of rebels that 
utilized both violence and diplomacy in the attempt to dissolve—or at least weaken—
colonial ties to Great Britain, thereby forming a semblance of independence for 
Ireland. Despite these efforts, as Hart points out, “the whole of Ireland did not 
participate equally in this change.”9 While the population of Ireland bore witness to 
the events that occurred in this era, the dealings that created the Free State were 
handled in such a manner that the population writ-large were simply observers. 
                                                          
7
 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921, Provincial Experience of War 
and Revolution (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1977), 281. 
8
 Peter Hart, The I.R.A. at War 1916-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
30. For deeper examinations of the Civil War and its immediate aftermath, see Bill Kissane, 
The Politics of the Irish Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Michael 
Hopkinson, Green Against Green, The Irish Civil War (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988, 
2004). For the Treaty debate, see Jason K. Knirck Imagining Ireland’s Independence, The 
Debates Over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Frank 
Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal: An Account, from first-hand sources, of the Negotiation and 
Signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921 (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1951). 
9
 Hart, I.R.A. at War, 31. 
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Fianna Fáil, on the other hand, would seek to change that by constructing a renewed 
dedication to a nationalist cause through the reconstitution of Irish republicanism.  
Shortly after his resignation from Sinn Féin, de Valera and his cadre of 
supporters launched Fianna Fáil, presenting the party‟s aims to the public in April of 
1926.
10
 The new party would immediately reject the abstentionism of Sinn Féin, 
instead opting to enter the Free State Dáil upon the assumption that party members 
would be elected into office the following year. Or, as de Valera told an audience the 
following month, republicans “must do their part to secure common action by getting 
into position along the most likely line of the nation‟s advance.”11 His newfound 
willingness to participate within the Free State government—a government that he 
and his followers viewed as essentially a British creation managed by Irish 
politicians—was tantamount to an effort to most efficiently affect change in Ireland, 
keeping in mind the ultimate goal of an independent state. Arguably, within a decade, 
Fianna Fáil did succeed in their aims, first by attaining political legitimacy in the Dáil, 
then by securing the popular ratification of a “republican” constitution in 1937. 
 As time passes and circumstances change, politicians unyielding to adaptation 
run the risk of insignificance and marginalization. The same can be said about 
political movements, as time, circumstance, and public perception invalidate a group 
so as to make them passé. However, it would be hyperbole to say that Eamon de 
Valera and Sinn Féin were completely removed from the political landscape in the 
years before the formation of Fianna Fáil. Indeed, the marginalization of Sinn Féin 
                                                          
10
 Eamon de Valera, “Aims of Fianna Fáil, Press Statement, 17 April 1926” in 
Moynihan, Speeches, 131-2. Moynihan notes that this statement was based on “an interview 
with a representative of the United Press. Ibid., 131. The fact that this statement was released 
before the actual creation of the organization further solidifies the notion that de Valera was 
indeed the central figure of the Fianna Fáil movement. 
11
 Eamon de Valera, “A National Policy,” in Moynihan, Speeches, 134. This 
particular speech was given at the first meeting of Fianna Fáil, which was held at the La Scala 
Theatre in Dublin on 16 May 1926. 
5 
 
had as much to do with their policy of abstention as the relative successes of the 
Saorstát. This self-imposed exile from the Dáil sparked an intellectual civil war within 
the hard-line republican movement that would result in the formation of Fianna Fáil 
by de Valera and his followers in 1926. In other words, as Ireland had moved on, Sinn 
Féin‟s platform seemed increasingly irrelevant and unfeasible, thus necessitating a 
reconstitution of republicanism that was politically suitable to operate through the 
democratic institutions of the Free State. Within a period of eleven years, the leader 
once deemed as seeing his time past would not only lead a renascent republicanism to 
multiple electoral victories, but succeed in forging a new constitution—so glibly 
accepted by London—and eventually gain recognition as an independent state in 
1949.
12
 This scenario was arguably one of the great political “comebacks” of modern 
political history.  
 The question remains: how did the Fianna Fáil movement rescue Irish 
republican aspirations from irrelevance in the wake of losses in the Treaty Debate and 
Civil War to such a degree that the party redefined Ireland‟s socio-economic and 
political narrative in its own image.  First, it is vital to understand that Fianna Fáil 
engaged with the democratic Free State, and therefore, it is of great importance to 
understand how the party validated and justified its actions within that system. By 
rejecting abstention and opting to enter the Free State‟s political fray, Fianna Fáil 
positioned itself as a republican alternative to Cumann na nGaedheal, offering Irish 
voters a chance to re-engage with the republican spectacle in a manner suitable to the 
era‟s sensibilities. The party was revolutionary but not overtly militant; it maintained 
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the charismatic leadership so essential to Irish nationalist movements; it cloaked itself 
in a brand of popular nationalism that was free from single-cause, dogmatic 
ideologies; and more than anything, it offered an electable brand of republicanism. 
Yet to say, in essence, that Fianna Fáil was a democratic party encouraging 
participation offers little context or understanding as to how the party succeeded. For 
the party envisioned itself as more than a political machine; rather it operated upon 
the assumption that it was a national movement that not only sought to forge a new 
government, but also to redefine all aspects of Irish society to fit within the party‟s 
vision.  
Further, it would be faulty to assume that Fianna Fáil operated in a socio-
political vacuum removed from economic and political currents that affected much of 
the world in the years that preceded the Second World War. Brian Girvin contends 
that “the republicanisation of Ireland had three components: political, constitutional, 
and diplomatic.”13 Through these three categorizations Girvin traces the manner in 
which Fianna Fáil utilized party policy to legislate itself, first into legitimacy and 
secondly into political domination. Further, Girvin stated—with little evidence—that 
Fianna Fáil “had republicanised domestic policy and created an institutional 
framework where the requirements of the Irish state and of its citizens would take 
priority over all other considerations.”14 One of the more remarkable aspects of 
Fianna Fáil was their ability to reconcile Irish republicanism with both Free State 
dynamics, and also with its geopolitical troubles specific to the onset of modernity. As 
such, the fundamental assumption of this work is that the most complete portrait of 
interwar Ireland must be based on the axiom that Fianna Fáil was both a party true to 
                                                          
13
 Brian Girvin, “The Republicanisation of Irish Society, 1932-48,” in A New History 
of Ireland, Volume VII: Ireland, 1921-84, ed. J.R. Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 136. 
14
 Ibid., 137. 
7 
 
its cultural and historical lineage, but also one that was undoubtedly concerned with 
contemporary issues beyond Ireland‟s shores. Thus, Fianna Fáil was a product of its 
time, interacting with the realities of the era. This was a moment that necessitated the 
party‟s full participation in the Free State Dáil—an entity that Fianna Fáil sought to 
destroy. 
 The ratification of the Fianna Fáil oonstitution by the people of Ireland in 
1937 and the passage of the Éire Confirmation Bill one year later stand as testaments 
to the transformative moment forged by Fianna Fáil in the years between its formation 
in 1926 and the eventual creation of a truly independent Irish State in 1949. In the 
early years of their intertwined existence, Cumman na nGaedheal and the Free State 
government it controlled—not to mention the continual marginalization of Sinn 
Féin—were the featured foundational aspects of Ireland of the time period. The 
creation, and eventual success of Fianna Fáil represented a watershed moment in Irish 
history, for nearly all aspects of Ireland‟s subsequent political and cultural life were—
and are—directly connected to this particular moment. Justifying its existence as the 
true harbinger of the Gaelic-Irish national tradition, Fianna Fáil quickly and 
effectively disarmed the Anglo-Free State binary from within. In the wake of Fianna 
Fáil successes, the once-victorious Treatyite party, Cumann na nGaedheal, had lost its 
validity, joining with the self-professed fascist Blueshirts to form the reactionary Fine 
Gael—a party whose origins were rooted in its opposition to Fianna Fáil policy. This 
was in direct contrast to its precursor that had been forged in the wake the Treaty 
debates. Further, the Constitution of 1937—also called “de Valera‟s Constitution,” 
alternatively the “Fianna Fáil Constitution”—legislated the party‟s socio-political 
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vision.
15
 This, what I have dubbed the Formative Era of the Irish Republic, comprises 
the years when the advancement of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalistic vision advanced from 
political rhetoric into the most foundational aspects of the modern Irish nation-state. 
The purpose here is to not to retell the legislative narrative of the party, but rather to 
demonstrate how Fianna Fáil attempted to forge a nation based on its renascent 
republican discourse. 
 Indeed, the party reconstituted republicanism to operate within the frameworks 
of the Irish Free State in contrast to the militant dogmatism of Sinn Féin. As Eunan 
O‟Halpin writes, “Whatever his complaints about the treaty, the constitution, external 
relations, or economic policy, de Valera in power was content to operate the 
administrative system fashioned by his opponents.”16 With the creation of Fianna Fáil, 
de Valera and his followers sought to displace a government still connected to 
London, and to reconstruct Ireland‟s socio-economic narrative in the hopes of 
attaining a level of independence that transcended mere political freedom. As such the 
party perceived itself as offering a corrective to the legacy of British colonialism—a 
legacy that the party explicitly claimed to have been perpetuated via the Free State 
and Cumann na nGaedheal. Far more implicit was the corrective to the colonial 
discourse that Fianna Fáil offered in terms of negotiating the unfinished, or at least 
unfocused, path to independence. 
To present Fianna Fáil as just a political movement with socio-cultural 
inclinations, therefore fails to represent what the party sought to do in the Formative 
Era. The party envisioned itself as a national movement and thereby advanced 
affectations of a large-scale, all-encompassing faction for which electoral triumph was 
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merely part of a larger effort to replace the Anglo-Free State discourse with a new 
republican narrative. Freed by its disassociation from Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil sought to 
advance a nation-wide movement —at least in the southern twenty-six counties—
intent on constructing a new nation from within. Fianna Fáil represented itself as an 
effort to instill a command over means—a distillation of nationalistic efforts into the 
everyday, and it transcended class and history: it was not encumbered by Marxian 
trappings, nor was it beholden to upholding a liberal-capitalist lineage. Rather, its 
immediate concerns centered on problems not solvable by nineteenth century 
ideologies. The party was concerned with the infinitely Irish problem of reconciling 
traditionalism—however imagined—with the realities of modernity. Compounded by 
the historical challenges of the inter-war period, the problem of Ireland‟s colonial 
heritage engendered a nationalist project that advanced an approach unique to the 
twentieth century. Fianna Fáil, therefore, offered a corrective to these problems by 
clearly delineating that which was acceptable in terms of tradition, modernity, and  
political agency, as well as constructs of femininity and masculinity. Fianna Fáil‟s 
nationalist project was tantamount to anti-hegemonic as well as hegemonic efforts—
in other words, at the same time that the party sought to dissolve both the Free State 
and remnants of British colonialism, it made concerted efforts to construct a new 
nation along republican lines. 
In the Formative Era, of course, the party was actively involved in the daily 
legislation of the Free State, often supporting policy that was in direct contrast to its 
nationalistic aims. This duality does much to explain the party‟s blatant 
contradictions. One such example regards the treatment of women. For example, the 
Bunreacht na hÉireann—in English, the “Constitution of Éire—declares “the State 
recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support 
10 
 
without which the common good cannot be achieved.”17 This passage from “de 
Valera‟s Constitution” is often used to signify the paternalism and misogynistic tone 
of Fianna Fáil in its advocacy of the primacy of the female domestic. Yet, as will be 
shown in chapter three, the nationalistic thrust of Fianna Fáil encouraged women to 
dress in appropriately modern clothing, and even to engage in party-sanctioned 
vocations. As will become clear throughout this work, the division of gender-
appropriate aesthetics into a masculine/feminine binary was done to suit the party‟s 
efforts to destroy what it considered to be the remaining vestiges of British 
colonialism, as well as to form the basis of a modern state. As such, it is my aim to 
focus on these nationalistic aims, which at times contradicted the party‟s legislative 
machinations. In sum, on the one hand Fianna Fáil was one of a small number of 
political parties working in the Free State Dáil, engaged in a very typical political 
dialectic, and on the other, they were a nationalist party working toward destroying 
the very entity in which they served. 
This approach speaks to Joost Augusteijn‟s assertion that “the history of 
independent Ireland and in particular the somewhat shadowy period of the interwar 
years has so far mainly been dealt with in a general manner.”18 I would add that the 
histories of this period tend to focus on the trajectory of the impact of Fianna Fáil and 
the independence of Ireland into the 1940s and beyond, namely to focus on the dour 
economic and social conditions in Ireland. However, as Augusteijn argues, “the Free 
State was not just the insular self-obsessed and culturally barren society it has often 
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been portrayed as.”19  Indeed, Elizabeth Russell argues that the Irish were rather 
voracious in their reading habits—although not exactly readers of the great Western 
Canon—adding, “their content was uniform: „guns and roses‟; shoot-outs at corrals 
and then happy-ever-after tales, and, when home-produced, an extra large smattering 
of soft-nationalism and a nod in the direction of the Vatican were added in for good 
measure.”20 The fact that Ireland was indeed a literate society, savvy to the clues and 
subtexts in such literature, adds to the importance of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist aesthetic 
that was presented in tropes familiar to even the most casual Irish reader. This 
coalesced with the party‟s labors to appeal to as many people as possible from myriad 
backgrounds—cosmopolitan urbanites, farmers, children, as well as adolescents 
looking for advice as to how they might fit within a utopian Ireland. In the years 
leading up to the ratification of the 1937 constitution, the effort by which Fianna Fáil 
sought to appeal to as many people as possible through its nationalist, participatory 
aesthetic—so as to widen their electoral appeal, but also to garner support for new 
republican frameworks—must be differentiated from its efforts in the Dáil. 
● 
 One of the major stumbling blocks when it comes to understanding the nature 
of Fianna Fáil is that of its revolutionary efforts. John M. Regan claims that the party 
“was built upon a revolutionary trajectory established in 1912.”21 While it is true that 
Fianna Fáil owed its existence to the efforts of its nationalist predecessors, the ability 
to distinguish itself from the political fray that marked the era prior to its creation lay 
not in its self-alignment on this trajectory, but rather in its ability to seize and redirect 
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Irish republican discourse. Further, it will be demonstrated below how Fianna Fáil 
actively distanced itself from this trajectory to which Regan refers. Speaking in 1927 
at the Second Annual Ard Fheis of Fianna Fáil, de Valera stated: “When 
circumstances change, methods must change; but the thing that has not changed is the 
aim, and that aim is to secure the complete freedom of this country; and we know that, 
no matter how they might alight it as a mere form, the form in which that aim will 
express itself is that of an independent Republic.”22 This subtle, but sharp, rebuke of 
Sinn Féin is essential in understanding the motivations for Fianna Fáil. The notion 
that circumstances had changed, therefore necessitating a change in methodology, 
freed de Valera and his followers from maintaining the hard-line Sinn Féin dogma 
that had been largely rejected by voters and marginalized by its political opponents. 
Further, the gendered critique of Sinn Féin by Cumann na nGaedheal essentially 
atomized the republicans, reducing them to mere individuals seen as ardent 
reactionaries threatening the stability of the state.
23
 As such, the reconstitution of the 
republican cause sought to reverse this trend through the advancement of a larger, 
national cause. 
A party that was simply Sinn Féin with a new name could not and would not 
have succeeded in the Free State, especially with a population savvy to, and largely 
disgusted with, the tropes of violent upheaval. The new party was distinctive and 
offered a new republican vision better suited to combat Cumann na nGaedheal. To 
what did the party owe its success? Alvin Jackson contends that Cuman na nGaedheal 
had failed to create an “exclusive constituency” apart from ex-Unionists and “those 
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who profited from commercial ties with Britain.”24 In contrast, he notes that Fianna 
Fáil “was able to tap an electoral core which was unreconciled to the Free State: it 
was rather that the party was able to reconstruct the political chemistry of Parnellism 
by combining nationalist fundamentalism with a carefully tailored social and 
economic appeal.”25 The implication is that the Irish public‟s support for 
republicanism was largely dormant, and that Fianna Fáil‟s aims served as a proper 
alternative to the stop-gap element of the Free State and its party of government. As 
such, Jackson portrays Fianna Fáil as offering a political pastiche in which the party‟s 
rhetoric was simply a rehashing of seemingly mordant ideologies. Further, Jackson 
contends that Fianna Fáil‟s success was due in large part to Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
failings in dealing with Europe‟s changing socio-economic landscape.  
 Richard Dunphy, meanwhile, attributes a more aggressive and activist stance 
to Fianna Fáil: “The party did not simply enjoy an electoral superiority, but succeeded 
in establishing its intellectual, moral, and cultural leadership.”26 Dunphy asserts that 
Fianna Fáil succeeded in part because of its ability to balance a new economic and 
social policy on top of pre-existing notions of republicanism within Ireland. In this 
sense, he does not differ much from Jackson, apart from the fact that he contends that 
the party was far more progressive in its vision of Ireland‟s future. An important 
element of Dunphy‟s work is his contention that the emergence of de Valera‟s new 
republican party to prominence completely restructured Ireland‟s political landscape. 
Joe Lee similarly notes that de Valera‟s party “succeeded in capturing the market for 
the emotional resentment of the excluded underdog, who felt that the political 
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„system‟ was fixed against them…[and] Fianna Fáil satisfied the demand for 
pageantry, and for vicarious participation, among the politically emotive.”27 This brief 
selection offers insight into Fianna Fáil‟s direct approach to affecting political change 
within Ireland, and in the case of Lee, how that in turn fed a cultural need. As such, 
these scholars describe the party as dispensers of a continuous string of mandates, 
likening it to a dictatorial puppet-master guiding the people to suit its own needs. 
These works present Fianna Fáil politics as clearly distinct from Irish culture, yet 
seeking to mandate the latter‟s progress. Conversely, my goal is to demonstrate the 
machinations of a party that attempted—successfully in the short term, at least—to 
forge a nexus between society and economy, culture and nationalist aesthetics, and 
gender and power. As such, the Irish nation, the Irish people, and aspects of their 
daily life were meant to be daily affirmations of Fianna Fáil republicanism. 
 Charisma and opportunism are two of the most commonly cited elements 
associated with the reemergence of republicanism under the guise of Fianna Fáil. For 
instance, Dunphy argues that de Valera‟s charismatic leadership was vital to the 
party‟s rise to power, and that “what the organisation developed was not simply a cult 
of de Valera, but a structurally anchored cult of leadership, which has been one of its 
most consistent features.”28 Bryan Fanning extends this analysis, seeing de Valera as 
part of a long line of prior leaders: “In the history of Ireland, Irish revolutionaries 
have united strongly behind the strong leader (Tone, Parnell, Collins, Pearse, etc.). In 
life and in death the ability of a single person to capture the hearts and minds of the 
Irish resolve to attain independence. Therefore, the stage was set for de Valera to 
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seize the reins amidst the economic strife of the early 1920s.”29 Or, as one Kerry 
boatman explained the reasons for Fianna Fáil‟s triumph: “Poor people always vote 
for them and now there are more poor people that [sic] ever before.”30  
Indeed the imagined link between social reform and the party was strong. 
Peter Mair writes “Once the Fianna Fáil programme had become legitimised, 
however, and particularly given that the Fianna Fáil programme also contained many 
of the more radical social and welfarist policies which were favoured by Labour, little 
potential remained for the smaller party to play an independent role. Indeed, when 
Fianna Fáil first took office in 1932, it did so in a minority government with Labour‟s 
support.”31 Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh notes, “In the late 1920s and into the early 1930s, de 
Valera and Fianna Fáil represented a force of promise or of menace, not only for 
different sections of the people of the Irish State but for Unionists and Nationalists in 
Northern Ireland, and for others including the British government.”32 Dermot Keogh, 
meanwhile, writes that “de Valera was not the revolutionary die-hard depicted in Free 
State and British propaganda of the time. He was a politician, who, during the early 
months of 1922, continued to believe in his ability to rekindle the spirit of national 
unity fostered during the War of Independence.”33 In the souvenir program that 
marked Fianna Fáil‟s fiftieth anniversary, the party described its founder as a man of 
the people: “Because the man who founded Fianna Fáil was so closely identified with 
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the fight of the Irish people for independence and sovereignty, the tendency has been 
to dilate and dwell on his stature as a soldier, or as a master of the art of politics, or as 
an international statesman...but he was also...an earnest social reformer.”34 Less subtle 
was the declaration “Magnetic as a leader, de Valera exercised a special influence and 
authority over public opinion…his were the words that were listened to by the 
greatest number of voters.”35  
 Despite these myriad views on the iconic nature of Eamon de Valera, the 
purpose here is not to judge the man or his party in one way or the other. This project 
seeks to look at the nationalistic aims of Fianna Fáil in the decade prior to the 
outbreak of the Second World War. At the heart of this study lies the transformation 
by Fianna Fáil of the Irish Free State into Éire, the precursor to the Irish Republic, and 
my focus will remain on the period prior to passage of the Éire Confirmation Bill of 
1938. My goal is to demonstrate the means by which Fianna Fáil successfully 
distinguished itself from the marginalized Sinn Féin party that had emerged from the 
Treaty Debate and Civil War, as well as to describe the steps taken by de Valera‟s 
party to destroy the vestiges of the British/Free State dialectic from within the system 
itself. Further, and perhaps most important, I will explore the means by which Fianna 
Fáil sought to incorporate all aspects of Irish life and society into one nationalist 
endeavor. As such, the most important aspect of this work is the contextualization of 
Fianna Fáil within the interwar zeitgeist, in a manner free from character study or the 
platform of party legislation beyond the Formative Era.  
● 
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George Mosse asserts that people increasingly looked toward the nation in 
their search for stability after the Great War, as well as to assuage anxieties about the 
impact of modernity.
36
 Michael Mays argues that uncertainties regarding modernity 
shaped nationalist movements, as they were “beset by processes of modernization that 
it could barely comprehend, and against which they was necessary to concoct 
defensive strategies. Moreover, that modernity seemed—and the travesties of the War 
and the worldwide economic collapse appeared to dispel any lingering doubts about 
the matter—to be careening out of control.”37 Mays adds that “insecure in that identity 
and unstable in its infancy, with relatively few indigenous resources, and burdened by 
a tremendous debt, the dilemma of a new Irish state intent upon establishing an Irish 
nation worthy of the long imagined and fought-over ideal explains much about the 
conservatism, the self-protectionism, and the insularity which are the facts, and not 
simply the crude stereotypes of the period.”38 In the effort to situate the nascent nation 
amidst the trappings of modernity, Fianna Fáil—like other nationalist movements of 
the period—latched on to symbols to justify a presence in modern politics. 
 Much has been written regarding the propensity of Fianna Fáil to emphasize 
the so-called backward gaze, but it is faulty to assume that this was the only direction 
in which the party was willing to look. Mays notes that in the years after the Great 
War 
Every nation would be forced to fashion its own image, to forge its own 
presumptively distinctive style, to weigh its circumstances, needs and desires, 
in order to determine its appropriate form, and to assess the conditions that 
would make one style preferable to another. If for a moment a revolutionary 
nationalism capable of embracing an indeterminate future had seemed a 
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possibility, after the Great War, and even more dramatically, after the 
economic collapse, nationalism would in the end, for all intents and purposes, 
retreat into the immutability of a serviceable past, refashioning itself in the 
process in the image of the newly dominant bourgeois class whose values and 
interests it would come to reproduce. Yet in Ireland—where national self-
definition had taken shape…that project was all the more pressing. And that 
beloved image of Ireland—rural, Gaelic, anti-materialist, retaining an ancient 
pastoral distinctiveness and simplicity—could only be maintained by turning a 
blind eye to the difficult realities then in the process of transforming the Irish 
landscape.
39
 
 
Yet Fianna Fáil did not turn a blind eye to the problems of modernity, nor did it seek 
to excise all aspects of modernity from their envisioned republic. Indeed, the party 
placed the pastoral as the goal, but as their nationalist aesthetic demonstrates, the 
party was willing to accept aspects of modernity so long as they fit within proper 
frameworks that did not challenge the idyllic republican vision. 
 Representations of Fianna Fáil in the Formative Era tend to emphasize the 
party‟s pastoralist vision, citing de Valera‟s famous call for a frugal and rural Ireland 
populated by industrious—not industrial—men and “comely maidens.”40 Indeed, 
sentiments such as this are largely representative of what has correctly been called a 
rather oppressive society, especially for women, or what James Smith called Ireland‟s 
“containment culture.”41 However, a deeper look at the nationalist aesthetic advanced 
by Fianna Fáil in the years preceding the drafting of the constitution shows a party 
much more interested in and open to incorporating elements of modernity into the 
national fold. Granted, some saw this as evidence of a continuation of British-style 
capitalization of Irish society, but the party‟s propaganda regarding economic 
nationalism, as well as the role of women within a “de Valerian” state, show that 
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Ireland was not the culturally regressive state that it once was. This, however, is not to 
say that the rhetoric regarding the inclusion of modernity was seamlessly woven into 
Irish society—much to the contrary. Rather, the point here is that Fianna Fáil worked 
to produce a republican narrative through the incorporation of a dualistic national 
rhetoric that fulfilled the need to reconcile—if not intermesh—the backward and 
forward gazes.  
In describing the downfall of Sinn Féin republicanism, Jason Knirck has made 
special note of the rhetorical dialectic between the supporters of the Treaty—Cumann 
na nGaedheal—and de Valera‟s party. Central to this was Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
ability to portray Sinn Féiners as feminine and reactionary, and therefore a threat to 
the peaceful order established by the Free State. According to Knirck, “pro-Treatyites 
used gendered arguments and stereotypes to bring republicanism into disrepute. As a 
result, republicanism became „feminized,‟ tarred with the brush of hysteria, 
irrationality and undue emotion.”42 Knirck adds that “Pro-Treatyites also used images 
of the irrational, emotional, feminized political figure to castigate women and urge 
their exclusion from politics. They linked women and republicanism, and much of 
their seemingly misogynistic policy was also directed against radical republicans.”43 
Notions of sacrifice, emotionalism, and reverence for Irish martyrs were a unifying 
force for the modern republican movement and were central to Sinn Féin‟s raison 
d’être. Further, these tropes highlighted by Knirck meshed well with British 
sentimentalities that “were perfectly happy to find the Irish just the sort of 
bucklepping, gallivanting rebels they had always proclaimed them to be, the rebel 
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being one reassuringly familiar kind of Irishman whom the liberal, book-buying 
English had taken fatally to their hearts.”44 This rhetorical endeavor to delegitimize 
the republican cause was taken up by Fianna Fáil and served as the basis for de 
Valera‟s party‟s gendered rhetoric that sought to correct the male/female binary 
within Ireland.  In regards to women, the Fianna Fáil corrective involved the defining 
of a proper role for women within an envisioned Irish republic; for men, this meant 
the situating of the Irish man as an active participant in a progressive, industrious 
Irish-based system of manufacture that moved Ireland closer to independence.  
Central to Fianna Fáil‟s corrective discourse was the promotion of a 
participatory ethos, where participation might mean any number of things including 
serving in political office, making expressions of militancy, or engaging in public 
protest. This was a clear departure from Sinn Féin. In the years following 1916, Sinn 
Féin had become a party of destruction, focused solely on ardent and adamant 
methods to affect change to Ireland in the hopes of dissolving the vestiges of colonial 
ties to Britain. Therefore, to participate in Sinn Féin meant to be actively involved in a 
course of destruction. Granted, there had existed the Second Dáil, but this was a tool 
of Sinn Féin that lacked a national mandate, and thus had little grounding in public 
sentiment. As such, Sinn Féin was advancing a rhetoric that asked the people of 
Ireland to support change—sometimes through violent means—to put a body into 
power that based its justification in revolutionary, not democratic acts. In this sense, 
post-independence Sinn Féin was still asking the people of Ireland to take a leap of 
faith, assuming that—if victorious—the party would be able to construct a stable and 
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peaceful Republic. In light of the stability already on offer through the Free State 
government, this was much to ask indeed.  
Conversely, Fianna Fáil added the element of popular participation from the 
outset. At the same time that it was actively seeking to destroy the Free State as well 
as British ties, Fianna Fáil was actively constructing a new socio-economic narrative 
that included all aspects of Irish society. In other words, Fianna Fáil was seeking to 
create a new Ireland in its own image. Central to this was the party‟s effort to define 
what was acceptable and what was not; what was appropriate to the new nation and 
what was a threat; it was a corrective to the nation‟s past troubles, as well as being 
representative of a new discourse. Fianna Fáil defined and trumpeted acceptable 
visions of Ireland‟s Gaelic past at the same time that it pushed for the nation-wide 
acceptance of modern industry as both a means of reifying independence and 
isolation, but also of instilling patriotism. Such an effort was akin to Roger Griffin‟s 
description of Italy where the Fascists “sought to bring about [that which] was not 
„anti-modern‟, but part of the attempt to create an alternative modernity to rescue 
society from decline and decadence, an aspiration which in turn gave Fascism‟s bid 
for the renewal of civilization a deep affinity with modernism itself.”45  The effort to 
construct a truly independent Éire was not simply the result of the party‟s legislative 
agenda; rather, Fianna Fáil constructed its new republican rhetoric through the 
inclusion of people within gendered frameworks, or what Foucault noted as the “way 
in which sex is put into discourse.”46  
The emphases in the party‟s aesthetic contained themes of tradition 
(Gaelicism, the glorification of a time before the “invasion,” the primacy of Ireland‟s 
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Catholicity), and modernity (glorification of growth and industry, the cult of 
progress), and they have much in common with nationalist parties that emerged in 
Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. Regarding nationalist movements of 
that era, Mosse has asserted the “ideal of classical beauty was co-opted by 
nationalism, just as nationalism would annex many other political movements and 
philosophies over the years…The visual self-representation of the nation was just as 
important as the much cited literature of nationalism.”47 In the course of its rise to 
power, Fianna Fáil would establish an inclusive republican aesthetic that created a 
definitive vision of a new, modern state.  According to Foucault such a modern state 
characterized both “individual and totalizing form[s] of power” and was built upon “a 
very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one 
condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a 
set of very specific patterns.”48 Unlike Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil constructed a nationalist 
movement that sought to unify the nation through party-sanctioned individual 
behaviors. More specifically, as is contended below, the party constructed sanctioned 
norms along a female/male binary that offered both a corrective to past difficulties, as 
well as a basis for building this new state. As such, the people of Ireland were not 
asked to submit their will and efforts to a mass mobilization of the people a la the 
Bolsheviks or Chartists, but rather through the inculcation of republican ideology into 
all aspects of their daily life which enabled the party to alter “the world by 
reinterpreting it.”49  
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In 1932 Benito Mussolini declared that “politics is the highest of the arts, the 
art of arts, the most godly amongst the arts, because it sculptures the most difficult, 
living material: man.”50 In this brief statement Mussolini captured the essence of what 
Roger Griffith defined as palingenetic ultra-nationalism,”51 or what Mark Antliff 
described as a glorification of “both a mystic past and a technological future in a 
manner that seems highly contradictory.”52 Simlilarly, Mosse has noted that “it was 
both traditional in its forms and dynamic in its movement, fascist aesthetic reflected 
fascism itself which, as we have mentioned, meant, at one and the same time, to 
uphold tradition and symbolize a revolutionary dynamic which was supposed to lead 
to a better future.”53 Citing the glorification of man, Mussolini reduced the power of 
the individual to its most basic and god-granted form, yet at the same time celebrating 
the progressive and modernizing form of man—the backward and forward gaze, in a 
word, Janus-faced. Antliff argues that fascistic political projects emerged from 
concerns regarding the dehumanization of industrialization, the “globalization of 
capitalism,” as well as Marxian socialism, which sought to remove individualistic 
expression in the exchange for the greater whole.
54
 Building upon Antliff‟s assertions 
that fascistic movements emerged not from a vile, destructive ideology—as many 
would later become—Fianna Fáil constructed its nationalist efforts at a time when 
there was a general dissatisfaction with the liberal/Marxian binary, as well as an 
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appreciation of the need for corrective frameworks. For Germany, Italy, and Spain, 
this “third-way” alternative to liberal capitalism and Marxian socialism was a means 
to destroy the remnants of the ancien regime, or to assuage anxieties regarding 
industrialization and the emasculation that followed the Great War.
 55
  
A study of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist rhetoric and aesthetic nationalism finds 
much in common with movements on the continent. In the case of Ireland, such an 
approach offered a corrective to the emasculation of colonization, as well as a 
framework for Fianna Fáil‟s plan for a modern state. Further, the party offered a 
participatory model that Lee contends “succeeded in capturing the market for the 
emotional resentment of the excluded underdog, who felt that the political „system‟ 
was fixed against them…[a]nd Fianna Fáil satisfied the demand for pageantry, and for 
vicarious participation, among the politically emotive.”56 Additionally, Lee contends 
that Fianna Fáil was most successful in “exploiting the fascistic rhetoric of 
nationalism.”57 
Walter Benjamin asserted “the logical result of Fascism is the introduction of 
aesthetics into political life.”58 I would add that the aestheticization of politics was not 
necessarily unique to fascist states, but instead was a means to cope with anxieties 
that resulted from the progression of modernity. Lutz Koepnick argues that politics 
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“becomes aesthetic in fascism because fascism explicitly utilizes the charismatic 
promise of Great Politics into a viable consumer good, a carefully designed and 
marketed product that appeals to dormant desires of modern consumers and window 
shoppers.”59 Koepnick adds that a political aesthetic of this sort was a “historically 
unique endeavor of breaking older bonds of solidarity while simultaneously rendering 
modern consumerism, including the consumption of charismatic politics, a privileged 
ticket to national rebirth.”60 While both Benjamin and Koepnick discuss the inclusion 
of militancy in the aesthetic of Germany and Italy, the fact that this was not seen in 
Fianna Fáil‟s rhetoric speaks volumes about the fact that the party was not fascist. Yet 
the inclusion of the aesthetic of national rebirth and “consumption” of the new 
nation—or in the case of Fianna Fáil, the renascent republican rhetoric—was fascistic, 
for Irish politics functioned within the same geo-political zeitgeist as Germany and 
Italy, and each was informed by similar anxieties. 
This is not to say, however, that Fianna Fáil was a fascist party. After all, the 
party actively sought to weaken and destroy the overtly fascist Blueshirt movement 
led by General Eoin O‟Duffy.61 Whereas the Blueshirts captured the militaristic 
element of fascism, the party failed to grasp the zeitgeist that informed and shaped the 
intellectual aspects of third-way movements. As will be seen below, Fianna Fáil was 
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adamant in its rejection of violence as a means to an end; rather the party was fascistic 
in the sense that it utilized similar means to advance its nationalist movements. 
Further, the purpose of this project is not to advance any theory regarding the 
secretive desire to construct a totalitarian, fascistic state. Rather, the inclusion of 
fascistic theory and historiography offers an insightful lens through which a greater 
understanding of Fianna Fáil‟s machinations can be gleaned. Further, the usage of 
such works affords greater contextualization to Fianna Fáil as not only an Irish cause, 
but a movement specific to the interwar era.
62
  
Aside from the rejection of outward, aggressive militancy, another point of 
departure between Fianna Fáil and the fascists on the Continent was that de Valera‟s 
party was not inherently anti-democratic. Despite assertions that de Valera was a 
“unique” dictator, Fianna Fáil was decidedly democratic as evidenced by its entry into 
the Free State Dáil.
63
 Further, as Lee notes, the appearance of the Blueshirts 
“permitted Fianna Fáil to pose as, and even to become, constitutionalists, defenders of 
law, order and majority rule against a militaristic threat. It thus enabled Fianna Fáil to 
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unobtrusively make the difficult subjective transition from rule by divine right to rule 
by majority right.”64 He adds, “had Fianna Fáil lost the 1932 election, however, it is 
not inconceivable that some of its constituent elements might have been tempted to 
lurch in a fascist direction.”65 Thus, it can readily be assumed that Fianna Fáil 
displayed fascistic tendencies in regard to its efforts to reconcile primitivist cultural 
nationalism with aspects of modernity, including industry and urbanization, as well as 
to deal with Ireland‟s colonial heritage. 
The aesthetic aspect to fascism—the art of the political—became the physical 
manifestation of the intersection between the modern and the ancient. In this sense, 
Fianna Fáil justified its existence through an electoral rhetoric couched in such 
traditional flourishes as promotion of the Irish language, evocations of past heroism, 
the elevation of a domestic virtue, and the advancement of Gaelic sport and literature. 
Like Germany and Italy, this embracement of an imagined past was emblematic of an 
effort to bridge a collective trauma—in the cases of Germany and Italy, it was the 
Great War, along with the internal strife that resulted from the nationalist movements 
of the late nineteenth century. For Ireland, it too had the trauma of the violence 
following Easter of 1916, not to mention the fact that a number of Irish citizens 
perished in the Great War. Such policy was not completely unique to Fianna Fáil, for 
Cumann na nGaedheal also advanced a rhetoric that promoted the Irish language and 
underwrote legislation that advocated growth and industry. Yet in “Gaelic Weimar,” 
mere legislation was not effective in the context of a global depression and offered 
little to combat the all-encompassing nationalistic juggernaut that was Fianna Fáil. Put 
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simply, Fianna Fáil recognized and sought to rectify the “problems” of interwar 
Ireland. 
Mosse notes that “analyzing the relationship between nationalism and 
respectability involves tracing the development of some of the most important norms 
that have informed our society: ideals of manliness…and their effect on the place of 
women; and insiders who accepted the norms, as compared to the outsiders.”66 His 
work underscores the importance placed upon the construction of appropriate 
gendered tropes by nationalist projects so as to advance the cause of the nation. 
Further, the ability to reconcile gender and modernity was a key component of forging 
an acceptable aesthetic. Mosse adds, “the dynamic of modern nationalism was built 
upon the ideal of manliness. Nationalism also put forward a feminine ideal, but it was 
largely passive, symbolizing the immutable forces which the nation reflected.”67 By 
providing “symbols with which the people could identify,” nationalist projects such as 
the one advanced by Fianna Fáil could harness the immense power of the nation‟s 
collective.
68
 The gendered corrective was key to Fianna Fáil‟s success, for the party‟s 
electoral dialectic with Cumann na nGaedheal began with the latter‟s assertions of 
feminized republicanism, forcing de Valera‟s party to counter by advancing a 
masculine rhetoric in order to neutralize the gendered charges by its opponents. As 
Mosse notes, “Masculinity provided the norm for society; its symbol had to send out 
clear and unambiguous signals.”69 Joan Scott identifies the significance of gender as a 
signifier in the “perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way 
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of signifying relationships of power.”70 And, for Fianna Fáil, there were two signifiers 
of power that needed correction: first, the aforementioned dialectic between itself and 
Cumann na nGaedheal, and secondly, Ireland‟s colonial relationship to Britain. 
Philippa Levine notes that such gendered representations of the colonized as “frail 
men” was “more than descriptive; it became a hierarchical ordering of quality, skill, 
and usefulness.”71 Thus, to undo this central aspect of colonialism, as well to build up 
a nation amidst anxieties regarding modernity, it became necessary to construct a new 
gendered binary that clearly defined aspects of society in a manner suitable to the 
nation-building efforts of Fianna Fáil. 
The use of fascist theory and historiography as a prism through which to study 
Fianna Fáil not only grants greater insight into the machinations of a party seeking 
alternatives to nineteenth century modalities, but it also demonstrates the means by 
which the party sought to assuage anxieties with its own troubled past. In the case of 
Ireland, much was needed to be done to “correct” its colonial legacies and the 
problems associated with its relationship to Britain. Fundamentally, Fianna Fáil 
offered an anti-hegemonic rhetoric both more subtle and more capable of dealing with 
the realities of the Irish Free State than had Sinn Féin. In its most essential 
manifestation, Fianna Fáil was a party making concerted efforts to remake Ireland in 
its own image, thereby correcting and altering the historical trajectories with which 
the nation was associated. 
● 
 This project is constructed in four body chapters as well as a concluding 
chapter. The first of these chapters focuses on the formation of Fianna Fáil and its 
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efforts to recuse itself from the associations with the militant Sinn Féin—an effort 
rooted in the gendered labels placed upon the republican effort by Cumann na 
nGaedheal. As Fianna Fáil chose to enter the Dáil, it willingly entered into a political 
contest with Cosgrave‟s Cumann na nGaedheal and in turn were forced to reconcile 
their past connections with the Irish Republican Army and the general wave of 
violence that had marked the period following the Easter Rising of 1916. In the period 
between 1926 and its first election triumph in 1932, therefore Fianna Fáil made a 
concerted effort to couch its political efforts in a rhetoric that was rooted in a delayed 
Enlightenment approach—that is they espoused reason and democracy as the 
hallmarks of a reconstituted Irish republicanism. Such was the effort to distinguish the 
party from the feminized irrationality of Sinn Féin. Further, the party took this 
approach to disassociate themselves from the “shadow of the gunmen” by advancing a 
rhetoric espousing pacifism and legislative reform. Through the use of such sources as 
correspondence between Eamon de Valera and Sinn Féin leader Mary MacSwiney, 
election ephemerae from both Fianna Fáil and Cumann na nGaedheal, and party 
manifestos, I will demonstrate: how Fianna Fáil situated itself within the frameworks 
of the Irish Free State in such a manner that allowed it both to operate successfully 
and to rescue the seemingly moribund republican cause. In turn, Fianna Fáil became 
the standard-bearers for a new republicanism grounded not in physical-force 
insurgency, but in rhetoric awash with themes meant to assuage an electorate with a 
clear disdain for rebellion. 
 Having validated itself as a legitimate party within the Free State Dáil, Fianna 
Fáil undertook efforts to construct an Irish republican masternarrative commensurate 
with its own aspirations. As the next three chapters will demonstrate, Fianna Fáil was 
actively concerned with defining what was acceptable and what was not acceptable as 
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an aspirational behavior for Irish republicans. At the same time, Fianna Fáil was both 
anti-hegemonic (British colonialism/Free State) and hegemonic (gendered 
nationalism). As such, the party sought to direct the energies of Irish women, 
enveloping them into the party‟s republican vision. After decades in which women 
had often been the public face of physical force insurgency—not to mention the very 
public spokespersons against the treaty—Fianna Fáil would attempt to refocus and 
shift the gaze of women in Ireland. Using examples from the women‟s page of the 
Fianna Fáil organ The Irish Press, chapter three examines the changing nature of what 
the party deemed to be acceptable behavior for Irish women. In a period of seven 
years between the paper‟s founding in 1931 and the ratification of the Constitution in 
1937, Fianna Fáil made a concerted effort to situate women within frameworks that 
did not reawaken the distasteful associations between republicanism and militant 
feminism. As such, the party envisioned women as the harbingers of the new 
nationalist ideal: domestic, old-fashioned, self-sufficient, and of the mindset where a 
free Éire was at the fore. Despite the continuous theme of a female-based primitivism, 
room was nevertheless granted to women to engage with such elements of modernity 
as modern fashions and party-sanctioned careers. Further, as the Economic War with 
Britain came to fruition, women were encouraged to participate—and thereby be 
afforded a sense of political agency—through a “buy-Irish” campaign where women 
were to fashion themselves and their homes with Irish products, thereby becoming the 
physical embodiments of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist aesthetic.  
 At the same time, Fianna Fáil used the economic conflict with Britain as a 
central cause belle, in order to define notions of masculinity through its glorification 
of the vocational male and of Irish manufacturing. In its earliest days, Fianna Fáil had 
made a concerted effort to de-gender itself as a means to remove the feminine—and 
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thereby negative—connotations associated with the republican movement in the 
1920s. Having succeeded, evidenced by its dual electoral victories in 1932, the party 
sought to cloak itself in rhetoric awash in a manly aesthetic that teemed with allusions 
to growth, active participation, insemination, and protection against the British other. 
Irish (republican) men were to follow the party‟s example and actively participate in 
the cause of forging an economically—and by virtue of inclusion, politically—free 
Ireland. This aggressive “war” with Britain represented Fianna Fáil‟s most ardent 
anti-hegemonic efforts, as well as its most hegemonic. This can be seen using 
dialogue between Seán MacEntee and Eamon de Valera during the Ottawa Economic 
Conference in 1932, election ephemerae, public rhetoric, and party propaganda 
utilized in such documents as the economically-tinged Fianna Fáil Bulletin. Whereas 
the party‟s views regarding the inclusion of women within the party‟s nationalist 
spectacle was about passive-aggressive support of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist aims, it 
sought to situate men in the traditional gendered dialectic of the active male in the 
hopes of destroying the remaining vestiges of Ireland‟s colonial ties to Britain as well 
as the Anglo-inspired Free State. 
 Having constructed a nationalist rhetoric that clearly defined acceptable tropes 
of femininity and masculinity, Fianna Fáil further defined that which did not fit within 
its masculine/feminine active/passive dialectic. At its essence, these efforts to 
distinguish what was unacceptable were tantamount to a queering of all things 
deemed unsavory, namely things most readily identified with Britain. By examining 
the depiction of political opponents as less than manly, the Eucharistic Congress of 
1932, and its relationship with Irish sport, the picture regarding Fianna Fáil‟s efforts 
to reconstitute the Irish nation become still clearer. The final chapter then concludes 
the dissertation and is centered upon an interesting dialogue between Fianna Fáil 
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ministers and representatives of Pathé films regarding celluloid evidence of notable 
party members and their involvement in the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War. 
The effort to suppress the material was tantamount to the party‟s efforts to both 
distance themselves from past connections to violence as well as to propell the 
nationalist republican movement forward. 
● 
 The success of Fianna Fáil‟s efforts to dissolve the vestiges of British political 
hegemony can be found in the British Parliamentary debates regarding the passage of 
the Éire Confirmation Bill in the spring of 1938.
72
 In the debate, it was clear that—
with few notable exceptions—Parliament was no longer concerned with forcing 
Ireland‟s hand regarding the custodianship of the Irish Free State. On 4 May 1938, 
Secretary of State for the Dominions Malcolm MacDonald quoted King George VI‟s 
response to the name change that was central to the bill:  
His Majesty‟s government in the United Kingdom takes note of Articles 2, 3 
and 4 of the new Constitution. They cannot recognise that the adoption of the 
name Éire or Ireland, or any other provisions of those Articles, involves any 
right to territory or jurisdiction over territory forming part of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or affects in any way the 
position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. They therefore regard the use of the name 
Éire or Ireland in this connection as relating only to that area, which has 
hitherto been known as the Irish Free State.
73
 
 
But, in his response to the eventual passage of the bill, the ardently outspoken 
opponent of Eamon de Valera, Winston Churchill, made the following plea regarding 
the bill: 
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An Irish Parliament, freely assembled, accepted the Treaty by a majority. That 
Treaty has been kept in the letter and the spirit by Great Britain, but the Treaty 
has been violated and repudiated in every detail by Mr. de Valera, quite 
consistently, because he had already rebelled against his colleagues who had 
made the Treaty in his despite. He has repudiated, practically for all purposes, 
the Crown. He has repudiated appeal to the Privy Council. He has repudiated 
the financial agreement. He claims to have set up an independent sovereign 
Republic for Ireland, and he avows his determination to have all Ireland 
subject to that independent Republic.
74
 
 
To which William Gallacher replied: “Good luck to him.”75 Such was evidence of 
Britain‟s attitude regarding the attempts by Ireland—via Fianna Fáil—to establish a 
state independent of British rule. The most interesting element of Churchill‟s tirade—
apart from its obvious vitriol—was the repeated acknowledgement that the current 
state of Ireland was the result of de Valera‟s actions. Granted, this might be indicative 
of Churchill‟s personal feelings toward de Valera, but the fact was irrefutable that 
Fianna Fáil had dramatically shifted Anglo-Irish discourse regarding the formation of 
an Irish republic. Was the Economic War won because of Fianna Fáil‟s mobilization 
of female consumers, or by its ability to best cloak itself in the rhetoric of manly, 
active, economic progressivism? Perhaps not. Yet, there is no question regarding the 
ability of the party to mobilize an electoral majority of the Irish nation to support its 
republican hegemonic efforts. 
 Further proof of Fianna Fáil‟s “moment” is best exemplified by the actual 
events surrounding the declaration of the Irish Republic in 1949. Conversations 
regarding the possibility of creating an official day of commemoration marking the 
formation of the Republic revealed just how much Ireland‟s political discourse had 
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been defined by Fianna Fáil during the Formative Era.
 76
 Fianna Fáil ministers argued 
in favor of basing the date of remembrance on the passage of the 1937 constitution, 
which in turn, became the constitution of the Republic.
77
 The debate then descended 
into a dialogue on a rash of gun violence during the Emergency—Éire‟s descriptive 
term for the Second World War—as well as discussions on the Civil War. Further, de 
Valera cited the Éire Confirmation Bill as confirmation of the 1937 Constitution‟s 
status as the true origin date of independence.
78
 The primacy of the Constitution, and 
in turn, the origins of the Irish nation was upheld in a rather incredible statement by 
the Fine Gael Taoiseach, John Costello
79
:  
When this Constitution was passed 12 years ago Deputy de Valera in a tour 
throughout the country asked everybody to read it, to study it and to learn it by 
heart. I venture to assert that that appeal fell on completely deaf ears. I want 
now the co-operation of every section of the community and of every political 
Party. What I want is the co-operation of every section of the community, 
every Party, so that that Constitution of which he is the author, if you like, or 
the sponsor, will be revered by our young people and that it will be the 
                                                          
76
 Dáil Éireann, The Republic of Ireland Bill, 1948—Committee (Resumed) 
Díospóireachtaí Parlaiminte, Volume 113, (2 December 1948).  
77
 For example, Aiken commented: “I object to the day on which this Bill comes into 
operation being called Independence Day. This Bill makes no fundamental change in our 
status of independence. The independence which we have here to-day will not be altered or 
improved in any way by the passing of this Bill. When this nation becomes united, and when 
the writ of the republic, which has been in existence for the last 11 years, runs over the whole 
Thirty-Two Counties, it will be appropriate for the Dáil at that time to name an Independence 
Day.” Ibid., 911. 
78
 De Valera, in one such example, declared: “We had no such thing in our practice. 
Our practice was simply, since 1937 or so, that five or six letters of credence were signed, of 
which the last I saw was in Irish, an Irish text signed by the King of Great Britain and Canada 
in his capacity as our agent and as a mark of our association with those States. That was the 
only practical thing that was done and as he was doing that as an agent he was in no sense a 
King of our country.” Ibid., 928-29. 
79
 John Costello (1891-1976) began his professional career as a lawyer—an endeavor 
that led to his appointment as Attorney General by the Cumann na nGaedheal government in 
1926. He was elected to the Dáil as a Fine Gael TD serving the south of Dublin. In 1948 Fine 
Gael earned enough seats—rather, Fianna Fáil lost a number of seats due to a republican 
rival—to form a coalition government, thus affording Fine Gael the chance to name a 
Taoiseach. Costello was the favored candidate amongst Fine Gael and Labour TDs, and was 
officially appointed Taoiseach on 18 February 1948, and served until 1951. Costello would 
again serve as Taoiseach between 1954 and 1957. Charles Lysaght, “John Aloysius Costello,” 
Dictionary of Irish Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 886-895. 
36 
 
Constitution of a State in which they can have pride and around which they 
can rally without the poisonous bitternesses [sic] infused into this debate by 
Deputy Aiken and his colleagues.
80
  
 
In essence, Costello was attempting to have Fine Gael take credit for the actual 
declaration of the Republic—a far cry from the party‟s anti-republican origins, not to 
mention the fact that Costello had vehemently opposed the bill to remove the king 
from the constitution. The mere fact that the declaration was created under the 
leadership of Fine Gael was demonstrative of just how much the nation‟s socio-
political frameworks had shifted during the Formative Era, as Fianna Fáil‟s became 
the central ideology on which Ireland operated. The rest of the project at hand seeks to 
demonstrate how Ireland reached this point through the machinations of Fianna Fáil 
between 1926 and 1938.  
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Chapter Two 
“An Act of Apostacy,” The Formation of Fianna Fáil and the Renascence of 
Republican Rhetoric, 1926-31 
 
To subvert the tyranny of our execrable Government, to break the connection 
with England, the never-failing source of all our political evils, and to assert 
the Independence of my country—these were my objects. 
 
To unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past 
dissentions.....these were my means. 
  -Theobald Wolfe Tone
1
 
 
 At the 1927 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, Mary MacSwiney denounced the “new 
departure” of Fianna Fáil, as having splintered from the rest of the republican cause. 
MacSwiney, once a close associate of Eamon de Valera and many other key figures of 
the new party, would soon come to embody the old vanguard of revolutionary 
republicanism. MacSwiney stated: 
Within the past twelve months certain of our colleagues inaugurated a new 
departure which would involve letting the Republic remain in abeyance for an 
unspecified time, while on certain conditions, the Free State Parliament is to 
be worked in the hope of giving that „Irish interpretation‟ to its acts, and 
winning the people back step by step to their true allegiance.  
 
But we have seen where steps and stepping stones have led already. In 1922 
when a way to peace was being explored Republicans refused to accept any 
agreement based on the acceptance of the Treaty position. Why should that be 
right in 1926 which was wrong in 1922? Yet that is what the new policy 
involves.
2
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Indeed, what was sacrosanct in 1922 for mainstream republicans was becoming 
increasingly negotiable in the wake of this so-called new departure. MacSwiney was 
rather prescient in her understanding of the meaning of Fianna Fáil‟s renegotiation of 
Irish republican discourse. In other words, she implicitly acknowledged the 
beginnings of a new phase in Irish politics during the postcolonial era. It was during 
this transitional phase from colony to independent republic that a new socio-political 
dialectic would emerge between Cumann na nGaedheal—the victors of the Treaty 
debate and civil war, as well as the party of government in the Free State until 1932—
and the re-imagined republicanism under the guise of de Valera‟s new party.  
 Beginning with its formation in 1926, Fianna Fáil found itself engaged in a 
two-front battle: on one side, they grappled with Cumannn na nGaedheal as the major 
parties within the Irish Free State; on the other, de Valera‟s party was enmeshed in an 
ideological confrontation with its former comrades as part of a larger effort to 
distinguish the new republicanism as a vital and sustainable cause within the 
democratic frameworks of the Free State. Complicating this latter facet was the fact 
that Fianna Fáil‟s electoral success was contingent upon its ability to distance itself 
from its revolutionary past. For Fianna Fáil, the period between 1926 and 1932 was 
one in which the party found itself engaged in a public battle to legitimate its 
existence by continually demonstrating its innovative—at least in Irish terms—
approach to republicanism. De Valera and his followers were in fact forced into a 
situation in which they had to rethink the very tenets of republicanism if they were to 
succeed in their ultimate goal of creating an independent state. Within the relatively 
popular Free State, this new departure played into Fianna Fáil‟s favor, as the party 
was, Eunan O‟Halpin‟s words, “unencumbered by impolitic absolutes, [and was] a 
party of reality in place of a party of dreams, one in which aspirational rhetoric would 
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complement rather than prevent participation in practical politics.”3 It is this 
“aspirational rhetoric” that will serve as the basis of the chapter at hand.  
 Following the defeat of revolutionary republicanism—namely Sinn Féin, the 
IRA, and such cognate organizations as Cumann na mBan
4—militancy had become 
distasteful and increasingly anachronistic within the Irish Free State. Bill Kissane 
writes:  
The transformation of the defeated opposition in the civil war into a 
respectable party of government that was the Fianna Fail [sic] of the late 
1930s is one of the most remarkable events in Irish political history. Not only 
did defeat in the civil war see the moderate section of the anti-treatyites enter 
the Third Dail [sic] on 11 August 1927, after coming to power in 1932, the 
leadership of the party embraced the very principle they had opposed in the 
civil war, majority rule.
5
  
 
The question remains as to why Fianna Fáil advocated democratic rule as they further 
distinguished themselves from their militant heritage.
6
 Further, how the party aligned 
itself with previous nationalist endeavors at the same time that it avoided the 
landmines that made those movements distasteful to the populace at large, stands as a 
considerable point of contention. Simply put, how was Fianna Fáil able, within a 
decade of what was seemingly a decisive defeat, to garner enough support for a 
republican renaissance, so that a republican state was inevitable rather than a high-
minded endeavor? 
 Knirck advances a thesis that early in the Free State‟s existence Cumann na 
nGaedheal was able to de-legitimize the republican movement by promoting a 
male/female dialectic in which the republican opposition was presented as irrational, 
emotional, and violent. He notes that Cumann na nGaedheal made much of Irish 
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women‟s “increasingly high profile within nationalist politics and were thus seen as 
critical cogs in the developing revolutionary machines.”7 Moreover, Knirck adds that 
“Cumann na nGaedheal politicians struggled to create a Free State/republican 
opposition and then blurred it with the more recognizable and resonant male/female 
opposition. In their quest to define a politics that excluded and delegitimized 
republicans, Cumann na nGaedheal defined a politics that excluded and delegitimized 
women.”8 The growing success of Cumann na nGaedheal and, in turn, the Irish Free 
State represented a victory for that party‟s gendered discourse. Concurrent with this 
was the decrease in interest in revolutionary rhetoric, which led to Sinn Féin being 
further marginalized in the political constructs of the Free State. While later chapters 
will explore Fianna Fáil‟s relationship with republican women, as well as the party‟s 
notions of masculinity, the present chapter will examine the methods by which Fianna 
Fáil sought to rethink and reintroduce republicanism to the Irish socio-political 
landscape.  
 By distancing itself from what R.V. Comerford refers to as “physical force 
insurgency,”9 as well as the feminized Sinn Féin, Fianna Fáil in turn embraced a 
delayed-Enlightenment approach to democratic republicanism where logic, the rule of 
law, and a general espousal of legislative insurrection became the means to both 
distinguish itself from previous incarnations of republicanism, and to engage more 
effectively in a socio-political dialectic with Cumann na nGaedheal. Such was the 
reality for a party revolting “against the tyranny of the dead.”10 Indeed, in the minds 
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of Fianna Fáil leaders, they, like the French and American revolutionaries, justified 
rebellion in terms of undoing a royalist tyranny that stood as a roadblock to the 
historical inevitability of freedom. As such, the period between 1926 and 1932 
featured Fianna Fáil promoting a party rhetoric which promoted a backward gaze, 
drawing upon elements of past nationalist movements in order to justify advancing 
Irish independence beyond the Anglo-inclined Free State. Fundamentally, Fianna Fáil 
attained legitimacy through its public rejection of the previous decade‟s militancy, 
clarifying its distinctiveness from Sinn Féin, and assuaging fears that a Fianna Fáil 
government would mean further bloodshed—despite Cumann na nGaedheal claims 
otherwise. The party further legitimated itself by advancing a socio-political discourse 
that advocated reform through legislative practice rather than militant revolution. This 
approach resulted in the renewed relevancy of republican discourse that would 
provide the foundations for an independent Irish Republic. 
 The advancement of a delayed-Enlightenment approach served not only to 
combat the party‟s gendered associations; it also created a distinct break from the 
revolutionary-republican approach of the IRA and Sinn Féin. Given the Irish public‟s 
distaste for further bloodshed, there was de facto support for the institutions of the 
Irish Free State. Additionally, Fianna Fáil found it necessary to abandon its top-down 
authoritarian approach toward attaining a republic, in favor of a more inclusive, 
participatory movement suitable for operation within an Ireland transitioning to 
relative autonomy. As Kissane notes, “after the civil war de Valera did not directly 
shift from an undemocratic position to a democratic one—he shifted from 
authoritarianism to ambiguity, and then to democracy.”11 Further, the entrance of 
Fianna Fáil into the political fray created a new two-party system which further 
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democratized the Irish populace, at least in terms of attracting potential voters to the 
electoral dialectic. However, as will be shown in later chapters, Fianna Fáil went 
much further, constructing a nationalist project, which, unlike Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s policies, was not interested in maintaining the Free State‟s status quo. 
Instead, Fianna Fáil adopted a discourse that aligned the Irish populace into gendered 
roles, making them active agents advancing the republican cause.  
 Fianna Fáil was born less from the politics of the civil war than from the 
failings of Sinn Féin republicanism to adapt to the relatively democratic constructs on 
offer in the 1920s. De Valera‟s new approach proved effective because the Anglo-
Irish trappings of the Free State enabled Fianna Fáil to present its republicanism as a 
movement of reform and program of reconstruction as a legislative, rather than 
militaristic, movement. What we find, therefore, in a study of Fianna Fáil‟s rhetoric in 
its first half-decade was that the party actively engaged Cumann na nGaedheal in a 
democratic dialectic, in direct contrast to Sinn Féin‟s guerilla-style of republicanism 
that sought reform from without. The most intriguing aspect of Fianna Fáil‟s 
reclamation of republican discourse lay within its efforts to recognize and adapt to the 
changing nature of Irish politics, thereby eschewing its disdainful connections to past 
militancy. Thus, one of the aims of this chapter is to demonstrate how de Valera and 
his party sought to advance a nationalist republican project from a position of socio-
political and economic anti-Anglo-Irish hegemony, as opposed to the anti-colonial 
militancy of pre-Free State republicanism.  
 Following the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War, republicanism was 
associated with war and violence, not to mention quixotic notions of external 
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association
12
 and, ultimately, complete independence from Great Britain. Specifically, 
Cumann na nGaedheal employed accusatory rhetoric to stoke public fear that a 
republican thrust meant further violence. Thus, de Valera and Fianna Fáil had not 
only to combat the albatross of militarism, but also the connections to an era from 
which the people of Ireland sought to escape. As such, Fianna Fáil was to spend the 
initial portion of the Formative Era demonstrating that it was not Sinn Féin—that it 
was not irrational, emotional, and most importantly not harbingers of a new belle 
Gaeilge. Ultimately, because of its ability to reconstitute republicanism as being 
logical, pacifistic, and democratic, Fianna Fáil emerged from the shadow of the 
gunmen to fully engage in the political dialectic of the Saorstát. 
 
“An Appreciation of the Position”—Fianna Fáil’s Trend toward the Pacific 
 Freedom from tyranny in the guise of monarchism, elevation of the cult of the 
electorate, rule of law, and an embrace of human reason as a progressive force are 
some of the hallmarks of Enlightenment thought. Phillip Pettit writes:  
Freedom as non-domination, as the French [Enlightenment] tradition spelled it 
out, required equality and indeed fraternity. It called for a scenario in which 
each could walk tall, secure in the knowledge that no one could lord it over 
them. Each could count on the support of others against any would-be 
dominating power. And so each could look others in the eye, seeing a fellow-
citizen there, and not anyone possessed of special privileges. No one had to 
live at the mercy of another, no one had to hang on the grace and favour of a 
lord…[Republicans] thought of freedom as the supreme political value and 
they equated freedom with not being stood over by anyone, even a benevolent 
and protective master. To enjoy republican freedom was to be able to hold 
your head on high, to look others squarely in the eye, and to relate to your 
fellows without fear or deference.
13
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By the 1920s, Enlightenment thought had permeated into the larger European 
masternarrative as the means to attain freedom, as well as the foundational aspects of 
the socio-economic discourse of many nations. In a word, these ideas were, without a 
doubt, legitimate.  What distinguished Fianna Fáil from its republican predecessors 
was the appreciation of Enlightenment ideology as a means to an end, as opposed to 
its being a construct to be put forth after the attainment of freedom. This difference 
speaks to the fundamental transformation within Ireland after the formation of the 
Free State—that is, between its, colonial and post-colonial condition. Credit must be 
given to those of the late 1910s and 1920s who succeeded in breaking many of the 
colonial ties between England and Ireland, thus enabling what was at least a 
marginally free Irish state. Such a situation opened the way for Fianna Fáil to evolve 
Irish republicanism from a revolutionary to a national policy. As such, an explicit and 
unwavering public discourse cloaked in Enlightenment notions of logic, freedom, and 
the advocacy of the will of the people was a key factor in allowing Fianna Fáil 
republicanism to reset the gendered albatross of its previous incarnation as Sinn Féin. 
In other words, it became the ideological foundation upon which the new party could 
most successfully combat the pro-Treaty—but not necessarily un-republican—
rhetoric of Cumann na nGaedheal and the Irish Free State. 
 The ability to present a clear vision of what an Irish Republic would entail was 
a key factor in determining the success of Fianna Fáil. While combating associations 
with the so-called “gunmen” was vital to granting peace of mind to those concerned 
about a renewal of bloodshed, de Valera‟s party was also clear in its intentions to 
achieve what they defined as an independent state through political means. Viewed 
through the prism of gendered discourse, the presentation of a new republicanism free 
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from the specter of revolutionary means represented an overall effort to reset the 
socio-political narrative of the Free State.  
In justifying its existence, then, Fianna Fáil borrowed much from the rhetoric 
and ideologies of Enlightenment-era thinkers and movements, finding validation in 
promoting the will of the people, the rule of law, and the virtues of Logic and Reason. 
It was in this sense that Fianna Fáil sought to expand the political debate in Ireland 
beyond the Treaty/anti-Treaty dialectic, and create something larger, and indeed, 
more participatory. Indeed, the ideologies of the philiosophes provided Fianna Fáil 
with its raison d’être; however, they did not necessarily guide the party in 
establishing its socio-political and economic platforms. As will be shown in later 
chapters, Fianna Fáil embraced a much more modern approach to widening its 
appeal—an approach distinct from the nineteenth-century liberal/radical axiom, and 
more in tune with the newer ideologies specific to the early twentieth century. The 
concern here, however, relates to how de Valera and his followers wedged themselves 
into the Free State‟s political dialectic.  
 Speaking to the inaugural meeting of Fianna Fáil at Dublin‟s La Scala Theatre 
on 16 May 1926, de Valera outlined the party‟s aims in a speech entitled “A National 
Policy.” In the early portion of the speech there appeared a section with the 
subheading “Appreciation of the position [sic],” in which de Valera was most clearly 
annunciated the party‟s new departure. He stated: 
We must not allow ourselves to be hypnotised by our own prejudices and 
feelings on the one hand or by our opponents‟ propaganda on the other. To 
underestimate our strength is even a worse fault than to overestimate it. We 
must not let our opponents dissuade us from attempting a task that is well 
within our power by suggesting that it is impossible…We must, if we really 
want to succeed, endeavour to judge the situation just as it is, measure our 
own strength against it, lay our plans, and then act with courage and tenacity.
14
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Judging the situation “as it was” enabled de Valera and his followers to construct a 
policy that abandoned romantic revolutionary pretenses, instead advancing a national 
project that was most suited to the realities of the era. This meant that the party would 
need to actively confront such issues as the Oath of Allegiance, the victory of the 
Treatyites, and in turn to concede that the Civil War was a thing of the past. For 
Fianna Fáil, fighting tyranny was something far more complex than positioning 
oneself against the British bogeyman; rather one had to confront the Cumann na 
nGaedheal/ Free State hegemony and all of its connections to England—real and 
perceived. This recognition of the situation “as it was,” as opposed to what it should 
be was one of the key differences between the pragmatism of Fianna Fáil and the 
idealism of Sinn Féin. 
 
MacSwiney, de Valera and the end of Independence-era Sinn Féin 
 For Fianna Fáil, to publicly break from Sinn Féin meant the disavowal of 
militancy.  However, there occurred a more private and far more personal effort to 
justify and legitimate the break from Sinn Féin. In essence, Fianna Fáil found itself 
fighting a discursive battle on two fronts—on the one hand they were challenging the 
authority and legitimacy of the political frameworks of the Saorstát and its party of 
government; on the other, they found it necessary to distance themselves from the 
radical Sinn Féin and the organizations with which the latter was associated.  
The formation of Fianna Fáil signaled the end of Sinn Féin in its 
Independence-era incarnation, and the ensuing decade would find de Valera‟s former 
party struggling to remain relevant. Indeed, de Valera envisioned the party as having 
ceased to exist in its original intent after 1921. Still, in this early phase of its history, 
Fianna Fáil engaged with Sinn Féin in a pitched battle over who could legitimately lay 
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claim to the republican moniker. Whereas in 1922 Sinn Féin could claim itself to be 
the republican party of Ireland, by 1932 Fianna Fáil had so successfully co-opted the 
movement that all of its printed matter proclaimed: “Fianna Fáil—The Republican 
Party.” My purpose here then is to detail what was essentially a rhetorical and 
ideological civil war between Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin—a war that marked the 
triumph of de Valeran republicanism and secured its socio-political thrust as the 
foundation for the future of Irish republican discourse. 
 A study of the struggle between old and new republicans reveals much about 
the distinctions between the two ideologies and makes clear the approach taken by 
Fianna Fáil. The largest point of contention between the two parties involved Fianna 
Fáil‟s entrance into the Dáil. More than anything else, the new departure polarized the 
two camps, with each arguing for the legitimacy of rival Dáils: that of the Irish Free 
State, and that of the Second Dáil which had drawn legitimacy from events transpiring 
before the treaty which ended the Anglo-Irish War. It is fair to say that the political 
platform espoused by Fianna Fáil was best suited to succeed within the democratic 
frameworks of the Free State. As such, by juxtaposing the republican movements, one 
can get a clearer picture of the wider scope put forth by Fianna Fáil.  
 In 1927, in a letter cited above, Mary MacSwiney challenged the new 
approach: 
 
We fully appreciate the work which Eamon de Valera has done for Ireland and 
the place which he has won for himself in the hearts of his countrymen. That 
makes his new policy all the more disappointing, but not even his personality 
can commend this compromise to us… 
 
For it is the proclamation of the Republic in 1916 and its constitutional 
establishment [in] 1919, that makes the new departure a matter of principle 
and a step backward.
15
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The irony of MacSwiney‟s letter is that it spoke of moving forward while anchored to 
the Republic of 1916/1919. Indeed, she was correct in asserting that the formation of 
Fianna Fáil represented a new departure, but in stating that the party was taking a step 
backward, MacSwiney‟s argument embodied the myopia shown by those who 
remained aligned to Sinn Féin policy.  
 Writing to fellow Sinn Féiner Michael O‟Donnell in 1927, MacSwiney 
suggested a renewed commitment to the militant anti-Britishness that had long 
marked Sinn Féin‟s policy. In a letter dated 25 April, she wrote: 
I believe that united action could be taken and that a majority could thereby be 
secured, provided that the Republican position can be safeguarded…In effect, 
Mr. de Valera is asking the people of Ireland and especially Republicans, to do 
now what we consistently refused to do in 1922, that is to „accept the Treaty 
position, but not the Treaty.‟ That is impossible for those who really believe in 
the Republic. Could not F.F. [sic] be brought to give up that part of their 
policy which makes united action impossible? […] 
 
Though I had no idea of it at the time Mr. de Valera was already discussing 
the Fianna Fail policy, so nothing was done.
16
 
 
The last portion of this statement is of the most interest, for it alludes to the fact that 
de Valera was already engaged in an ideological split from Sinn Féin as far back as 
1922. Indeed, de Valera‟s rhetoric and decidedly non-military positioning dated back 
to at least 1919 when he toured the country advancing ideas that he would incorporate 
into Document #2. Further, as MacSwiney‟s words highlight, Fianna Fáil‟s greatest 
challenge among republicans was to justify its entrance into the Dáil in such a manner 
that it would not appear that the party was acting the supplicant. In other words, 
Fianna Fáil could not appear as being weak and having accepted defeat, nor could 
they appear to be angry radicals bringing chaos and disruption to the Free State Dáil.  
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 In the months prior to the 1927 election, de Valera travelled to the United 
States in order to raise funds for what he hoped would be a Fianna Fáil-based 
newspaper and to raise awareness of and support for his new party. At the same time, 
MacSwiney worried that de Valera‟s turn in America had “muddled thinking,” by 
making speeches that were “out and out Republican. That and the name—[Fianna Fáil 
the] Republican Party—have deceived many.”17 Thus the political campaign for 
Fianna Fáil against Sinn Féin in the United States was conducted on two fronts—first 
being the money-raising effort, and second being the effort to encourage Irish-
Americans to embrace the party‟s new nationalist project. In other words, the move 
from Sinn Féin went deeper than just a political shift: it was intent on stealing away 
the right to be called the Irish Republican Party.  
 Splitting from Sinn Féin and choosing to enter the Dáil assured that Fiana Fáil 
initially would lack the numbers to win any majority in future elections. Fianna Fáil 
would, at times, find it necessary to form coalition governments in the 1930s and 
beyond, but they would be formed on evanescent partnerships with myriad minor 
parties such as Labour, or the Farmer‟s Party. Despite the republican kinship, Fianna 
Fáil would never form a coalition with Sinn Féin. This fact demonstrated the adamant 
stance de Valera took in refusing to be associated with the militant republicans, but it 
also sheds light on how Fianna Fáil was intent to be seen as a different kind of 
republicanism. So adamant were they—as seen below—that the party refused to 
consider any coalition with Sinn Féin, thus eschewing any possibility of forming a 
majority in the Dáil. 
This latter point may strike one as being rather anachronistic, for Sinn Féin 
was seemingly intransigent regarding its own policy of abstention from the Dáil. 
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However, a confidential letter written to de Valera by MacSwiney reveals that 
gestures had been made to reconcile the two parties to put forth a united, republican 
effort. Less than three weeks after her letter to O‟Donnell, MacSwiney wrote: 
  
A Chara
18
:- 
 
During your absence [in America] there has been, as I have no doubt you 
know, a great deal of talk, unofficial of course, about a possible understanding 
between your people and Sinn Fein. I have been approached on the matter and 
I have said, and I think most of my colleagues agree with me, that I see no 
reason why we could not join together and make a big effort, which I believe 
would be most successful, or a majority. The difficult is the minority position 
for which directly or indirectly I for one would not stand. It has been 
suggested that a majority is almost a certainty; that we could negotiate for that 
and make no stipulation about the minority; that if afterwards the minority 
resulted, and your people did things we could not stand by, we would not be 
responsible.
19
 
 
Two lines from this excerpt are particularly striking. The first is the aforementioned 
suggestion that Sinn Féin was willing to retreat from its policy of abstention and enter 
the Dáil, and second is the last line in which MacSwiney conceded the differences 
between the two parties by suggesting that the parties would be united as a majority, 
but divided in minority. It appears as if MacSwiney was suggesting taking this 
ideological „civil war‟ between the republican parties to the level of the Dáil and 
having the voters decide which of the two they preferred. Conversely, her plan could 
be seen as a political rehashing of the Irish Civil War, in which a united republican 
cause—however tentative—could destroy the Free State Dáil from within thereby 
securing an independent state. Further, MacSwiney suggested that a minority coalition 
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between Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin should retain abstention, but in majority, the two 
would violate their stance on the Oath. 
 MacSwiney continued in the same letter, but with a completely different tone, 
writing:  
That is what I call a Pontius Pilate attitude, and I will have nothing to do with 
it any how. You have declared that there will be no going into the Parliament 
unless the oath will be removed. There is not one chance in a thousand that the 
oath will be removed if you only get a minority. Would it not be worth while 
telling that to the people, and promising not to use the minority position this 
time in order that we might join together and rouse the enthusiasm of the 
people, which seems from all I hear possible to do at this juncture. That is why 
I write to you…[others] may not approve of my writing, but, I feel bound not 
to lose what seems an excellent chance for lack of this appeal to you. 
 
I have been told that your party are pledged to the minority position, I don‟t 
think that argument holds good in view of the situation with which we are 
faced, and you will forgive me if I say that the argument reminds me very 
much of Cosgrave‟s notion of his honour which binds him to keep word 
faithfully to England though he may break it with impunity to his own fellow 
countrymen.
20
 
 
The rhetorical flourish of calling de Valera Pilate is in line with the propensity by 
members of Sinn Féin to position themselves as martyrs. In this case, de Valera, like 
Pilate, was sentencing a visionary to an unfair death, thus demonstrating an ignorance 
of the True Word. Name-calling aside, it appears that in the second half of the letter 
MacSwiney rescinds her offer of a coalition, noting that a minority position would do 
nothing but destroy the republican cause, in turn giving greater strength to Cosgrave 
and the perception that he and his party sought to maintain ties to Great Britain.  
 De Valera responded with a pithy, terse letter four days later. He wrote: 
A Chara:- 
 
I received your letter on the 11
th
 inst. I am not going to give a complete reply 
because I have explained my position so often before.  
 
What you call the ‘minority’ position of FIANNA FAIL [sic] is an essential 
part of the whole program, and to give it up would be to cripple the policy as a 
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whole. Knowing your attitude on this question, and being as convinced that I 
am right as you are that you are right, I feel that we can only agree to differ. 
 
I do not know what SINN FEIN [sic] will do in the matter of preference votes 
in the coming elections, but we at any rate are determined to see that no 
Republican votes on our side are lost. It is a pity Sinn Fein cannot see eye to 
eye with us on our policy as a whole, for I believe that together on that 
program we would be almost certain of success. 
Do Chara, 
Éamon de Valéra.
21
 
 
One of the most striking elements of de Valera‟s letter is that he promotes the idea of 
Fianna Fáil as having a larger, more comprehensive movement that transcended the 
singular issue of the entering into the Dáil. Whereas Sinn Féin was most successful 
and vital in the chaotic years between Easter 1916 and the Treaty debates, its 
approach had become outdated the moment the Irish Free State was established. 
Militancy would not succeed in a country tired of war. The creation of a 32-county 
Republic would not succeed in a country where Unionists dominated in Ulster. A 
reactionary political discourse would not succeed in a country stabilized by the 
relative successes of the Saorstát government. De Valera understood this and knew 
that the only way to establish a republic was through larger, institutional changes. 
That is, republicans needed to do more than break the symbolic chains of British 
authority; they needed to destroy and rebuild the entirety of Irish socio-political and 
economic masternarratives. Operating outside of the Free State, using reactionary 
methods, could not work within the system accepted by the Irish public. Further, the 
final two lines of de Valera‟s letter suggest that he would only reconcile with Sinn 
Féinners if they would switch over to his perspective. Nevertheless, in the years that 
followed this exchange, Sinn Féin hardened its militant stance, repeating calls for an 
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armed uprising against the Free State and the British, essentially ensuring its spot in 
the political wilderness.  
 
From Document #2 to Pamphlet #2 
 In contrast, Fianna Fáil‟s most explicit expression of delayed Enlightenment 
ideology can be found in a pamphlet penned by Frank Gallagher under the rather 
unimaginative title, Fianna Fáil, Pamphlet #2.
22
 Throughout, Gallagher decried 
England‟s nebulous relationship to constitutionality, in turn connecting such 
vagueness to the Constitution of the Irish Free State. Citing constitutionalism as a 
prerequisite for order and progress, Gallagher wrote: 
A nation may enjoy prosperity and be at peace without international alliances; 
men can be happy and free without being members of a party or an 
organisation. But to the people making up a nation agreement is indispensable 
as to the rules under which their joint life is to be lived. Before they can have 
national or corporate existence they must decide upon the fundamental 
principles by which their common affairs will be directed, their common 
progress and safety assured, and their common ideals realised. If such 
agreement is lacking a nation slips back into tribalism.
23
 
 
In this particular statement, Gallagher called into question the validity of a nation 
derived from an imposed tradition, as opposed to one that emerges from the will of 
the people, essentially challenging the very authority and legitimacy of the Free State. 
Further, Gallagher was clearly advancing the Fianna Fáil party line that sought to 
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establish a discursive and distasteful Free State/Cumann na nGaedheal-British axis 
which in turn invalidated all that had been created in the wake of the Treaty.  
 The calculated, logical attack on the legitimacy of the Free State continued 
with Gallagher‟s assertion that, without a citizenry-derived constitution, a nation 
would degenerate into “a mob at loggerheads with itself.”24 “Where a people have by 
alien force been denied the exercise of their liberties,” he continued, “this unwritten 
Constitution has a more vivid reality, a more persistent influence. Because the so-
called Constitution under which such a people are governed is not the expression of 
their genius, their individuality, or their ideals, the unwritten Constitution more than 
ever dominates the national mind.”25  The struggle against a government derived from 
an imagined or coerced tradition was one of the hallmarks of Enlightenment-era 
thought.  
 The whiggish notion of human progress was a fundamental thrust of 
Enlightenment-era revolutionaries—an ideal that presented them as at the vanguard of 
human inevitability. In turn, Gallagher noted: 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, when feudal systems and absolute 
monarchies began to topple in Europe and America, the peoples had learned 
their lesson in much bitterness. They had learned that there must be one law 
that was fundamental, a declaration of rights with which all laws must 
conform, some infrangible [sic] decree safeguarding humanity of tyranny and 
absolutism. The need was so apparent that long before Louis goes to the 
guillotine, the popularly chosen Constituent Assembly of France has adopted 
the Constitution; long before Britain is driven out of America the Declaration 
of Independence, which is also a declaration of rights, is adopted at 
Philadelphia long before the guerrilla war reaches its full vigour and 
scope…in Ireland the first Dail Eireann has declared the freedom of the Irish 
people and its democratic rights (January 21
st
 1919).
26
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Apart from the direct connection to the American and French revolutions, there was 
an implicit notion that a genuine Irish constitution should be the inevitable result of 
the people‟s movement that began in January 1919. It is also worth noting that 
Gallagher chose 1919 as the watershed for Irish independence, as opposed to Easter 
1916. He added: “The freed peoples, having been made wise by long suffering, see 
into the future and know that the first act of a liberated democracy must be to lay 
securely the foundations of a free national life. The laying of these foundations is 
completed when a Constitution is drafted.”27 But who are these people, and to which 
nation do they belong? Using these arguments, the constitution created in the wake of 
the Treaty and enforced by Cumann na nGaedheal could arguably suffice; therefore, 
Gallagher found it necessary to make the case for a more purely Irish constitution. He 
based such arguments in what he called “The Force of National Tradition.” In order to 
stave off a return to tribalism or the continuance of Free State/English tyranny, he 
suggested a new constitution be created in the wake of an increasingly, powerful Irish 
National Tradition, something most assuredly not done by Cumann na nGaedheal. 
Gallgher wrote: “To devise a basic law for an old nation and in it to ignore the 
national tradition is folly. But to endeavour to impose a basic law, a Constitution, in 
flagrant conflict with this tradition is insanity. And so it is proving in Ireland to-
day.”28 
 Toward the end of the pamphlet Gallagher also made a clear distinction 
between the republicanism of Sinn Féin and that of Fianna Fáil. For the former, 
Gallagher implied that they lacked the imagination to mount a successful campaign 
for a new Irish constitution that did not stem from revolution or rely on an 
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abstentionist, and thus divisive, policy. Further, when placed in the context of a 
national trend toward a truly Irish constitution, the matter of the oath was nothing but 
a mere tyrannical blockade against the tide of progress. In a section entitled “An Act 
of Apostacy, [sic]” Gallagher stated: 
In face of this analysis it is clear that nobody who believes in Ireland‟s right to 
nationhood can take this oath, and that its taking is tantamount to a public act 
of apostacy [sic]to the whole national faith. It is not only an acceptance of, but 
a most solemn promise to preserve, the instruments forged by Britain for the 
destruction of that faith. Both „Treat‟ [sic] and Constitution, violate the 
national tradition and, consequently, cannot lead to peace in Ireland. Yet 
unless the representatives of the people abjure that tradition and swear to 
preserve these fomenters of war they are to be excluded from the Free State 
Parliament. They have no choice, therefore, but to stay out. But as long as they 
are forced to stay out the [sic] Free State Parliament can be nothing but the 
headquarters of an alien domination holding Ireland for its own profit. History 
teaches us that such a situation inevitably breeds war. Let the Free State 
Constitution stand as it now is; let the oath remain. Then the Irish people‟s 
only alternative is another national uprising.
29
 
 
Of great interest is the call for the Free State to remain intact. If one were to stop 
reading at this point, it might seem as if Fianna Fáil was calling for a new revolution 
led by the new republican party. However, in the next paragraph, Gallagher begins a 
new section entitled “Unite and End This Chaos!”30  
 For Gallagher, the act of apostasy was not necessarily the renunciation of the 
Free State Dáil, but rather a clean break from Sinn Féin‟s policy of revolution from 
without. To rebel again would destroy and alienate the “National Tradition.”  As such, 
Gallagher wrote: 
But all doors are happily not yet closed to the people. There is a way out 
besides the devastating way of the sword. That way is the drafting of a truly 
Irish Constitution and, as the first step towards the creation of an assembly 
capable of doing that, the abolition of the oath. These things can be 
accomplished under the pressure of public opinion…And if the Irish people 
united to end the imposition of disgraceful oath and false Constitution [the 
Free State] would fall as Jericho fell before the clamour of an unanimous 
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action. If the deputies were themselves in the name of the people to uphold an 
imposed Constitution what force could compel them to act otherwise? None. 
And the deputies elected by the people are the servants of the people and can 
be made obey [sic] the orders of the people.
31
 
 
Advancing the Fianna Fáil party line that the Free State was a British creation cloaked 
in Irish clothing, he wrote: “The Free State Constitution, like the „Treaty,‟ was made 
in London and was imposed from London. Documents having such an origin cannot 
and do not bind the Irish nation. Their origin and their nature are proof that the first 
duty of Irish nationalists [is] to get rid of them for the nation‟s sake.”32 Lest anyone 
think that he and Fianna Fáil were advocating war, Gallagher made a clear push for 
future struggles to be fought within the legal and peaceful confines of the Free State 
Dáil. The push for a legislative thrust that transcended both the oath and the Free State 
was neatly supported by Gallagher‟s claim that “Without a genuine Irish Constitution 
Ireland must live perpetually wasted by dissension.”33 
 Pamphlet #2 provided a basis for Fianna Fáil‟s public disavowal of Sinn 
Féin‟s physical force insurgency, while justifying intellectually the new party‟s anti-
hegemonic stance. More than about any other material from the period, Pamphlet #2 
did more to distinguish Fianna Fáil from the other republican movements of the early 
twentieth century in that it placed the party in a position that its ideology was realistic 
and rooted in the nature of things; a party advancing such a position was, in a word, 
electable.  
Ideology and willingness to accept the trappings of the Free State and the 
requisite oath were simply not enough to gain votes, nor does the pamphlet on its own 
explain Fianna Fáil‟s success in the 1930s. Still, in light of the gendered environment 
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of the 1920s, this pamphlet—representative as it was of Fianna Fáil‟s electoral 
rhetoric—did much to shed those elements of republicanism denounced by Free 
Staters as “feminized.” Absent from this manifesto were the call to arms; the 
arguments rooted in emotion; the commemoration of the “martyrs” of 1916; the 
pedantic conceit of holding the key to Irish freedom. Instead we find Fianna Fáil 
aligning itself with the liberal revolutionaries of France and the United States, where 
constitutionalism and national identity were manifest in the welling up of public 
motion. Granted, there is neither mention of heads on pikes nor of raids on British 
camps, yet the importance of aligning the Fianna Fáil movement to those of France 
and America was in that it gave the party relevance and legitimacy amidst the socio-
political atmosphere of Free State Ireland. Put simply, the pamphlet established 
Fianna Fáil‟s raison d’être as pushing for an Irish constitution to replace the nebulous 
Free State/England constitution.     
 In his address to the second Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, de Valera was most clear in 
his embracement of Enlightenment-style notions of logic, rule by law, democratic 
constructs, and progress. Early in the speech, de Valera defined the justifications for 
his party‟s envisioned republicanism, couching it in terms of national progress and 
destiny—no doubt a nod to the party‟s moniker as the soldiers of destiny. De Valera 
intoned: “I have often said that behind the State always is the people and the Nation, 
and if ever you want to build up a real lasting national movement it must be based on 
the welfare of the people…[and] if the Irish people get the right to choose their own 
governmental institutions without interference, that the choice they would make 
would be that of a Republic.”34 This statement represents a marked change from Sinn 
Féin rhetoric, where a republic was something to be earned through revolutionary 
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action, in turn being handed over to the people of Ireland. As such, this break from 
militancy as a means to an end was better suited for success within the already 
democratic Free State, not to mention more appealing to a populace ready to move 
beyond the violence of the recent past. This latter point was made all the more clearly 
when in the same address, de Valera stated that in order to attain a free republic, 
Fianna Fáil and its followers “must get a national agreement above that [Free State] 
constitution as long as it lasts, and the national agreement is an agreement amongst all 
parties that the representatives of the people, freely elected, free to meet without any 
political Tests of any kind, may decide by majority rule the national policy for the 
moment. I see no other way. It is either that way or the appeal to force.”35Another 
interesting aspect of this speech was how de Valera positioned both the Constitution 
and Cumann na nGaedheal as having a basis in British authority, like Gallgher noting 
both explicitly and implicitly that neither were of true Irish origin. Further, the 
rhetoric placed the will of the people as being of the utmost authority—a power that 
transcended colonial ties or party affiliation. 
  
“The Last Straw”—Fianna Fáil v. the Oath 
In the first national election held after the formation of the party, Fianna Fáil 
won forty-four seats in the Dáil, which forced the party‟s hand regarding its views of 
the Free State Dáil. The stumbling block was the requisite Oath, which, as we have 
seen, remained as the basis for Sinn Féin‟s policy of abstention. At the time many 
viewed Fianna Fáil‟s entry into the Dáil as an act treasonous to the republican cause, 
or at least an example of how de Valera and his party had betrayed the movement. 
Yet, a brief study of how Fianna Fáil justified its entrance into the Dáil gave the party 
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its first major opportunity to distinguish itself from Sinn Féin, especially in the way 
that it responded to gendered attacks. When the dust had settled, Fianna Fáil had 
demonstrated its willingness to operate within the frameworks of the Saorstát. 
Whereas earlier policy might have resulted in republicans threatening force as a way 
to combat the Oath, the new republicanism of Fianna Fáil grounded its contentions in 
legal proceedings and critiques of such a requirement.  
In response to the killing of key Cumann na nGaedheal party member Kevin 
O‟Higgins on 10 July 1927, which, although unsolved was blamed on radical 
republicans, with some implicating members of Fianna Fáil. Dunphy notes that 
“Although de Valera strongly condemned the murder, Cumann na nGaedheal, 
apparently convinced that Fianna Fáil‟s parliamentary abstention contributed to an 
atmosphere in which such murders took place, coupled a new Public Safety Act 
against the IRA…with an Electoral Amendment Bill aimed at Fianna Fáil.”36 One 
such bill required members of the Dáil to take an oath of office, and provided an early 
test to Fianna Fáil, namely its willingness to abandon Sinn Féin‟s policy of abstention. 
O‟Halpin notes that “de Valera had to choose between being consistent and being 
constitutional. The decision he made transformed the politics of independent 
Ireland.”37 In essence, the acts that resulted from O‟Higgins‟ murder forced the hand 
of Fianna Fáil and their approach to the Oath, as the party would be compelled to 
address the issue if it were to enter the Dáil legally. As a means to publicly combat the 
actions of Cosgrave and Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna Fáil printed the first issue of 
the Fianna Fáil Bulletin on 25 July 1927, in order to claim the actions 
unconscionable, and perhaps, illegal. Under the headline “War Upon the People‟s 
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Peace,” the paper read “By illegal exclusion of 45 Republican deputies, debarred by 
police and military force from taking their seats, the Cumann na nGaedheal Party 
manoeuvred themselves back into office despite the people‟s emphatic vote. They 
have now proclaimed war on the public peace.”38 The same editorial also claimed that 
these actions had invalidated the Free State Constitution of 1923. Under the 
subheading “The Last Straw,” the author(s) referred to Cumann na nGaedheal and 
their “revising” of the constitution as tyrannical actions, stating that the “Free State 
Constitution [can] now be declared to be less fundamental than a [illegible insertion] 
Emergency Bill but deputies who in the future swear to the Constitution swear in 
addition to the English King to Partition and to this latest most ferocious [action].”39 
The attacks on tyranny may seem more suited to a previous era, but they were vital to 
Fianna Fáil‟s claims to legitimacy. By presenting the party of the state in such terms, 
Fianna Fáil was able to appear as the more rational and less reactionary of the two 
parties. Further, by appealing to the will of the people, they added a greater sense of 
legitimacy for their cries of tyranny. Despite this, Fianna Fáil would eventually 
abandon their legal attacks against the Oath, instead choosing to rhetorically side-step 
the issue and address it from within the Dáil itself.  
In essence, de Valera‟s party shunned, even marginalized, the significance of 
the Oath as they chose to enter the Dáil, labeling it an “empty forumla.”40 In an 
untitled draft of a letter written by de Valera, the Fianna Fáil “chief” laid out the 
reasons for their change in policy. On behalf of the Fianna Fáil Deputies, he wrote: 
“They recognise that this legislation may imperil the general peace, that it 
disfranchises and precludes from engaging in any peaceful movement all Irish 
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Republicans who will not acknowledge that they owe allegiance to the British 
Crown.”41  Herein lay two assertions: first, that Fianna Fáil was placing the will of the 
people above that of party conviction, and second, that they had indeed abandoned the 
policy of abstention. In the closing refrain, de Valera wrote: 
Thus, if the signing of a meaningless political formula [i.e., the Oath] is 
sufficient to secure for them admission to their seats, the Fianna Fail Deputies 
feel it in their duty [sic] in this crisis to comply with the formality. On the 
other hand, they feel it is equally their duty to accept the consequences of 
continued exclusion if entry can only be obtained at the price of the transfer of 
their allegiance from the Irish Nation to the English King. They feel confident 
that their constituents, and all Republicans, will support them in their refusal 
to commit as public representatives what they must regard as an act of national 
apostacy [sic].”42 
 
The act of apostasy referred to by de Valera and Gallagher was the abandonment of 
Sinn Féin‟s hard-line stance toward abstention, as well as the latter‟s principled stance 
on the revolutionary republican Dáil which Sinn Féin had sought to legitimize. It 
appears that Fianna Fáil was more concerned with the public‟s distaste for militancy 
than any perceived contradictions of its representatives entering the Free State Dáil. In 
short, Fianna Fáil went to great lengths to assure the Irish people that they were in no 
way connected to the violence that continued in parts of Ireland.  
  
“Devvy’s Circus”—Fianna Fáil v. Cumann na nGaedheal and the Public 
Struggle Over the Gunmen 
  
From its establishment in 1926 Fianna Fáil continually struggled to remove 
itself from such associations, a struggle that was manifested in a very public political 
battle throughout the following decade. As the party of government from the 
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formation of the Free State up through a narrow loss in 1932, Cumann na nGaedheal 
took the tactical approach of attempting to weaken support for Fianna Fáil by drawing 
connections between the latter and the reviled “gunmen” of the Irish Republican 
Army. The connotation was that Fianna Fáil was a party of godless murderers intent 
on dragging Ireland into another civil war, or worse, a protracted confrontation with 
Great Britain. A study of the election material used by Cosgrave‟s party during this 
era shows that Cumann na nGaedheal continued to portray Fianna Fáil along gendered 
lines as irrational, emotional, militant, and thus feminized agents of disorder. 
Conversely, a study of Fianna Fáil‟s election material reveals a party making every 
effort to extricate themselves from this feminized label, in turn resetting the gendered 
discourse. 
 Underlying Cumann na nGaedheal‟s message was the perceived threat that 
Fianna Fáil posed to the Free State‟s sense of law and order. In a continuation from 
their rhetoric levied against Sinn Féin in the early 1920s, Cumann na nGaedheal 
positioned themselves as the manly custodians of the security and lawfulness of the 
Irish Free State. This theme continued up through the demise of Cumann na 
nGaedheal and served as the basis for the party‟s dialectic with Fianna Fáil. Such 
themes were evident in two electoral posters from the 1927 and 1932 elections. The 
first and most recognizable is a poster depicting a shadowy gunman looming 
menacingly over an unassuming, quaint rural Irish home. The words “The Shadow of 
the Gunman. Keep it from your home. Vote for Cumann na nGaedheal” implied that 
the party was all that stood between security and the feared gunmen.
43
 (Figure 2.1) 
Another example of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s effort to draw explicit connections 
between Fianna Fáil and the feared gunmen can be found in a poster centered upon a 
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drawing depicting card game and three figures sitting at a table, including de Valera, 
an upright and decidedly non-threatening “Saorstat Citizen,” and a shadowy figure 
labeled Saor Éire—Ireland‟s socialist party—and IRA.44 The most striking feature of 
the cartoon is the long leg of de Valera featuring the words “Fianna Fail” stretched 
out under the table passing a card labeled “the Joker” to the shadowy IRA/Saor Éire 
figure. Beneath the drawing are the phrases “Fianna Fail‟s Game. Don‟t let them 
cheat you! Vote for Cumann na nGaedheal.”45 Again we find a continuation of the 
theme that de Valera worked in concert with the militant gunmen that, according to 
Cumann na nGaedheal, were running rampant through the countryside. Further, the 
image was meant to show that de Valera and his party were working to undermine the 
purity of the Free State citizen. It is also worth noting the emphasis of the Irish citizen 
as being that of the Free State rather than of Ireland, connoting that the Free State, 
was the apex of Irish citizenry. This latter point is something that would be seized 
upon by Fianna Fáil in its own rhetoric, as the party would reify the notion of Ireland 
and its citizenry, thus negating any connections to Britain such as was seen in 
reference to the Free State. 
 One of the more recognizable images from this era was an election poster for 
Cumann na nGaedheal emblazoned with the headline “HIS Master‟s Voice.” The 
phrase was a replica of the famous advertisement utilized in England and Ireland by 
the Gramophone Company (later HMV) and RCA/Victor in the United States 
beginning in 1909 and featured Nipper the dog reacting to a realistic recording of his 
master.
46
 Beneath this was a drawing of a particularly effeminate-looking de Valera, 
                                                        
44
 Cumann na nGaedheal, The Joker, c. 1932, NLI, EC POL/1930-40/6. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 The image utilized by the Gramophone Company was based on an 1898 painting 
by British painter Mark Barraud‟s “Dog Looking at and Listening to a Phonograph.” Charles 
Bernstein notes that Barraud‟s painting “is iconic of the uncanniness [sic] of the human voice 
65 
 
with a Fianna Fáil card hanging from his hand, being held up by a shadowy gunman 
armed with two guns, each labeled “IRA” and “Saor Eire.” The connotation was that 
de Valera was a passive agent, indeed puppet, of the militant and radical elements of 
Irish politics. Given the connection with the Victor ad, a more vulgar interpretation 
can be ascertained, notably that de Valera was the IRA‟s and Saor Éire‟s “poodle.” 
Further, the phrase “HIS Master‟s Voice” suggests that de Valera and his party had 
been hijacked by extremists, but also that he and his party were really militant 
extremists hiding under the cloak of a thinly veiled neo-republicanism. Spanned 
across the bottom was the phrase “Make YOUR voice heard by voting for Cumann na 
nGaedheal.”47 This latter statement represented a fear tactic employed by Cumann na 
nGaedheal where it is implied that a Fianna Fáil government would somehow mean 
the end of democracy and the return of the perceived lawlessness of the previous era.  
 The propaganda published by Cumann na nGaedheal also offered more 
complex characterizations of Fianna Fáil than mere accusations of violence and 
disorder. In many cases, references to specific elements of de Valera‟s actions and 
republican events were included. One such example was a Cumann na nGaedheal 
electoral poster that depicted de Valera—“Fianna Fail” is emblazoned across his long 
arms—opening a door labeled “Constitution Amendment Act,” allowing the ever-
present IRA and Saor Éire gunmen access to a munitions dump containing “Dumped 
Arms,” “Mines,” and “High Explosives.”48 The poster simply reads, “Don‟t let this 
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happen. Vote for Cumann na nGaedheal.”49 Unique to this particular poster was what 
was dangling from the Fianna Fáil leader‟s coat pocket; a paper entitled “Document 
no.2,” a clear reference to de Valera‟s failed alternative to the Anglo-Irish Treaty50 
The connotation here is that the Free State under the leadership of Cumann na 
nGaedheal was a bulwark on behalf of safety and peace, as opposed to what Fianna 
Fáil would unleash in Ireland.  
 Perhaps the most striking depictions by Cumann na nGaedheal of de Valera as 
the harbinger of violence came in the form of two posters portraying the republican 
leader as the orchestrator of the death and destruction wrought by the Civil War. The 
first was entitled “Presented by the Artist to the Nation,” and depicts de Valera as the 
artist pondering a work of his own—entitled “Civil War by E. De Valera”—and 
features images of war and a city ablaze. (Figure 2.2) Dangling from the painting was 
a price tag with the figure “£33,000,000,” the estimated cost of damages from the 
prior conflict.
51
 Similar in theme, but more striking in its accusation of human cost, 
was a poster with the title “The dead who died for an „empty formula‟. Was it worth 
it? Vote for Cumann na nGaedheal.”52 (Figure 2.3) Above was a striking line drawing 
of a classic image of Erin, dressed in traditional Irish gowns, holding de Valera by the 
arm while pointing to a series of crosses—an image not unlike what was seen in the 
wake of the Great War—and featuring the names of prominent Irish nationalists who 
had lost their lives in the Civil War. De Valera has a look of shock and surprise, as 
well as an effeminate posture. Erin was his complete opposite, looking fierce and 
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stern. The names on the crosses are as follows: Liam Mellows, Erskine Childers, 
Seamus Dwyer, Sean Hales, Emmet McGarry, Cathal Brugha, Rory O‟Connor, and 
Michael Collins.
53
 It is somewhat ironic—if not anachronistic—that de Valera was 
labeled with the death of these men despite the fact that some were executed by the 
Free State government.
54
 The implication, however, was that the ultimate blame for 
their demise lay at the feet of their political leader. 
 In a similar vein, a Cumann na nGaedheal poster entitled “Oh Dry Those 
Tears!” depicted a weeping de Valera as having the body of a crocodile, eliciting 
misguided emotion over the destruction brought by the Civil War. (Figure 2.4) The 
subtitle “The cost of an empty formula” was common in Cumann na nGaedheal 
propaganda, and was a clear signifier of Fianna Fáil‟s militant lineage. In what is 
clearly a feminized depiction, through “crocodile tears,” de Valera apologized to a 
manly Irish laborer about the destruction wrought by the Civil War. But in an 
interesting twist, the worker, wearing an apron labeled “Irish Industry,” complained 
war had crippled Irish industry. As £33 million went up in smoke, the hobbled worker 
shook an angry fist at de Valera.
55
 The message was clear that emotion and ideology 
had been the great enemies of industry and manly Irish industriousness. Both posters 
demonstrate one facet of the larger battle Fianna Fáil would have to fight to attain 
legitimacy with the Free State electorate. It would have been disingenuous for the 
members of Fianna Fáil to simply state that they were not at fault for the Civil War. 
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More than anything, Fianna Fáil had to put to bed any notion that its new 
manifestation of republicanism would in any way rekindle the passions of 1921-22. 
 Although exaggerated in their claims, these posters were clearly meant to 
establish unease among the Irish populace about Fianna Fáil‟s militant past. The 
Cumann na nGaedheal posters depicting de Valera as the harbinger of death and 
destruction—both corporal and financial—were intended to draw a clear line from the 
Civil War to what the Treatyite party saw as a renamed manifestation of Sinn Féin 
and the IRA. In essence, the past was used to cause unease about the very presence of 
de Valera on the public scene. But, what would a Fianna Fáil state look like according 
to Cumann na nGaedheal? One vision was presented in a poster that declared: “No 
Goods Taken From Window! Supplies from Goods Stores Only.”56 (Figure 2.5) 
Situated above this declaration was an image of de Valera dressed as a shopkeeper, 
offering key Fianna Fáil policies disguised as “goods,” such as “No Oaths Taken,” 
“High Tariffs,” “Land Annuities” and “De-Rating Schemes.”57 To the side of de 
Valera, standing in a side door was a masked gunman watching over a store of arms 
including rifles and “bombs for jurymen.”58 In this case, Cumann na nGaedheal was 
making a literal case that Fianna Fáil was a front for violent revolutionaries intent on 
bringing violence and disorder to Ireland.  
As seen above, Cumann na nGaedheal sought to position itself as a law and 
order party, one that maintained peace and accord not only within Ireland, but with 
England as well. Herein lay Cumann na nGaedheal‟s second point of attack against 
Fianna Fáil—they were the same old revolutionaries as 1916 and 1921, and their 
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election into government would result in a renewed conflict with Britain. Moving 
from connotations of past connections with the civil war, Cumann na nGaedheal 
sought to portray Fianna Fáil as a political branch of the IRA. Considering the 
connections between Sinn Féin and the IRA—not to mention Fianna Fáil‟s still 
ambivalent relationship with the IRA—Cumann na nGaedheal needed little effort to 
depict de Valera and his followers as revolutionaries launching a new directive 
against the Free State and England. In this sense, Fianna Fáil had to free itself from 
the stigma of the gunmen. 
 Another election poster, likely from 1932, sought to incite the fear that Fianna 
Fáil was a party that lacked the seriousness and integrity to warrant election into 
power. (Figure 2.6) The very large poster was a mock-up of the type of poster used to 
promote a travelling circus, in this instance “Devvy‟s Circus.” In an unambiguous 
reference to de Valera‟s mixed ancestry—his mother was Irish-born and his father 
was a Spaniard she met in the United States—the words “Senor De Valera [sic]” were 
in very large print, clearly meant to catch the eye of the passerby, followed in smaller 
type with a description of him as a “World Famous Illusionist, Oath Swallower, and 
escapologist. See his renowned Act: „Escaping from the Strait Jacket of the Republic‟ 
Everyone Mystified!!”59 Above this is included a series of phrases, reading: 
“Absolutely the Greatest Road Show in Ireland To-Day!” “57-Star Performers-57” 
“Will visit this town any time between now and the General Election!”60 To the 
reader, the seriousness of Fianna Fáil was being brought into question. Most telling 
was the phrase “Escaping from the Strait Jacket of the Republic,” which connotes that 
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de Valera was somehow utilizing circus tricks—a type of chicanery not described in 
the poster—to escape from his past as a key figure in the 1916 Rising, and the subtle 
reference to the destruction which followed; an anachronistic claim considering that 
many of the key members of Cumann na nGaedheal were sympathetic—if not 
actively involved—with the declaration of the 1916 Republic. Adding to the notion 
that Fianna Fáil was a party comprised of men willing to change on a whim, thereby 
proving to be unstable was the listing of “circus” performers, who were all members 
of the party. For example: “Frank Aiken: The fearsome FIRE-EATER. See him Make 
Faces at the British Lion!” 61  “Johnny Magintee: Fresh from the Gold Rush. In „On 
Again! Off Again! Gone Again! Done Again!”62 “Monsieur Sean Lemass: Famous 
tight rope performer. See him cross from the Treaty to the Republic on the tight-rope 
every night. Marvellous [sic] performance.” 63 The poster concludes with call of 
“Performing Frogs Champion Croakers!” “Marvellous [sic] trained sheep!” “By 
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special request the Senor will try his fifth chance at the Greasered Poll.”64 Taken as a 
whole, this poster exemplified the effort by Cumann na nGaedheal to portray key 
figures of Fianna Fáil as irrationally and foolishly anti-British, with a history of 
vacillating between a pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty stances, or as failures making 
numerous attempts to awe their followers with deceit and conceit. Most telling, 
however, was the presentation of followers of the party as thoughtless sheep blinded 
by the spectacle of Fianna Fáil. Like a circus, Fianna Fáil was being portrayed as 
mindless, evanescent entertainment, and thus untrustworthy and dishonest.  
 Another Cumann na nGaedheal election poster from September of 1927 
continued the theme of portraying Fianna Fáil as harbingers of an empty rhetoric that 
would ultimately yield no results. The sparse poster depicted a large chicken with a 
stereotypical rendering of de Valera—stern, large nose, glasses—looking sadly upon a 
cracked and empty eggshell, across which was written: “The Empty Formula.”65 
(Figure 2.7) Below the egg were the words “The hen that took 5 years to lay an egg, 
and then it was empty. Vote for Cumann na nGaedheal.” In light of the assertion that 
Cumann na nGaedheal exerted great effort to feminize the republican cause, there are 
two notable facets about this particular poster. The first advanced the themes of de 
Valera and his party as the unpleasant and illogical choice, depicting a hen—a female 
chicken—who was, moreover, infertile. The second notion was that Fianna Fáil‟s 
platform, borne of the Treaty debate and Civil War, was as empty in 1927 as it had 
been in 1922. The conclusion made for the Irish voter was that de Valera and his 
“hatched” republicanism was as hollow as it had been five years prior, but most 
importantly, as there was no “chick,” Fianna Fáil‟s ideals would never mature—
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indeed, they had never truly existed in the first place. Additionally, the depiction of de 
Valera as a hen brings to mind Angela Bourke‟s assertion that “In storytelling, and in 
written reminiscences of rural life, we also find a recurring analogy between 
resistance to the keeping of hens and resistance [by men] to women‟s speech. That 
hens make too much noise, and that women talk too much, is a familiar theme in 
men‟s traditional storytelling.”66 
 Although they were in power, the level of vitriol expounded by Cumann na 
nGaedheal suggests that Cosgrave‟s party deemed Fianna Fáil to be a serious electoral 
threat. Even in the early days of the party, the presence of Fianna Fáil became a 
lightning rod in which all aspects of the political debate revolved around the 
republicans‟ rhetoric. In other words, the republican movement, whether it was Sinn 
Féin or Fianna Fáil, remained a powerful force throughout the life of the Irish Free 
State. Furthermore, the issue of republicanism‟s fate was indeed the central element 
directing Irish political debate. Yet, in the years leading up to its electoral triumphs in 
1932, 1933, and 1937, Fianna Fáil had to constantly weather severe attacks that were 
geared along gendered lines. Accused of being irrational, violent, treasonous, and 
equivocating, the party embraced a public discourse that incessantly distanced itself 
from the type of republicanism that had been made irrelevant by historical events, 
and, by extension, undermined the propaganda and rhetoric of the pro-Treaty Cumann 
na nGaedheal.  
 In its first five years of existence, Fianna Fáil could not equal Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s aesthetic attack. It would take roughly four years before Fianna Fáil was 
able to equal the types of images explored above, but when it responded, Fianna Fáil 
engaged with these charges of violence and irrationality. A cartoon from the 15 
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February 1932 edition of the Irish Press demonstrates the manner in which Fianna 
Fáil would not only mock Cumann na nGaedheal‟s accusations, but also weaken the 
affect of such posters as “Devvy‟s Circus,” and the “Shadow of the Gunmen,” which 
appear in the cartoon. (Figure 2.8) The artist “Bee” depicted an “Ex-Unionist” 
standing before a room filled with well-fed, monocle, and formally dressed males, as 
saying: “Mr. Cosgrave has not been returned, but our money has been well spent. As 
you will see, it has been employed by Cumann na nGaedheal to defame the natives far 
better than we used to do it.”67 Simply put, the broadsides studied above had little 
impact on Fianna Fáil, other than to shape the party‟s rhetoric and to form a 
foundation from which they could launch their own attacks on Cumann na nGaedheal.  
 
“Unscrupulous Propaganda”—Fianna Fáil’s Reasoned Reply 
As shown above, Cumann na nGaedheal utilized a particularly pointed 
aesthetic attack on the electability of Fianna Fáil. Initially, Fianna Fáil deflected these 
accusations by responding with speeches and pamphlets—such as Pamphlet #2—
relying mostly on public events and print media reports on these events to engage 
Cumann na nGaedheal. To be sure, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s efforts to associate 
Fianna Fáil and the “gunmen” had achieved some success, as evidenced by the direct 
references to these themes within Fianna Fáil‟s own election propaganda. One such 
case was a poster with the title “Unscrupulous Propaganda,” with the subtitle “Here is 
a copy of a leaflet issued by Cumann na nGaedheal during the elections.”68 Centered 
on the poster is a copy of a Cumann na nGaedheal leaflet, which is bookended by the 
words “You Know the Facts.” The text of the Cumann na nGaedheal piece reads: 
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“Shot dead. A Cumann na nGaedheal Candidate and a Detective Officer were on 
Sunday in Leitrim. Shot Dead. While canvassing for support. You can rout the 
gunmen by supporting Cosgrave & Redmond and voting Blythe Brady.”69 The bottom 
of the poster read: “Do you think a party that would stoop to such methods is worthy 
of your support? Vote for the Fianna Fáil candidates.”70 Although there are similar 
examples of Fianna Fáil repudiating the claims of its opponents, de Valera and his 
party utilized a much more public, perhaps more cerebral, approach in responding to 
the claims of Cosgrave‟s party. 
For instance, at the party‟s first Ard Fheis in November of 1926, Eamon de 
Valera stated: 
 
I have never said, and am not going to say now, that force is not a legitimate 
weapon for a nation to use in striving to win its freedom. I know that in history 
it is seldom that foreign tyrants have ever yielded to any other. I have believed 
and still believe, that if a nation held in subjection by a foreign power were to 
exclude altogether the idea of using physical force to free itself, it would in 
effect be handing itself over as a bound slave without hope of redemption. It is 
a long wait they destine themselves to who rely on their tyrants spontaneously 
suffering a change of heart. 
 
But a nation within itself ought to be able to settle its polity so that all 
occasion of civil conflict between its members may be obviated, and NO 
NATION WHICH EVEN PRETENDS TO FREEDOM WILL SUFFER A 
FOREIGN POWER TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE THE 
ADOPTION OF SUCH A POLITY IMPOSSIBLE.”71 
 
In this short passage, de Valera is able to construct a rhetorical distinction between the 
republicanism of Sinn Féin and that of his own party. By acknowledging the 
legitimacy of force as a means of escaping foreign tyranny, he lauded the efforts of 
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previous revolutionaries, yet at the same time he is clear in noting that this was 
effective in the past, but had no place in Fianna Fáil‟s vision for Ireland‟s present. In 
the next paragraph de Valera firmly stated that force had no place in Ireland, thus 
acknowledging the belief that he and his party viewed the nation as being in a 
transitional phase between colony and complete independence. The significance of 
such a position was that it allowed Fianna Fáil to develop a socio-political and 
economic discourse that would operate within the frameworks of the Irish Free State, 
thereby abandoning the abstentionism and militancy of Sinn Féin and other hardline 
republican offshoots.  
 Returning to Pamphlet #2, we find another rejection of violence as a tenable 
option for establishing an Irish republic. With the Civil War still fresh in the public‟s 
mind—not to mention being incessantly resuscitated by Cumann na nGaedheal and 
republican militant groups—Fianna Fáil had to clarify its role in the causation and 
fighting of the war.  Gallagher contended that the root cause of the Civil War was not 
militant republicanism, but rather that the Treaty that “had already filled the nation 
with dissension.”72  He further asserted that the Treaty “outraged the national tradition 
by destroying Ireland‟s age-old nationhood and substituting for it that which has for 
centuries been most loathsome to Irish nationalism—the domination of the British 
monarchy.”73 In a clever twist that played into the anti-British rhetoric of Fianna 
Fáil‟s nationalism, Gallagher did not blame Cumann na nGaedheal for orchestrating 
the civil war, but rather claimed that they were duped by the duplicity of Prime 
Minister Lloyd George. Under a heading entitled “A Constitution Based on Civil 
War,” Gallagher wrote: 
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Had Prime Minister Pitt sat in Mr. Lloyd George‟s place when the 
Constitution was under revision in London in 1922 he could not, in the 
circumstances of the time, have produced a document better calculated to 
divide our people. The Articles of Agreement for a Treaty which in the 
Preamble are made the real Free State Constitution had already proved their 
power not to unite the nation but so completely and thoroughly to divide it as 
to make Civil War possible after six months. How better could any British 
statesman secure the permanent weakening of Ireland by internal disunion 
than by declaring that to be the fundamental law which had already cast the 
whole nation in conflict and confusion [?]
74
 
 
What Gallagher did, in essence, was to establish a causal link between Britain and the 
Civil War, implicitly questioning the courage and wisdom of those Irishmen 
responsible for the Treaty and the resultant constitution. Further, Gallagher‟s 
assertions undermined the logic of all things associated with the Free State 
constitution as being inherently divisive, thereby enabling Fianna Fáil to interact with 
an entity that held no validity. Indeed, the most significant element of this passage 
was tantamount to Fianna Fáil‟s attempt to establish a very public disconnect between 
their party and the outbreak of the war. 
 From its inception, Fianna Fáil sought to foster a new socio-political and 
economic dialectic that moved beyond the militancy of the previous decade. As such, 
the formation of the party could be presented as the beginning of a new era in Irish 
history; thus the time between 1926 and 1937 served as a transition from the Civil 
War era to that of a fully independent state. In many ways, Cumann na nGaedheal 
represented an Ireland that was born of the Civil War and Treaty Debate—not to 
mention retaining some connections to Britain—whereas Fianna Fáil advanced a 
movement that sought to break from this narrative, in turn creating a new republican 
masternarrative. De Valera‟s closing speech from Fianna Fáil‟s first Ard Fheis made 
this break explicit. Speaking of a leaderette in the Irish Independent from that 
morning which accused of Fianna Fáil of representing a shadow of the once-bloody 
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fight, de Valera responded: “I ask who is responsible for its remaining? I simply point 
to it as an objective fact…Those who complain that the „shadow of the bloody fight‟ 
remains must point their accusation elsewhere. It remains because human nature is 
what it is, because national aspirations are natural to men. I have done nothing but 
point out the facts.”75 While justified at certain times—even in Ireland‟s past—force 
was a means to an end, but in de Valera‟s view, the Free State precluded the need for 
further bloodshed. Militancy and force—in the figurative, rather than literal sense—
was something that was not without place in the rhetoric of Fianna Fáil. Indeed, 
militaristic organization and activist rhetoric were to be key elements for de Valera‟s 
party as it advanced its nationalistic republican cause throughout the decade. In 
referring to the renascence of the republican movement, de Valera stated: “We have 
rallied ourselves and have already made wonderful progress in rallying the whole of 
the national forces. These forces were scattered, but they were not annihilated. In a 
short time they will be as stout an army as ever, and every success will increase their 
morals.”76  
 Still, in relation to its political dialectic with Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna 
Fáil republicanism needed to be made distinct from Sinn Féin republicanism. 
Although the rhetoric of the party aligned Fianna Fáil along a continuum of 
nationalist heroes, it had to tread carefully its problematic associations with Sinn Féin 
and the more recent past. Whereas Cumann na nGaedheal sought to draw an 
unequivocal line connecting Fianna Fáil to Sinn Féin, de Valera and his party sought 
to add greater nuance to the past. Building on his speech from the first Ard Fheis, de 
Valera made a much more explicit statement regarding the connections—or lack 
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thereof—between Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin in 1927. Speaking at the party‟s second 
Ard Fheis, de Valera stated:  
To free a country that has been in the oppressive grip of a big Empire for 
seven centuries is not a light task. It can only [be] performed if we are firm 
and conscientious and if we feel that we can start again and build up from the 
foundations. We are building up solidly from the foundations, and we have 
built up and established to-day—and I hope it will prove to be an organisation 
of destiny—and an organisation which is a fitting successor to the great Sinn 
Fein Organisation which exited from 1917 to 1921.”77 
 
The last sentence of this quotation is rather curious, considering the fact that de 
Valera was president of Sinn Féin after 1921, yet it is more understandable if we view 
the statement through the prism of his vision for Fianna Fáil. In essence, de Valera is 
claiming that Sinn Féin had ceased to be vital after 1921 with the formation of the 
Irish Free State, for the militancy that created it was no longer vital to the greater 
cause of creating an independent republic. Therefore, Sinn Féin was no longer a 
viable entity within the frameworks of the Irish Free State. Yet, it was on this 
incarnation of Sinn Féin the united revolutionary entity that had opposed the 
foreigner, and not that of the abstentionist/militant Sinn Féin of the mid-1920s, that de 
Valera sought to lay as his party‟s historical foundation. At the very heart of this 
speech was the notion that Fianna Fáil marked a new departure for the republican 
movement, as well as an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Saorstát.  
 The acceptance of the Free State as a real and functioning state provided the 
starting point for Fianna Fáil in its efforts to operate as a “slightly constitutional 
party,” for the very machinations of the organization were rooted in the plan to form a 
majority within the Free State Dáil and then destroy it from within, thereby creating a 
new Irish state. As such, Fianna Fáil—from its inception—wrapped itself in the cloak 
of innovation, a truly new departure for the Ireland of the 1920s and beyond. In the 
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same speech given in 1927, de Valera was explicit in his claims that the party was 
formed with an eye toward the future: 
The circumstances, however, in which this organisation has to perform its 
task, are not the same circumstances as those in which we had to fight then, 
and if we are going to succeed it will be using at each particular moment, as I 
have often said, the methods which seem best at that moment for the success 
of our task. When circumstances change, methods much change; but the thing 
that has not changed is the aim, and that aim is to secure the complete freedom 
of this country; and we know that, no matter how they might alight it as a 
mere form, the form in which that aim will express itself is that of an 
independent republic.
78
 
 
The themes of rebirth and renewal are essential to understanding the nature of Fianna 
Fáil‟s renascent republicanism in the Formative Era. Party leaders envisioned their 
new project as the beginning of a socio-political and economic trajectory headed 
toward establishing a state independent of both the long durée of the British conquest 
and also the short durée of the Irish Free State.  Thus, Fianna Fáil would concern 
itself with constructing an innovative and expedient party discourse suitable for the 
exigencies of both the Irish Free State and interwar Europe. 
 The examples above make it clear that Fianna Fáil was cognizant of how they 
were cast as irrational militants by Cumann na nGaedheal. As such, de Valera‟s party 
was explicit in its effort to distinguish themselves from the militant republican past. 
As Knirck has demonstrated, Cumann na nGaedheal did much to build strength within 
the Free State by casting the republican movement in feminine terms—a trend 
continued through the image of Fianna Fáil as the harbingers of a renewed 
commitment to the policy of the gunmen. As has been shown, Fianna Fáil went to 
great lengths to distance itself from this association. Another aspect of the party‟s 
discourse can be found in their promotion of a logical, delayed-Enlightenment 
approach to such controversial issues as its entrance into the Dáil and the ensuing 
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battle over the Oath of Allegiance. From one perspective, this can be seen as a gender 
neutralization of sorts, in which the party sought to dissolve any feminine 
connotations at the same time it embraced a more active, reasoned masculine 
cloaking. 
 
CODA 
 On 9 November 1932, de Valera addressed the sixth Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis—
the first since the party had attained a coalition government in the Free State Dáil. The 
speech reflected the entrenchment of the party‟s republican approach, but it also 
foreshadowed its embracement of a policy of action and rhetoric of institutional 
change. De Valera stated: 
This organisation of FIANNA FAIL was founded primarily to provide a path 
to peace and to the ultimate victory for which a common understanding and an 
agreed national policy is the first essential. The pillars on which the policy of 
the organisation rest are: the acceptance of the vote of the majority of the 
people‟s elected representatives as deciding national policy, and the abolition 
of the oath which at present prevents a section of our people from having 
representation in the representative assembly. 
 
Recent elections have shown that the people have come to appreciate the fact 
that we are really the Party of peace, and that our programme is the one which 
promises the most satisfactory solution of the national problems with which 
we are confronted. It is not improbable that before the next Ard Fheis 
assemble the representatives of this organisation will have placed upon them 
the responsibility of guiding the nation and governing that portion of it 
included in the twenty-six counties.
79
 
 
In essence, this speech serves as a rhetorical transition from the period of the 1927 to 
1932 when Fianna Fáil was fighting for legitimacy in its dialectic with Cumann na 
nGaedheal. Further, the speech established that the notion of republicanism and the 
will of the people—an Irish Enlightenment of sorts—had become an indisputable fact. 
By looking backward, Fianna Fáil was successful in its bid to rightly align itself 
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among the pantheon of Irish nationalist efforts, at the same time avoiding the pitfalls 
of the unpopular and distasteful associations with militant republicanism. Put simply, 
Fianna Fáil had succeeded in creating a political discourse suitable for operation 
within the Irish Free State. However, as de Valera alludes, the problems of governing 
in 1932, as well as the overall goal of attaining an independent state necessitated that 
Fianna Fáil adopt innovative measures to attain such a lofty ideal.  
 The threat of gunmen and the gendered discourse of Cumann na nGaedheal 
had been effectively neutralized by the machinations of Fianna Fáil in the period 
between its formation and its election—as a coalition—into government in 1932. This 
was in large part due to the ability of the party to effectively deflect the attempts made 
by Cumann na nGaedheal to construct a direct link between the two republican 
movements. Indeed, the positions taken above are meant to explain how Fianna Fáil 
was able to withstand the slings and arrows of Cosgrave‟s party in such a manner that 
they were able to attain electoral legitimacy within the Irish Free State. However, this 
alone does little explain the appeal of Fianna Fáil as an alternative for the Irish voter. 
Lest one thinks that Fianna Fáil was solely whiggish in its intent, one need only 
examine the party‟s policy during its initial period as head of a Free State coalition 
government. Notions of logic, reason, and constitutionalism served largely as agitprop 
so that the party could carve itself a niche within the Free State‟s political realm. This 
backward embrace of eighteenth-century ideology represented only a portion of the 
party‟s larger discourse. Much of the material covered in this chapter depicts the 
party‟s more generalized and nebulous ideologies, with little indicating actual 
practice. Further, the call-back of Enlightenment-tinged rhetoric offers precious little 
insight into how the party would or could deal with the specific problems affecting 
Ireland in the interwar years. Yet as the party moved toward greater relevance, Fianna 
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Fáil began to espouse innovative socio-economic and political approaches free from 
the nineteenth-century liberal/conservative/radical triad. Attempting to place the party 
within this model fails to recognize the interwar zeitgeist that informed Fianna Fáil, 
not to mention offering the party great opportunities to succeed. By eschewing the 
politics of external association, revolutionary separatism, or bastardized 
commonwealthism, Fianna Fáil manufactured a reconstituted nationalist project that 
sought to envelop all aspects of Irish life in an active, newly-gendered movement.  
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO 
 
Figure 2.1: Cumann na nGaedheal, Shadow of the Gunman, University College 
Cork Digital Archives, http://multitext.ucc.ie/viewgallery/1332, accessed 17 
November 2009. 
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Figure 2.2: Cumann na nGaedheal, Don’t Let This Happen, NLI, EC POL/1930-
40/6. 
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Figure 2.3: Cumann na nGaedheal, An Empty Formula, NLI, EC POL/1930-40/6. 
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Figure 2.4: Cumann na nGaedheal, The Cost of an Empty Formula, NLI, EC 
POL/1930-40/6. 
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Figure 2.5: Cumann na nGaedheal, No Goods Taken From Window!, NLI, EC 
POL/1930-40/6.  
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Figure 2.6: Cumann na nGaedheal, Devvy’s Circus, NLI, EC POL/1930-40/6. 
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Figure 2.7: Cumann na nGaedheal, The Hen That Took 5 Years to Lay An Egg, 
NLI, EC POL/1930-40/6. 
  
90 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Bee, "Ex-Unionist," Irish Press, 15 February 1932, 1. 
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Chapter Three 
“Bright Days Are Coming! In Quaker Gray.” Fianna Fáil and the Reconstitution of 
Irish (Republican) Women, 1931-1937. 
 
“Never met a wise man, 
 If so, it‟s a woman.” 
 -Nirvana
1
 
 
“The Spectacle reunites the separate, but reunites it as separate.” 
 -Guy Debord
2
 
 
In the 7 June 1933 edition of the Irish Press, on the page of the paper dedicated 
solely to women, there appeared a column that blurred the lines between advertisement, 
political rhetoric, and nationalism. Further obfuscating the lines between journalism and 
business, the ad was printed in a font indistinguishable from the rest of the newspaper. 
The first in a serial feature, the editorially-tinged advertisement was entitled “Morning in 
the All-Irish Home,” and asked: “Is yours a real Irish Home? Are you doing everything a 
patriotic Irish man or woman should do to support the industry of your own country? We 
shall show how you can have a real 100% Irish home not only without entailing any 
sacrifice, but with immediate advantage to yourself in the matter of quality and price.”3 
(Figure 3.16) This advertisement for Dromona Soaps constituted some of the most 
acceptable republican proscribed behavior presented to Irish women within the “Fianna 
Fáil organ, the Irish Press.”4 
 As the previous chapter demonstrated, Fianna Fáil had succeeded in its attempts 
to refocus the republican gaze by removing its most openly militaristic elements, thereby 
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exorcising the aspects of republicanism that were repulsive to so many. In essence, 
Fianna Fáil rejected the dogmatic approach of the earlier republican movement, so that it 
could appear distinct from the politics created in the wake of the Treaty debates. While 
militancy had contributed in part to the formation of the Irish Free State, Fianna Fáil‟s 
ability to transform the republican cause allowed the party to address the changed socio-
political conditions of the Irish Free State, unencumbered by the trappings of the 
dogmatic republicanism of Sinn Féin. A central aspect of this new strategy, Fianna Fáil‟s 
efforts to construct a domestic discourse for women—when placed in its socio-political 
and economic contexts—exposes a rhetoric rooted not in simple misogyny or repression. 
Rather it was a concentrated effort to distance the party, as well as the cause of 
republicanism, from their ties to Sinn Féin, Cumann mBan, and associations with 
emotion and the irrational. Fianna Fáil would maintain that the ultimate goal of 
republicans never changed, but that the means used to attain it had changed radically, 
which in turn drastically affected its relationship with the republican women of Ireland. 
The questions then remain: To what level were women included in the republicanism of 
Fianna Fáil? And to what extent did this all fit within the party‟s larger nationalistic 
narrative? 
The historiographical trend regarding women in 1930s Ireland has tended to 
depict Fianna Fáil as instituting an anti-woman, if not misogynistic, policy. Others have 
emphasized de Valera‟s call for a primordial femininity as depicted in his “Comely 
Maidens” speech. 5 This Manichean dialectic regarding the relationship between women 
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and policy in 1930s Ireland clouds the historical context within which Fianna Fáil 
reconstituted itself. Indeed, Cumann na nGaedheal instituted policies that can be 
construed as repressive of women, but the distancing of Fianna Fáil from its feminist-
friendly Sinn Féin roots is certainly striking. Yet, as Nancy Curtin has written of the 
generation of the United Irishmen, “Republicanism…was a manly calling…But women 
could also exert themselves as heroines exemplifying republican virtue, reflecting as a 
redefinition of femininity that complimented and supported new ideals of masculinity.”6 
What I would like to suggest, however, is that Fianna Fáil‟s socio-cultural discourse 
regarding gender was rooted more in political and economic expediency than in an 
overarching need to set the course of women backward two hundred years. Considering 
its origins, and the curbing of “attacks on women‟s citizenship and employment after 
1937,”7 Fianna Fáil‟s vision for women in Ireland was informed more by its desire to 
widen the party‟s influence and power. Granted, it can be argued that after 1937 there 
were precious few rights that could have been stripped from Irish women, but it is 
difficult to imagine that the party suddenly developed a misogynist streak upon its 
inception that altered their political platform in the years leading up to the passage of the 
1937 Constitution.  
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 In her contribution to Gender and Power in Irish History, Maryann Valiulis 
writes 
Women were critical to the Free State‟s definition of itself as a pure and virtuous 
nation. The important question was, what role would women play in the new 
State? In the struggle for independence, women played a vital role in 
organizations such as Inghinidhe na hÉireann and Cumann na mBan. They ran 
guns, sheltered IRA men on the run, churned out propaganda, served as judges in 
the new established Dáil courts, and in general, did what needed to be done.  
 
However, with the establishment of peace—at least in the twenty-six counties—in 
the eyes of both Irish political and ecclesiastical leaders, Irish women needed to 
be returned to the home. The need was to re-establish a traditional gender 
ideology which sees the hearth and home as women‟s rightful sphere. Their 
citizenship, their participation in the State, would be directly related to the home.
8
 
 
There is much truth to Valiulis‟s argument, but one must add a level of nuance to such 
claims. She further contends that motherhood was elevated to a level of primary 
significance, as it afforded a “political status”9 and “according to the dominant discourse 
of the period, women did not have a public identity, nor did they belong in the public 
sphere.”10 This perspective largely reflects what has been commonplace in the 
historiography of women in de Valera‟s Ireland, or, as Caitriona Clear writes, that the 
words “de Valera‟s Ireland…convey an oppressive, stagnant, uncomfortable social 
environment for women.”11 
Unlike men, however, Irish women were envisioned bearing a double burden. On 
the one hand they were to be the pure vessels of the Gaelic-Catholic-Irish triumvirate, 
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thus assuaging the conservative wing of the nationalist effort. At the same time they were 
to be radical consumers, purchasers of fetishized Irish products, thus creating a domestic, 
republican aesthetic in which all manners of life were meant to progress and reiterate 
expressions of Fianna Fáil, cum, Irish Republicanism. Through the fetishization of Irish 
products and the attempted categorization of female work, Fianna Fáil was able to 
construct a feminine discourse suitable for its gendered nationalistic framework.  
 There is little question that there was a plethora of legislation enacted that sought 
to create what James M. Smith calls Ireland‟s “containment culture.”12 Smith, like others, 
sees policy regarding women continuing in an unbroken manner from the Carrigan 
Committee, through the Legitimacy Act, and Criminal Law Amendment Act, to “protect” 
women through repressive government action. Similarly, Tom Inglis notes “although 
women played a crucial role in the struggle for independence, once this was gained, the 
new Free State began to pass legislation that helped confine women to the home.”13 
Indeed, there is little need to argue with any contention that there was a culture of 
repression in Ireland, Fianna Fáil also operated outside public policy frameworks to reify, 
or even dictate, gendered tropes regarding the appropriate behavior of Irish women in the 
domestic, and to a lesser extent, public, sphere. In other words, at the same time that de 
Valera and his colleagues were publicly praising the silent, Irish domestic, their party was 
constructing another, more active, supportive role for Irish women.  
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These sentiments may have been the reality for women under the guise of Fianna 
Fáil, yet a deeper analysis of the party‟s propaganda elicits a much different intention for 
the party in the years between 1932 and 1937. Women were indeed politicized by the 
party, but in an untraditional manner more in line with the types of feminized 
politicization seen on the European continent. Moreover, as Clear writes, “it is 
inaccurate—to say the least—to depict de Valera‟s Ireland as a graveyard of women‟s 
rights…The very fact that women‟s rights were constantly being debated, defined and 
defended indicates that they were very much alive.”14  
As will be demonstrated in this chapter and the two that follow, Fianna Fáil 
instigated a public conversation that sought to envelop all aspects of society into its 
republican efforts, including its envisioned role for women as the physical and economic 
embodiments of the Irish nation. In other words, women were indeed proscribed a 
political role within the party‟s renascent republicanism, and in turn the germinal that was 
the Irish Republic. To be sure, women were neither as influential nor as visible in Fianna 
Fáil as they were in Sinn Féin and its related movements. This reality, in and of itself, 
was rather repressive and paternalistic in its own way, but it is faulty to claim that Fianna 
Fáil offered —at least in its electoral rhetoric and cultural envisioning of Ireland—
nothing but a place in the home for Irish women.  
One of the more remarkable aspects of Irish politics and society in the years 
bracketing the 1916 Easter Rising was the very public position that women played in 
forming the intellectual bases for the republican movement. The works of Karen Steele 
and Nadia Clare Smith, for instance, illustrate the active role that women played in 
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shaping the intellectual origins of the Irish Republic. Steele has examined what she refers 
to as the “advanced nationalist press,” which had a journalistic energy that combated “the 
figure of Ireland as a woman, pervasive and long-standing image…an ideological 
construct of a femininity commonly understood to be modest, passive, obedient, and 
submissive.”15 In addition to the public sphere in which women produced such journals 
as the Shan Van Vocht, Smith notes that women were also increasing their political 
awareness and visibility through the publication of works of history. Smith writes that 
“Irish female historians could gain access to political power in a new state through both 
their own political activism and the writing of histories with a political dimension.”16 
Many of these same women were key figures in the republican movement, from Sinn 
Féin up through the formation of Fianna Fáil, yet as the previous chapter demonstrated, 
associations with women and feminized discourse were increasingly distasteful to de 
Valera‟s nascent party. The purpose of the chapter at hand is to examine the manner in 
which de Valera and his party sought to harness and refocus the energies of all Irish 
women—both republican and non-republican—in a manner that both served and posed 
little challenge to the party‟s socio-economic and political aims. 
 Louise Ryan and Margaret Ward write that “Anti-colonial nationalist movements 
have frequently employed gendered ideologies that position women in „traditional‟ roles 
within the domestic sphere.”17 Yet the manner in which Fianna Fáil envisioned women 
was not as simplistic as their mere relegation to the home. Instead Fianna Fáil advanced a 
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rhetoric that offered women what they saw as a crucial role in their cause, in turn 
refocusing the energies of republican-minded women toward actions that were more 
acceptable to the party‟s aims. This was done by encouraging female participation via 
expressions of everyday living in the city and on the farm through their outward 
appearance and consumer habits. Such aims were reflective of a much more nuanced 
relationship with women that was part and parcel of an overarching effort to redefine the 
republican movement. Ryan and Ward further note, “women have been a continual part 
of nationalism, not just occasional players who can be easily summoned and 
dismissed.”18 I wish to add to this by noting the tentative, if not completely guarded, 
political agency offered to women by Fianna Fáil in the years leading up to the drafting 
and eventual institutionalizing of the Bunreacht na hÉireann—the constitution drafted by 
de Valera in 1937. Although not the complete repression or degradation claimed by 
some, this vision was an effort to politicize the women of Ireland in a manner consistent 
with the nationalistic aims of the party. Indeed, the Constitution of 1937 did codify the 
domestic role of women, giving credence to Clear‟s depiction of what it meant to be a 
woman in de Valera‟s Ireland. But when contextualized within the time period and 
juxtaposed with the masculine image on which Fianna Fáil sought to base its economic 
policies, it is more accurate to say that women were envisioned as being vital to the 
construction of an independent Irish state. What is striking, however, is that while the 
hallmarks of paternalism and repression were evident in the party‟s rhetoric, there was for 
at least a brief period of time, the perception that women could embrace elements of 
modernity while serving the Irish state. 
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 To relegate women to an apolitical home would have been counterproductive to 
Fianna Fáil‟s nationalistic thrust, for the party viewed women as key producers and 
consumers both in, and of, a republican Éire. As was the case in much of Europe during 
the 1930s, nationalism and politics intermeshed to become indistinguishable, and the 
party worked to position women in roles suitable for their gender, so that they could 
participate in the republican spectacle made possible in the democratic Free State. 
Valiulis writes “Focusing on men and the gender legislations of the 1920s and 1930s 
demonstrates the need for a more complex understanding of this period, because what 
was happening in Ireland was not simply a turning away from the modern world but 
rather was also part of a more universal trend in Western countries.”19 Koepnick 
described that broader trend: “As it conceals the allegorical thrust and reason of the 
commodity form, modern consumer society engenders modes of mass cultural 
entertainment in which repression and wish-fulfillment, fantasy and symbolic 
containment, join together in the unity of a single mechanism.”20 Thus, women—like 
men—were neatly defined and placed within a socio-economic and political narrative. 
 As it was with Fianna Fáil‟s renascent republicanism, the party operated within a 
dualistic framework in which elements of modernity blended with the primitivist 
elements of cultural nationalism. It was within these rhetorical frameworks that Fianna 
Fáil afforded a vision for Irish women that allowed for certain freedom regarding 
modern—if not bourgeois—fashion inspired by the latest trends in France, as well as 
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encouraging them to embrace and purchase modern manufacture made in Ireland. The 
projected role for Irish women was not nearly as backward as previously believed when 
contextualized with the party‟s advancing of a masculine discourse that glorified manly 
action and domestic growth. Indeed, de Valera once said that “everyone knows there is 
little chance of having a home in the real sense if there is no woman in it, the woman is 
really the home-maker.”21 Elizabeth Francis Martin writes “Like the mothers of the 
American and French Revolutions before her, the Irish woman was idealized as the vessel 
of the race, and her fulfillment would come from the realization of her children‟s dreams 
and achievements, not her own.”22 But what was that envisioned role, and to what extent 
did it advance and support the party‟s efforts for a new republic?  
 
Women and the Irish Press 
The Irish Press, from the onset of publication in 1931, included a page dedicated 
to the interests of women. The idea of a woman‟s page was not exclusive to the Irish 
Press, and as it had been employed by the Dundalk Examiner/An Scrúduightheioir which 
began publication on 20 September 1930 under the direction of Frank Aiken.
23
 In the 
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fourteen months prior to the launch of the Irish Press each edition of the Dundalk 
Examiner included a daily page concerned with “Matters Feminine.” The bulk of the 
articles with bylines were written by an author credited solely as “Maire” [sic] and were 
surrounded by recipes, serial stories, and advertisements geared toward women.
24
 The 
articles were very similar to those that would later appear on the woman‟s pages in the 
Irish Press in that they tended to focus on women‟s fashion and domestic advice. One 
distinction lay in the Examiner’s implicit advocacy of Irish tweed and its importance in 
the fashions of Irish women—at least in the sense that such clothing was vital to the 
development of home industries. Such suggestions foreshadowed the types of articles that 
would later appear in the Irish Press where connections between consumerism and 
patriotism were made. 
There are a number of elements observable in the woman‟s pages in the Irish 
Press from its inception up through the ratification of the Constitution in 1937, all of 
which point to a discourse which trended toward a clear depiction of the acceptable 
republican female. Of particular emphasis in the pages of the Irish Press were matters 
related to contemporary fashions, the domestic woman as wife and busy homemaker, 
and, as the Economic War raged—that of a republican consumer. The shift from activist 
revolutionary to subtle republican fits within the paternalistic, logical, and rational 
nationalism of Fianna Fáil in the 1930s. Female readers of the Irish Press were 
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encouraged to be frugal—except when purchasing Irish products; modern yet traditional; 
subdued yet fashionable; patriotic and unquestioning. Indeed, there was room for women 
inside Fianna Fáil‟s vision for Ireland, and according to the Irish Press, compliance—or 
manufactured consent—meant following the party line regarding fashion, occupation, 
domesticity, and consumerism. 
 If one were to question the importance of the Irish Press in advocating Fianna 
Fáil‟s renascent republicanism, one need only to take into consideration Sean MacEntee‟s 
declaration that the paper “was established in order to put the Republican position before 
the people, in order to keep the Republican flag flying, in order to put a Republican 
Government in the Dáil and in order to give a Republican Constitution to the people of 
Ireland.”25 O‟Brien notes that “Cumann na nGaedheal severely under-emphasised the 
cultural identity of the Irish people, and it was this omission that later allowed Fianna Fáil 
via the Irish Press to exploit the hunger for cultural cohesiveness.”26 It should be added 
that the Irish Press served as the means by which Fianna Fáil sought to define the 
national narrative through focusing their readers‟ gaze through the message of the paper. 
Regarding women, “The paper made a special emphasis to recruit female writers and was 
the first newspaper in Ireland to appoint a woman‟s page editor.”27 Yet, the question 
remains as to what this relationship between Fianna Fáil, the Irish Press, and the readers 
of the woman‟s page was, and how it related to the republicans‟ vision for women in the 
Free State. While general themes remained consistent up to the passage of the 1937 
Constitution, the emphases of the woman‟s page underwent noticeable changes that 
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largely reflected the dictates of Fianna Fáil policy. In this short period, the page became 
increasingly political, offering Irish women a more prescribed framework of approved 
behaviors and avocations. As such, the woman‟s page in the Irish Press offers a clear 
indication of Fianna Fáil‟s emerging definition of both the private and public norms for 
women. 
   
I’m Glad I’m Not Beautiful!—Redirecting the Energies of Irish Republican Women 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the party exerted much effort in the cause of 
distancing itself from the militant iconography of Sinn Féin. Such a position demanded 
that de Valera and his followers break any public ties with the agents of the advanced 
nationalist press. As a result Fianna Fáil had to construct its own nationalist narrative that 
reconfigured its relationship to past and potential republican women. Whereas in the time 
of Sinn Féin‟s greatest prominence, female nationalists had a great amount of influence 
on republicanism, Fianna Fáil set out to channel and refocus their energies. Eve Morrison 
writes that despite being home to an influential feminist movement “Ireland was just one 
of several European countries to prioritize the return of women to their traditional 
domestic roles as a means of restoring order and normalcy in the inter-war period.”28 This 
was particularly apparent in the Irish Press‟ daily page devoted to the interests of women. 
Especially in the early years of the Press, the clear narrative thread that heralded the 
intelligence of women also sought to refocus their energies away from the public sphere. 
For example, in the 15 September 1931 issue—printed in the paper‟s first month of 
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publication—there appeared a brief article entitled “Women Are Clever!” that was 
written by “An Admiring Man.”29 In part it read:  
Women are too clever for words! 
 
Think of having to prepare food, look after three or more children, rush out to 
admire a man‟s handiwork in a garden, dust a house, make beds, dole out tea and 
cakes at eleven o‟clock, lay a table, and serve a dinner—ALL IN ONE 
MORNING!... 
 
Think of taking a new length of cloth, and CUTTING it to make a dress that can 
be worn without shame in the broad light of day! 
 
Think of boiling gallons and gallons of milk every year, without ONCE letting it 
boil over. 
 
Think of making money last a week without a reserve upon which to draw should 
you over-spend one day! 
 
Think of lighting a fire EVERY day for the best part of eight months! 
 
Think of these things, oh ye men, and then say that women aren‟t clever IF YOU 
DARE!
30
 
 
On the surface this article would appear to be another example of Fianna Fáil‟s efforts to 
confine women to the home and reinforce women‟s domestic “duty.” Indeed, such an 
assertion is certainly valid, yet when contextualized with the party‟s overarching 
republican rhetoric, sentiments such as the contention that women were in fact clever 
became understandable as part of an all-encompassing change through the reification of 
gendered tropes. Further, there was the insinuation that women could channel their 
energies and individuality into important domestic work. The role of women in the 
home—as clever as it could be—coalesced with the party‟s economic and political policy 
in a manner that invigorated and supported Irish industry. Through the construction of 
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domestic harmony, Irish women would play a key role in both refocusing feminine—if 
not feminist—energies to serve as the kinetic energy that sped the wheels of the Irish 
economy. 
 On 14 September 1931 an article written by “A Plain Girl” appeared on the 
woman‟s page of the Irish Press with the following headline: “I‟m Glad I‟m Not 
Beautiful.”31  Defending her non-beauty, the author wrote: 
There‟d be so much to lose for one thing… 
 
It‟s such a nuisance being beautiful, and I‟m naturally lazy. And it‟s expensive, 
too. I have never to „bury‟ my face in the cold cream jar or lie like a statue for 
hours with sticky stuff spread all over my neck and features. While Kitty, my 
beautiful sister, spends two hours every night ironing out her face and chasing 
imaginary wrinkles round her nose. I hop into bed and sleep soundly. My face 
costs me nothing but a cake of soap and a dab of powder…. 
 
The happiest day of my life was when Michael whispered, „I love you,‟ If I had 
been beautiful perhaps I should have wondered…Golden hair and eyes like two 
big stars can act like magic in the moonlight, but a snub nose and a big mouth 
can‟t be camouflaged. Michael saw what he was getting, anyhow. So I married 
him.
32
 
 
 Extrapolating the sentiments of this article as reflective of Fianna Fáil‟s envisioned 
Cailíní, then one would be forced to conclude that the ideal woman was one who was 
modern, fashionably grounded, and self-sufficient. 
 The woman‟s page in the Press was not without its contradictions. Although at 
times women were encouraged to add Irish flourishes to the latest fashions—as will be 
shown below—in its earliest incarnation, the Press intoned that women embrace elements 
of the past: the backward gaze. On the same page as the “Plain Girl‟s” declaration about 
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the joy of not being beautiful, there appeared an article entitled “Shall We? A Quintet that 
Shows HOW the WIND Blows,” where women were told, “styles are, at any rate, a 
definite return to the „good old days.‟…The modern girl‟s clothes will be grandmother‟s 
clothes and so exempt from criticism, and that will be that.”33 Further, the piece declared 
that “hand embroidery, the hall-mark of the womanly woman, will be used in taffetas and 
faille on the bustle frocks and the designs will be of the rosebud and forget-me-not 
school, not the futuristic!”34 Clearly an exhortation to avoid the excesses and vanity of 
the styles of the day, it recommended subtly that women should not be overly concerned 
with the trivialities of the fluidity of contemporary fashions. An exemplar of this 
traditionalist trend can be seen in the 1 October 1931 edition of the Press. (Figure 3.1) 
 The glorification of the trends of the past was not limited to fashion and cosmetic 
flourishes. An article in the 21 October 1931 edition of the Irish Press implored women 
to add “Old-Time Touches in new Decorative Schemes.”35 In part, the article read: “The 
back-to-our-grandmothers trend in fashions is naturally reflected in home decoration, and 
to be thoroughly up-to-date you must introduce old-time accessories into your furnishing 
schemes.”36 The article further suggested that women use inherited objects to decorate 
their houses, and if they were not fortunate enough to have received such articles, then 
they should “haunt auctions or [to] search in antique shops for attractive specimens which 
are rare enough to take quite a lot of finding and make the hunt the more exciting.”37 
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There is little doubt that the women were being encouraged to embrace elements of the 
previous decades so as to avoid showiness, in turn embracing simplicity rather than 
conspicuousness.  
Another common theme refocused the gaze of readers to an era that predated the 
age of the militant female revolutionary. Missing from these articles were the topics 
found in the advanced nationalist press—with its ever-present calls for militaristic action 
and revolutionary tomes. Instead, they were filled with directions to become 
domesticated harbingers of Irish primitivism, that is, to be the direct connection to an 
imagined Irish past. Such was the intention of an article that advanced the “Vogue of the 
Demure.”38 This effort to reconstruct the appropriate role of women was commensurate 
with Fianna Fáil‟s initial concern to bridge the problematic associations with the 
militarism that Cumann na nGaedheal had pinned upon Sinn Féin. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find the party—at least before the 1932 election—still advancing rhetoric 
overly concerned with a backward gaze. After its election into government, however, 
Fianna Fáil became far more concerned with the embracement of modernity. 
Nevertheless, the recurring themes—albeit fraught with contradictions—of a sense of 
“old-fashionedness” certainly suited a party so obviously anxious about its past 
associations and the means by which they could incorporate women into the national 
movement. 
 In the earliest editions of the Irish Press, numerous articles glorified the pastoral 
and the harmony of the home and garden. For instance, in an article appearing on 22 
September 1931, author Emily Dowling wrote: 
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Life is not easy in the country any more than in the town, but in the country 
sorrow and death are eased. We live closer to the earth, we sink more quietly into 
its arms.  
 
It is the consciousness of this, perhaps, that makes our homing imaginations fly, 
not to a building made of bricks and mortar, cut to State measurements and 
equipped with telephones and lifts, but to some little house softly-moulded of red 
earth, with a hood of brown thatch and a floor of beaten clay. 
 
In its friendly shelter we hope to find the healing of peace.
39
 
 
Inherent in this passage was the anti-government tone against mandated building 
regulations, well as a seeming distaste for the trappings of modernity. As such, Dowling 
glorified the country as a place of idyllic Elysium where one could breathe a “freedom 
which is not to be found in cities.”40 Sentiments such as this were frequently expressed 
throughout the first three years of the Press, and they were contrasted only by ponderings 
on modern fashion that had an air of “if you must.” For Dowling, the joys of city-
dwelling were attributed to the whims of youth, yet she wrote that “in the hearts of the 
most of us there is a secret yearning for the country, for some remote land of our 
dreams.”41 Further, Dowling noted that “it is a pity the young who leave it so callously do 
not realise this. It is a pity they are not taught to appreciate more fully the blessing of 
being country-born, to see more clearly the delights with which they are surrounded.”42 
Dowling clearly insinuated that it should be the burden of the older generation to educate 
younger women about the joys of pastoral living.  
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Although explicit elements of Irish nationalism are absent from this passage, the 
message was clear that the people of Ireland needed to return to their primeval heritage 
via the elevation of the Irish sod. In gendered terms, it was Irish women who were to 
focus their energies toward the beauty of the Irish landscape, distancing themselves from 
the unpleasantness of the cities and all their associations, including political activism. In 
the early days of the Press, it was beyond question that women were to be apolitical, 
leaving such business to the men emblazoned and lionized on the front pages of the 
paper.  
 There was also no doubt that the writers of the Press were intent on reintroducing 
Irish women to the joys of domesticity and the inherent tranquility that it provided. A 
series entitled “Modern Furniture in the Home” was somewhat anachronistically titled as 
it had less to do with incorporating modern furniture trends, but rather was more about 
modern in the chronological sense. For instance, in an article written by a “Home 
Specialist” about the dining room, readers were told, “The room where we eat our meals 
should have dignity as well as conviviality. There should, therefore, be harmony in 
furniture and atmosphere.”43 In regards to the bedroom, the health of the family‟s wage-
earners “depend[s] to a great extent on their comfort and even health.”44 Readers were 
guided by the advice that “overcrowding with furniture is worse in a bedroom than 
anywhere, for it destroys that atmosphere of rest and contentment that should mark a 
bedroom. Decide first then what furniture you MUST have, and then decide WHERE 
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each piece should go.”45  As for the kitchen, the same advice regarding spacing of 
furniture and practicality applied, yet the opening sentence neatly summarized the 
message: “The kitchen is really the housewife‟s workshop.”46 After decades of feminist 
discord where political activity was a matter of public spectacle—not to mention the 
connotations this had for Fianna Fáil—the allegory of domestic harmony fell in line with 
the party‟s efforts to re-establish traditional gender ideologies.  
 Citing the work of Constance Markevicz‟s “Woman with a Garden” in the journal 
Bean na hÉireann, Steele claims that the columns sought to “reclaim the garden‟s 
political potential for both women and nationalists by composing features that 
allegorically described how readers could resist domesticity and imperialism through the 
most visible icon of the Ascendancy class, the garden.”47 Twenty years later, Fianna Fáil 
would once again utilize the garden to shift the gaze of Irish women, albeit in a fashion 
much different than what Markievicz had intended. Throughout its early run the Irish 
Press featured a regular column entitled “The Woman Gardener” that offered sage and 
practical advice meant to improve the lives of the Irish family. Far from being the 
allegory on rebellion and resistance, these articles instead encouraged women to create a 
garden that established calm and tranquility, as well as serving as the practical purpose of 
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decorating their traditional homes.
48
 One such example came from a 5 January 1932 
article entitled “Harmony Between House and Garden,” which warned the reader that a 
“seeming unimportant point which many house-owners overlook when they lay out their 
gardens is that of harmony between the building and its plot of land. There should be 
some tangible relationship between the layout and materials of the garden and the size 
and composition of the dwelling.”49 By “avoiding the incongruous” and planting a 
“garden that „belongs‟”50 the garden and the entire house would exude “pleasing 
sympathy and unostentatious charm.”51 Another purpose of the garden was that of 
practicality and general improvement of the Irish diet, as evidenced in an article subtitled 
“Grow Your Own Vegetables.” It claimed “the housewife who studies food values, sets a 
high standard of health for her family, and at the same time practises sound domestic 
economy.”52 More than just being economical, the article claimed that “as a people, we 
do not eat enough vegetables, and those we do eat have little variety. Potatoes and 
cabbage seem to exhaust our imagination.”53 Additionally, women were encouraged to 
accept “the Virtues of Herbs.”54Apart from improving the diet of the people of Ireland, 
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the purpose of the garden—according to the Irish Press—was to occupy the minds of 
women year round. For example, in an article entitled “Still Much to be Done,” women 
were warned, “when everything in the garden looks lovely, when plants are gay and full 
of promise, the gardener is apt to „sit back‟ and feel that she may call half for a time. But 
there is still much to be done,” whether it be fertilization of Chrysanthemums or planning 
for “Next Year‟s Strawberries.”55  Two weeks later, on 18 August 1932, readers were 
given even more specific instructions on how to busy themselves by constant pruning, 
tidying up borders, and being mindful of the removal of pests.
56
 From planning for 
autumn planting in June
57
 or of “Jobs for July,” 58 the remaking of the home was an 
occupational concern for the women—a far cry from the allegorical means of anticolonial 
resistance.  
 In September 1933 an article penned by C. O‟R. [sic] waxed poetically about the 
inherent beauty and value of “An Irish Home in Adrigole,” a home that represented “the 
backbone of the Irish nation [and] will move every reader with its beauty and its truth.”59 
At the time, Fianna Fáil was trumpeting its efforts to construct new housing for Ireland‟s 
rural population. The article described the home as being in disrepair, cared for by the 
embodiment of the party‟s traditional ideal who wished to emigrate to America, but who 
remained in Ireland because “she has an ailment which will not pass the emigration 
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authorities.”60 This woman and her children “expect little out of life, and consequently 
are not easily disappointed.”61 Despite the hardships the reader was told “there is a 
wonderful faith in these people that supports them like a breastplate. Biodh sagla ort agus 
ni baoghal duit. That is how they walk, in fear and righteousness.”62  
 Through the Irish Press it appeared that Fianna Fáil became more resigned to 
relegating home and garden advice as merely that—advice. More important, however, 
was the overarching theme of confining and defining the energies of Irish women. Even 
at this early stage women were still seen as the harbingers of the primitivist Gaelic ideal 
fashioning home and garden as well as their bodies in a manner that reflected and 
reinforced the party‟s feminine ideal: domestic, cognizant of the beauty of the Irish past, 
demure, and passive. Most important, however, she was to embody that approved Irish 
ideal. 
 Your Uniform—Fashioning Janus  
 
It would, nonetheless, be faulty to assume that Fianna Fáil‟s sole vision of women 
was one of the muted domestic. In consecutive issues printed in October of 1931, two 
articles appeared where fashion was the primary concern for women of distinct vocations. 
On 17 October a short entitled “Fashions in Irish Tweed” could be found, accompanied 
by a photographic example. In part, the article declared “Tailored modes for the Business 
Girl. Suits of the jumper persuasion fashioned in fine weave Irish tweeds are decidedly 
the vogue. They are, too, definitely practical propositions for the business girl.”63 This 
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recognition of professional and public women was careful to ensure that such fashion was 
subdued and “neutral” in color, namely blacks and whites.64 This is but one example of a 
trend in which nearly all articles that discussed clothing for public wear promoted the use 
of muted colors and modest tailoring. High fashion for the visible woman—whether it 
was in daily business or in society—was meant to be of “midnight bloue [sic],”65 
ensembles in “Three shades of brown,”66 long wraps of “White and Nile blue,”67 or 
“Coats with a Military Air…[or while] Brown and its Near Relations Still Dominate Day 
and Evening Wear.”68  
In fact, a cursory examination of the numerous small articles on modern fashion 
reveals that Fianna Fáil advocated acceptance of fashionable clothing inspired by 
designers in Paris and New York. Many of these highlighted articles were filled with 
such adjectives as “smart,” “distinctive” or “original,” and the clothes were often noted 
for their unique and noticeable flair. An advertisement from 6April 1934, for instance, 
cements the notion that both the Press, and by association Fianna Fáil, were willing to 
concede to women the luxuries of wearing the latest fashions. This advertisement was 
unique in the sense that it trumpeted the paper‟s fashion advice, noting “Fashions to 
please/every purse are advertised/in The Irish Press. Whether you need—tailored suits, 
frocks, evening dresses, lingerie, silk stockings, smart shoes, a chic hat or gloves. The 
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Irish Press will tell you WHERE to buy them. HOW much they cost. And, for your 
convenience, you can order by post.”69 (Figure 3.2) Indeed, the party—via the Irish 
Press—was advocating modern fashions, but in this process there was also an underlying 
sense of direction and prescription in the advertisements. While the fashions were of the 
vogue, clear guidelines regarding coloring, fabric, and design were evident throughout. 
(Figures 3.3-3.10)
70
 
Steele noted in Constance Markievicz‟s series “The Women of „98” a recurrent 
theme of “what to wear in the revolution.”71The heralded clothing of past feminine 
revolutionaries was something to be envied and perhaps emulated by Irish republicans in 
the 1910s and 1920s. Steele adds that such clothing “suggest that Markievicz‟s own 
Easter Rising uniform, a green Irish Citizen Army coat and a hat with the ostrich plume 
feather, was selected not merely to express her „theatrical flair,‟…but also to establish a 
connection with earlier militant women fighting for Ireland.”72 Such ostentatious displays 
of feminist rebellion were duly shunned by Fianna Fáil as evidenced in a January 1932 
article from the Irish Press in which women were given the following advice: “As 
regards colours, the following may be worn with safety: navy blue, black, brown, rich 
wine red, dark green…[and] can be introduced by suitable trimmings. The colours to be 
avoided are light blues, vivid reds, yellow, pale green, white.”73 Later that year, readers 
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were told “Bright Days Are Coming!...in Quaker grey.”74 (Figure 3.11) Indeed, while this 
may have been reflective of fashionable trends of the period, the recommendation to wear 
conspicuously dark clothing—referred to once as “Your Uniform”75—was repeated over 
and over again. Conversely, in a foreshadowing of the Economic War, women were 
encouraged to accessorize their dark clothing with such things as yellow frocks made of 
Irish tweed. In other words, colorful plumage was encouraged so long as it was produced 
in Ireland.  
The attempt to damper notions of aggressive femininity through outward fashions 
and behaviors and domestic tranquility continued throughout the early run of the Press, 
yet there appeared a distinct, if not explicit, change in tone. Added to these sentiments 
was a greater embracement of a muted couture moderne marked by nativist Irish 
flourishes. As such, to the “vogue of the demure” was added the vogue of the Gael. In a 
slight change of nuance, women were encouraged to be less coy regarding their patriotic 
aesthetic. Whereas the concern of Fianna Fáil in the period between 1927 and 1932 was 
about justifying the party‟s raison d’être, the party‟s cause belle—namely the economic 
conflict with Britain that began in 1932, as well as the push for a formal break from 
colonial ties—instead guided the period that followed. This shift was slowly reflected in 
the manner in which the readers of the woman‟s page of the Irish Press were encouraged 
to dress. By early 1933, women were depicted as the physical and aesthetic 
representations of Fianna Fáil‟s reconstituted republicanism. Perhaps this shift indicated 
the party‟s newfound sense of legitimacy, fueled by its electoral “triumph” in 1932, 
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which essentially signaled the end of the need for the party to remain concerned with 
distancing itself from the shadow of the gunmen. In essence, the encouragement of 
women to outwardly embrace Irish republicanism served as a transition between the time 
of the demure and the following period in which women were promoted as consumers of 
the coming Irish republic.  
In contrast to the muted if modish clothing of the public female, the domestic 
woman was encouraged to wear practical clothing that meant “easy work.”76 Whereas the 
articles on la mode were small asides, those geared toward housewives were far more 
substantive. In this case, the article read: 
Everybody else has an outfit—it is taken for granted that the baby, the school-
child, the sports-girl, the bride and all the others must have „special‟ clothes. But 
nobody seems to suggest a sane practical outfit to ease life for the woman who 
does her own housework. 
 
The maidless housewife smiles ruefully over the articles in the magazines 
imploring her to be dainty at all times! How is she going to slip into fragile be-
ribboned underclothes at seven o‟clock on a cold morning when she rises to make 
the family‟s breakfast? Besides, after a morning‟s housework, the fragile things 
would be fit only for the wash-tub and the work-basket. 
 
The housewife‟s main need is something she can get into quickly; something 
durable, for she has plenty of mending without having perishable lingerie of her 
own to add to it; and something neat in appearance. 
 
The solution? A cretonne frock free of “ribbons and lace” that allowed for unencumbered 
housework. These two contrasts—the muted businesswoman/socialite and eager and 
energetic housewife—served as the two models for appropriate behavior for Irish women 
per the Irish Press.  
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Embedded in the fashion ideals promoted by Fianna Fáil was a duality that 
appeared consistently in the party‟s gendered rhetoric, where conceptions of femininity 
(and masculinity) were defined by primordial and modernist tropes. Though Fianna Fáil 
tended to promote the muted domestic as the norm, there was a certain level of 
acceptance of such aspects of modernity as the professional woman as well as modern 
fashions. Such double vision was a common trend amongst nationalist parties that sought 
to operate outside the capitalistic/socialistic dialectic, instead opting for a third way—
unencumbered by nineteenth-century dogmatism—that allowed for the intersection 
between past and modern.  
 
Win the Economic War By Planning! Women as Patriot Consumers during the 
Economic War 
 
The politicization of women became much more apparent in the Irish Press 
during 1933 when the once innocuous articles on fashion and domesticity became imbued 
with calls for direct participation in Fianna Fáil‟s Economic War. In an article published 
on 9 June 1933 entitled “Does Beauty Mean Nothing to You?” the authors queried the 
reader: “Life is poorer for us and our children because we wear badly designed cotton 
fabrics, use badly balanced cretonnes in our homes and put terrible wall papers on our 
walls.”77 The article continued and encouraged Irish women to strip their walls bare of 
foreign-produced wall papers, replacing it with Irish-made paint, as well as accentuating 
their windows—always open to the beauty of the Irish nation—with fine Irish lace. 
Additionally, the emphasis on “badly designed cotton fabrics” was a clear condemnation 
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of British-imported cotton and fashions designed in London. Later that year, women were 
encouraged to “Win the Economic War—by Planning!”78 Facilitating this planning was a 
serial guide to Irish products published throughout 1933. Over the course of the year, 
women were encouraged to serve Denny‟s Bacon for breakfast, as “The prosperity of 
your country depends on the way in which each of you supports its industries,” and to 
“Make your home one a patriotic Irish man or woman would be proud of.”79 (Figure 
3.12) Beyond bacon, women were told to purchase Irish margarine, mineral water and 
“Irish Paints for brightening the All-Irish Home”;80 and bridging the gap between fashion 
and patriotism, to wear “Irish Woolens only in the All-Irish Home.”81 (Figures 3.13-3.15) 
Urrey Chocolates would provide a little luxury for the Irish Home, as would iron gates 
produced in Ireland. Irish children would be comforted and healed by “All-Irish 
Preparations,” and medicinal and toilet items should “be Irish whenever possible,” and 
were of the “highest quality obtainable.”82 Finally, this poem appeared in a column 
entitled “The Irish Ideal Home” on 6 December 1933: 
The ideal home has room for no complaints; 
The painted spick and span with Irish paints, 
From roof to ground, no trace of dust is seen;  
Tis cleansed with Irish goods, and therefore clean, 
And those who in this ideal homestead dwell, 
By Irish food are fit and well. 
Though hygiene paves the way, they rightly think— 
Good health‟s maintained on Irish food and drink 
Thus, hygiene, health and happiness are found 
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In every home where Irish goods abound.
83
 (Figure 3.16) 
 
Referred to as the “Nation‟s Bursar,” Irish women were expected to combat British 
colonialism, and in turn support Fianna Fáil nationalism by contributing to what was 
hoped to be an increasingly self-sustaining Irish economy. After all, shopping and 
bargain-hunting were deemed the “most popular pastime for women.”84 Granted, this was 
a far cry from the intellectual and active involvement of republican women prior to the 
formation of de Valera‟s republican party, there was nonetheless an indication that 
women did indeed have a role in an Irish republic that was suitable to Fianna Fáil‟s 
gendered discourse. Although the connection between nationalistic consumerism and the 
Economic War was begun in earnest in 1933, the connection between republican efforts 
and the advocacy of goods of Irish manufacture had its origins in the first Ard Fheis of 
Fianna Fáil when the following resolution—put forth by Robert Bondfield of the Dublin 
City Craobh (branch)—was passed: “That F.F. [sic] should start an Irish Industrial 
Revival Campaign, by urging its members to buy nothing but Irish goods, and, also as far 
as possible, to have propaganda distributed throughout the 32 counties and to see that 
every Craobh set up committees to deal with the same.”85 
 The appeal to women and their significance to the Economic War
86
 can be found 
in a statement made by Eamon de Valera: 
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I make a special appeal to the women of this country…if they want to help us win 
this war, that every time they go out to buy an article they will try to get an article 
of home manufacture. I used to say that we could get back our cotton and silk 
trade, but until we can get Irish cotton and silk we ought to be content with Irish 
woolens. We can get our artists to design costumes for our women much more 
appropriate in our country and climate than the fashions imported from Paris, 
London or New York. 
 
I know that we can work up a tremendous enthusiasm here by sanctioning deeds 
of violence in certain directions, that we could get up a war atmosphere in which 
we would all be at fever [pitch], and we would get in that way a sort of artificial 
enthusiasm. But that wears off. That state of exhilaration might evaporate as it 
evaporated in certain conditions before.
87
 
 
This particular speech, likely to have been given in 1932 or thereafter—note the present 
tense of the reference to winning “this war”—was de Valera‟s most explicit call for the 
form of political activity advocated by Fianna Fáil. It was more than just a call for 
support of the party‟s protectionist policies, as de Valera was calling for women to 
become active agents in the Fianna Fáil spectacle; working, sewing, buying, wearing, and 
enthusiastically advancing the cause of a free republic. 
De Valera‟s intentions were mirrored in a call for the creation of the Woman‟s 
Industrial Development Association, “an endeavour to co-ordinate the activities of town 
and country.”88 According to a report of the inaugural meeting that took place in late 
February 1935, the goal of the WIDA was to establish markets for country products in the 
city: “Quantities of fireside articles are made in the very midst of the country; markets 
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should be found for them in Dublin and other big towns.”89 Days later an article appeared 
marking the progress of the WIDA, noting that it had “left the ranks of small 
organisations and has become the national voice of the consumer, an active agent for the 
sale and purchase of Irish-made goods, and with the proposed new organisation that voice 
will make itself heard over all Ireland.”90 The article further noted plans by the Dublin 
Branch of the WIDA to “hold a mannequin parade of Irish clothes…which promises to be 
one of the most interesting exhibitions of what can be worn in the way of all Irish 
garments that has ever been held.”91 Although limited and somewhat stereotypical, 
women were indeed granted a sense of political agency via the mobilization of their 
consumption habits. The very fact that the Irish Press would deem it appropriate to 
publicize—albeit to its female readers—the WIDA demonstrates a clear link between the 
party and its envisioned role for women in Ireland. The intersection of fashion and 
nationalist intentions neatly coalesced in the push for an Irish vogue, which, in turn would 
support the isolationist elements crucial to the intended results of the Economic War.  
 The relationship between economics and nationalism were readily apparent in the 
advocacy of the WIDA, yet there was a noticeable, if not unique, call for a larger cultural 
nationalism seen in the organization‟s material. For example, in covering the “All Irish 
Dress Parade” from March of 1935 called for an increase in Irish design. The author, 
A.K., stated  
Goodness knows we have enough tweeds, woolens and linens of all sorts to cover 
us from Rathlin to Mizen Head. What we want are people to show us how it 
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would be done. How it should be done gracefully, with art and style and that 
subtle touch that is the difference between being covered and being „dressed‟. 
 
The French have a word for it, many words. 
 
When Irish designers and dressmakers can catch up with the Irish manufacturers 
of beautiful dress goods, then we shall have a word for it too. At present the 
designers with one or two exceptions, are left at the post, while the manufacturers 
are well away. 
 
We send tweeds and wools all over the world, while we have no one at home to 
show us how they should be worn.
92
 
 
Accompanying the show were “Misses Sheridan [who] sang songs and duets in Irish and 
English with harp accompaniment and gave a very entertaining finish to the show.”93  
After a later show in May of 1935, the Press declared the event to have 
“effectively demonstrated what could be done when brains and good taste were combined 
in the production of garments.”94 The show further “attracted people of all classes of the 
community to the hall and was more representative in this respect than any all Irish dress 
display yet held at Ballsbridge.”95  According to the article, the following persons 
“occupied seats on the platform”: Sean T. O‟Kelly, Seán Lemass, Dr. and Mrs. James 
Ryan, Frank Fahy, Tomás Ó Deirg, and Senator Mrs. Wyse Power.
96
 The dignitaries at 
the meeting represented some of the most powerful and prominent members of Fianna 
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Fáil—clearly an effort by the party to publicly advocate on behalf of the WIDA. Whether 
or not the WIDA was an outgrowth of Fianna Fáil, the mere fact that the organization 
existed and was trumpeted in the Irish Press clearly demonstrates the manner in which 
the party sought to politicize the women of Ireland through the embracement of a cultural 
aesthetic in which they were to be both producer and consumer of the republican thrust. 
 By 1935 the home advice articles became more overt in their recommendations 
that Irish women incorporate Irish-made products into their home projects. Further, these 
products, such as that discussed in Sheila O‟Brien‟s article regarding a crocheted cosy-
cover, were meant to utilize Irish linen and featured Gaelic designs. O‟Brien‟s pattern 
called for a “half-yard primrose-coloured Irish linen,” and was meant to be “a most 
acceptable gift for every woman who possesses a tea-pot, and, of course, every woman 
does!”97 Later that month a pattern for a turtle neck jumper, which “worn with a hand-
woven Irish tweed skirt and a belt, …completes a very smart Spring outfit.”98 For a 
readership trained in creating the idyllic Irish home, the slight change in advice 
advocating the greater presence of Gaelic symbols in the home was simply an added level 
of nuance.  
Beginning in 1934 and continuing into early 1936, periodic articles also 
encouraged female physical activity and personal health that augmented Fianna Fáil‟s 
gendered consumerism. At that time weekly columns appeared that educated women 
about fitness, so that they could lose their “double chins” or “thin those ankles.” Evident 
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of consumerist nationalism, women were told, “If everyone ate an Irish apple a day, this 
homegrown fruit industry would soon be on its feet.”99 Women were encouraged to take 
up the new trend—as seen in Germany—toward such outdoor physical activities as 
hiking or engaging in a game of Camogie, or Camoghuidheacht, dubbed “Irishwomen‟s 
National Game.”100 In this sense, women were encouraged to literally participate in 
expressions of Irish primordial nationalism through exercise and the training of their 
bodies amidst the physical beauties and restorative properties of the Irish landscape. 
Moreover, the channeling of feminine energy into the nationalist cause was in direct 
contrast to the passivity encouraged in 1931 and 1932.  This increased malleability 
regarding women suggests Fianna Fáil‟s policy toward women was more fluid, and, 
rooted in political expediency than previously believed. This also suggests that Fianna 
Fáil was willing to back away from its initial repressive rhetoric toward women, which 
has been established as an action necessary to the combating of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
power.  
 
The Greatest Career of All—Public Vocations for Irish Republican Women  
 Moreover, in 1935 a new thematic trend emerged that was concerned with the 
vocations of the modern Irish woman, which again suggests that Fianna Fáil‟s stance 
toward women‟s work was more nuanced than previously appreciated. Concerns 
regarding the vocational role of women had appeared in the Irish Press as early as 
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December of 1933 when an article was printed under the headline “What Shall We Do 
with our Girls?”101 The author, apparently a woman but listed only as D.F., queried: “Are 
women going back to where they were twenty-five years ago?...Retrogression on the part 
of our sex would indeed be a step in the wrong direction.”102 Noting that poor economic 
conditions were threatening to flood the job market with women, the author stated that 
the problem could be solved if “Irish capital were diverted into home industries…[and] it 
requires small breadth of vision to see that this country must save itself by endeavouring 
to supply the nation‟s needs as far as possible, from within its own boundaries.”103 
According to D.F., possible vocations for women included accountancy, catering, 
auctioneering, publicity work, and law where “solicitor in preference to the Bar” was 
recommended.
104
 Despite the tentative acceptance of women in the workplace, the author 
cautioned: 
In Ireland of course, we regard religious vocations and marriage as the highest 
careers for women, but it is impossible to ignore the fact that for many reasons a 
big proportion of women do not marry. 
 
In justice, therefore, we cannot deny the intelligent woman with the necessary 
qualifications and possessing industry and ability, the right to be economically 
independent and have the free choice of a career. In the minor commercial 
positions undoubtedly women are a menace to men. This arises from the fact of 
men themselves refusing to pay an economic wage, and taking advantage of a glut 
in the labour market. If a living wage were paid and the standard of service raised 
the inefficient and pin money woman would be eliminated.
105
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Once again we find propaganda in the Press operating at the intersection between party 
politics/legislation and gendered tropes, as Fianna Fáil was clearly positioning women 
away from jobs meant for men.  Clear writes “The ban on women doing certain kinds of 
industrial work in the mid-1930s was a pragmatic attempt to prevent new industries from 
hiring female labour (by definition cheap) in preference to paying breadwinner wages to 
men, rather than an explicit attempt to limit women to the home.”106 Such policy was not 
unique to Ireland, as many nations, in response to the Depression, sought to direct female 
workers away from such traditionally male vocations as manufacturing or construction. 
Yet, in light of the gendered labeling utilized by Cumann na nGaedheal against its 
republican rivals, the desire to refocus and redefine feminine energies had implications 
beyond economic recovery in that there were nationalistic intentions in what Fianna Fáil 
was advocating.  
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, in addition to its intent to attain 
electoral success, Fianna Fáil was in the midst of a wide-ranging and all-encompassing 
effort to construct a new Irish state while the world was mired in an economic nadir. Daly 
has cited Fianna Fáil‟s concern with female employment as a means of “reversing 
population decline and creating employment, in part because the post-1929 international 
recession had meant a virtual end of emigration from Ireland—the safety valve of 
previous generations.”107 However, the distinction between economic safety-valve and 
paternalistic misogyny were not the sole reasons for Fianna Fáil‟s policies regarding 
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women‟s vocation. As with the examples given above regarding fashion, homemaking, 
and consumerism, the direction in which the party sought to guide women through the 
Irish Press was solely intended as part of constructing the nation anew. 
Thus it is readily evident that the woman‟s pages of the Irish Press were 
constructed in such a manner to guide women in a direction that best suited the aims of 
the party. Critically, Fianna Fáil was attempting to redefine notions of femininity and 
female existence to fit within its newly constructed Irish narrative. Beyond just mere 
politicization, Fianna Fáil sought to make everyday life an extension and daily 
reiteration/reaffirmation of a new existence where party affected all aspects of normative 
behavior. Mary Cullen has noted that many works of history “do treat the masculine role 
as the human norm, presenting a past of male agency and leadership and female passivity 
and dependency.”108 In the case of Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press in the years leading up 
to the Constitution of 1937, there was a distinct effort to construct a certain level of 
socio-political agency for women, at least in the sense that the party sought to make 
indistinguishable the political and the socio-cultural. In the Ireland that Fianna Fáil was 
seeking to construct, political activity was not solely limited to household work or 
preordained occupations. As such, relegating women to such roles were not simply a 
means to restore heternormativity , but also to appropriate women into Fianna Fáil‟s 
nationalist project. 
As prelude to a running discussion on women in the workforce, Sighle ní 
Chinnéide editorialized in 1935 that women must work because of the socio-economic 
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realities that Ireland faced in the 1930s.
109
 This implied that Fianna Fáil was able to 
concede the point of women in the workplace so as to secure a purely Irish workforce, yet 
they still maintained an attitude reflected by writer Nan Mahony who declared 
housekeeping to be “the greatest career of all.”110A series of editorials appeared in the 
Irish Press in early 1935 regarding women in the workforce, and came at a time when 
there were increases in labor force participation by women throughout Ireland.
111
 This 
very short-lived journalistic debate marked a fascinating turn for the Irish Press, as 
women writers were becoming both more visible—in that they were given featured 
bylines—and decidedly political.112 Ní Chinnéide‟s editorial from 18 January 1935 
opened by noting that a “certain hostility towards the woman worker has crept in amongst 
us.”113 She added: “While professing to have women‟s best interests at heart, quite 
responsible people now advocate the exclusion of women from public employment, that 
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they may be thereby inclined to return to their pre-war life as the cherished wives, sisters 
and mothers of bread-winners.”114 This latter point referred specifically to the Great 
War—note the absence of allusions to the Anglo-Irish War or Irish Civil War—having 
necessitated the increase in female labor and is of great interest, for it asserts that chaos 
and instability had created a problem that needed remedying. Ní Chinnéide further cited 
capitalism and the Industrial Revolution as both curses and blessings for women because 
they afforded female laborers an opportunity to demonstrate their vocational worth but 
also created the low rates of pay that “for women workers [was] the main cause of the 
real injustice.”115 Thus, Ní Chinnéide claimed, the conceptions of female labor in a 
Catholic nation such as Ireland needed to be rethought to better suit the realities of post-
war modernity, such that “when equal pay for equal service becomes the rule, then only, 
will the fathers of families obtain the preference to which they are entitled.”116 
In essence Ní Chinnéide argued that a system of equal pay would correct the 
imbalances created by capitalism and the Great War, not to mention provide “honest 
work for all citizens, men and women,” a message not unfamiliar to followers of Fianna 
Fáil‟s rhetoric. Ultimately, ní Chinnéide used feminist language to codify the role of 
women in the Ireland envisioned by Fianna Fáil. Rhetoric aside, there was no arguing that 
ní Chinnéide was readily defining the accepted place for women in the Irish economy: the 
primacy of the domestic ideal (“Women are generally the first to admit the married man‟s 
prior right to employment”); republican provision of work; and most importantly, the 
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positioning of women in a manner that supports but does not challenge the nationalistic 
aims of de Valera‟s party.  
Responses to ní Chinnéide‟s article were published the next week and were duly 
divided by gender. Among the male responses listed under the article header “Women 
Must Work While—Men Must Write—these letters,” were statements that centered upon 
the notion that motherhood was an “innate ambition of every female,” or that cited the 
importance of a stable and orderly home.
117
 Such sentiments clearly reflected the types of 
themes present in the earliest editions of the Irish Press. For example, a letter written by 
Sean Gearoid Traynor queried: 
If the solution of the difficulty is to be found, we must put back our clocks not 
twenty years, but forty or a hundred, if necessary. Who minds going back a little 
anyway? Certainly not the enthusiastically-minded political economist. Better to 
be dubbed a personified anachronism than look for a solution in a future that 
seems to be landsliding [sic] further into the political mire. If our men could find 
enough to do, our women should be happy in consequence. The fables say they 
were happy long ago. 
 
Let us first provide employment for our men; and if our unemployment queues 
are filled to overflowing with women we shall only have to pity them in their self-
created misery. Back to their homes! If instinct does not tell them this we shall be 
forced to devise a place of sending them to some desert island where, like Mark 
Twain‟s immortal company of charwomen, they can eke out an existence by 
taking in each other‟s washing.118 
 
Another reader made an implicit reference to the problems of emigration and late 
marriage and claimed that women‟s apathy regarding employment was due to single 
                                                        
117
 “Women Must Work While—Men Must Write—These Letters.” Irish Press, 24 
January 24 1935, 5. 
118
 Sean Gearoid Traynor, “The Remedies are not Modern,” ibid.  
132 
 
status, as they tended to “concede the prior right of employment to husbands which they 
have denied to potential fathers of families.”119  
Ní Chinnéide responsed to these writers logically and dispassionately: 
My main thesis—that in this modern man-made world women must, of necessity, 
find work outside their homes—remains unchallenged. Instead of trying to 
disprove this fact your chief male correspondent indulges in a glorious onslaught 
on a number of absurd unchristian theories which have no place in my original 
article… 
 
In Ireland the great body of women workers is composed of—(1) Elderly 
spinsters whose hopes of matrimony have long passed away; (2) Girls in their 
twenties who will, for the most part, marry eventually; (3) Those comparatively 
few women who wish to exercise their undoubted right, as individuals, to remain 
single; (4) Widows; (5) Mothers with ne‟er-do-well husbands. These classes of 
people will always be with us, and it is for them, primarily, that the plea for fair 
play was made; that, in the Ireland to-morrow [sic], they may not be deprived of 
their hard earned right to occupy those positions for which by ability, education 
and training they are best fitted.
120
 
 
Ní Chinnéide‟s response remained the final word on the subject and can be seen as most 
representative of Fianna Fáil‟s position. Indeed, ní Chinnéide accepted—if not 
advocated—the primacy of the male in the work place, yet there was still a rather 
progressive element to her arguments. Having women in the workplace, she argued, was 
an inescapable facet of modernity as well as the nationalist project. 
Indeed the “ní Chinnéide exchange” was a precursor to the series of articles that 
appeared throughout 1935. This series began a mere four days after ní Chinnéide‟s 
riposte to her critics and explored the career options for young Irish women who were 
neither interested in nor perhaps able to dedicate their lives to housekeeping. The 
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introduction to the series promised that career women from all fields would assess their 
careers in these articles, “giving you solid data, [and] will add to them the benefit of her 
own wise advice and experience.”121 However, the rest of the article was filled with 
warnings regarding these professions, as Nan Mahony declared that housekeeping was 
the career in which she was most interested. She added that “the intelligent girl, with a 
trained mind, makes a better housekeeper than the girl with good biceps but not mind,”122 
insinuating that the professions to be addressed in future columns might, in fact, lead 
women back to the home. This passive-aggressive approach was indicative of Fianna 
Fáil‟s position regarding professional women, in that so long as their vocational choices 
fit within their approved frameworks—as well as accepting the primacy of domesticity—
then women were “free” to enter Ireland‟s workforce. 
The careers given read like a list of so-called “traditional” jobs for women: 
Nursing;
123
 Domestic Economy Teaching;
124
 Civil Service—not if you planned to marry, 
however;
125
 Technical Teaching;
126
 Woman of the Land;
127
 Professional Bean Tighe 
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(housekeeper);
128
 Waitress;
129
 Librarian;
130
 Telephonist;
131
 and Draper
132
, among others. 
Exceptional columns exploring careers as doctors, pharmacists, and journalists were 
largely written in a way that was discouraging, noting the long hours, difficult road, and 
general hardships toward attaining these positions. Indeed, there must have been 
difficulties for women entering these positions, yet in light of the general sentiment 
encouraging women toward domesticity, the bias against professional was clear.
133
 
Moreover, the lack of politicization as well as the emphasis on careers as Ireland‟s 
caregivers fits within the larger trend regarding careers for women, not to mention Fianna 
Fáil‟s concerns with promoting what might be called a “contained feminine.” This series 
on women‟s vocations was, therefore, part of the much larger trend by Fianna Fáil to 
balance modernity with its primordialist national discourse. Moreover, it was 
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representative of the party‟s effort to establish acceptable frameworks for women who 
did not fit within that of the much-preferred domestic. 
1936 marked a further, more radical departure in regards to the representation of 
women in the Irish Press. Throughout the year there was an explicit move away from the 
heavy-handed articles on fashion and domesticity that had been seen from 1931 to 1935, 
as there now appeared on the women‟s page an intersection between women and Irish 
politics. On 21 March 1936, the Press announced the reconstitution of the women‟s page, 
cementing its status as being concerned with both the domestic and public lives of Irish 
women.
134
 That year also saw a regular feature entitled “Women in the News,” which 
included columns dedicated to charting the philanthropic and social activities of 
prominent Irish women. Another innovation was the increased presence of female writers 
whose articles were often accompanied by photographs of either the author or the subject 
of said column. In the 11 March 1936 edition of the Press, there occurred the first 
recognition of feminist organizations, with a “Women in the News” column that 
announced the formation of Mná na hEireann (Women of Ireland) and Mná na 
Poblachta (Women of the Republic). The article neither promoted nor condemned the 
groups, stating only that they were purely republican. Articles written by Hanna Sheehy 
Skeffington, a longtime advocate of women‟s rights, saw a push toward the construction 
of a new Irish feminism, which—informed by the horrors of World War I, a war that she 
had demonstrated against—promoted pacifism and greater sense of gendered equality.135 
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When viewed within the political context of 1936, the association with Skeffington‟s 
vision of feminism enabled Fianna Fáil to put up a stronger bulwark against claims by 
their enemies of communistic leanings. This trend toward appealing toward a more 
explicitly politically aware readership can be seen as setting the foundation for the 
headline which was emblazoned across the 4 November 1936 edition of the Irish Press 
which read: “Mr De Valera Outlines the New Constitution.” 
 In the years leading up to the passage of the Bunreacht na hÉireann in 1937, the 
Irish Press served as the most consistent example of Fianna Fáil‟s effort to define 
acceptable definitions of femininity. As the 1930s progressed, the party‟s female norms 
changed, reflecting both its electoral successes and its increasingly sure-footed sense of 
the aesthetics of private and public life. Granted, there was a distinct level of paternalism, 
if not misogyny, in the legislation of Fianna Fáil in the 1930s, yet in the party‟s 
envisioned Ireland, women were to be both the physical embodiment of the nation, and 
the main consumers of its products. This was the level of agency granted by Fianna Fáil 
in its overarching efforts to establish and independent republic. Additionally, women 
were not just relegated to the embodiments of the primordial notion of both femininity 
and Irish national identity. Like the male—whom Fianna Fáil defined as upholders of 
traditional, Catholic manliness, and as the muscle behind the modernization and 
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industrialization of Ireland—the female of Ireland was also encouraged to accept and 
utilize aspects of modernity in the effort to construct an Irish Republic. Such evidence 
stands in direct contrast to de Valera‟s call for a nation of comely maidens, instead being 
more representative of the participatory ethos so common to third-way governments 
throughout Europe in the interwar period. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THREE 
 
Figure 3.1: “In Brown and Beige,” Irish Press, 1 October 1931, 3. 
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Figure 3.2: “Fashions to Please,” Irish Press, 6 April 1934, 5. 
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Figure 3.3: “Distinctive…,” Irish Press, 1 December 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.4: “Cape Effects…,” Irish Press, 16 August 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.5: “Distinctive,” Irish Press, 14 November 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.6: “Fashion’s Latest Whims Need Not Alarm Us,” Irish Press, 8 January 
1934, 5. 
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Figure 3.7: “Tweed Five Piece,” Irish Press, 6 November 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.8: “On the Journey,” Irish Press, 9 November 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.9: “Home Wear,” Irish Press, 4 November 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.10: “Be Individual in your Clothes,” Irish Press, 4 November 1932, 3.  
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Figure 3.11: “Bright Days are Coming!,” Irish Press, 10 March 1932, 3. 
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Figure 3.12:  “Morning in the Irish Home,” Irish Press, 7 June 1933, 3. 
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Figure 3.13: “Irish Woolens Only in the All-Irish Home,” Irish Press, 24 June 1933, 
5. 
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Figure 3.14: “Cleanliness Is Next to Godliness,” Irish Press, 7 June 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.15: “No 10: Footwear for the Irish Home,” Irish Press, 8 July 1933, 5. 
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Figure 3.16: “The Irish Ideal Home,” Irish Press, 6 December 1934, 5. 
 
154 
 
Chapter Four 
“Put the Laggards Out!” Fianna Fáil and the Aesthetics of Masculinity 1932-1938 
 
―Il coraggio, l‘audacia, la ribellione, saranno elementi ssenziali della nostra 
poesia…Noi vogliam esaltare il movimento aggressivo, l‘insonnia febrile, il 
passo di corsa…‖1 
 —Futurist Manifesto 
 
 
More than a mere political party, Fianna Fáil sought to be a full-fledged 
nationalist project operating within a democratic framework facilitating the transition 
from colony to independent state. The Treaty that ended the Anglo-Irish War, and the 
Free State it created, enabled Fianna Fáil to shift republican discourse from an anti-
colonial reactionary rhetoric to an active, multileveled nation-building project. Because 
the party leaders viewed the Free State as a temporary transition from colony to 
independence, they embraced a rhetoric aimed toward both destroying the last vestiges of 
British interference and actively constructing the facets of a modern, independent nation-
state. Having broken free from their Sinn Féin roots, they—legitimated by electoral 
successes—reoriented representations of themselves from the feminized images created 
by Cumann na nGaedheal by constructing a nationalist project steeped in masculinism.  
In particular, when viewed through the prism of gender, the Anglo-Irish 
Economic War of 1932-37 elucidates the mechanics of Fianna Fáil‘s construction of an 
independent Ireland in a renascent republican image. Fianna Fáil represented its work as 
an effort to instill a command of means—a distillation of nationalistic efforts into the 
everyday. The party transcended class and history, as it was neither encumbered by 
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Marxian trappings nor beholden to a liberal-capitalist lineage; rather, its immediate 
concerns centered on problems not salvageable by nineteenth-century ideologies. As 
Brian Girvin notes, ―these policies coincided with and reinforced a conviction within 
Fianna Fáil that a new age had begun: one in which sovereign Ireland would finally break 
the historic connection with the United Kingdom and establish a specifically Irish 
dimension to social life and the economy.‖2 The party was concerned with the infinitely 
Irish problem of reconciling traditionalism with the realities of modernity; both the 
latter‘s fixation with imperialism and industry and the former‘s role in creating a 
harmonious social unit. The problem of Ireland‘s colonial ties—compounded by the 
instabilities of the inter-war period—enabled a nationalist project that advanced a 
uniquely twentieth-century approach, and the question remained as to how this model 
would be presented to the Irish people.  
Intriguingly, the interwar period actually provided various avenues for the 
creation of an independent Irish state, with Fianna Fáil crafting a nationalist program 
encased within masculine rhetoric.  This presentation seeks to demonstrate how Fianna 
Fáil engaged in a hegemonic struggle aimed toward forging a new republican power bloc, 
which utilized common tropes in order to naturalize its ideology within the nation‘s 
public discourse.  Drawing on these gendered frameworks, Fianna Fáil fashioned an 
ideology aimed toward restoring an imagined social harmony, but bent on correcting the 
legacies of the colonial past.  
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Having emerged from a contentious six-year battle in which it depended largely 
on broadsides and pamphlets to combat Cumanna na nGaedheal‘s gendered attacks, 
Fianna Fáil—upon its election into government—began to affect a more aesthetic 
expression of party policy. Abandoning Sinn Féin‘s policy of abstention from the Dáil, 
Fianna Fáil had become an active participant in an entity that they ultimately sought to 
destroy. The means by which the party advanced its socio-economic nationalist agenda 
for a new republican movement were as follows: first, through the establishment of a 
profoundly gendered active/passive dialectic between itself and Cumann na nGaedheal 
(and, later, Fine Gael); second, through the assertion of an aesthetic of masculinity and 
growth, readily seen in Fianna Fáil‘s economic propaganda; and, finally, in the Economic 
War where de Valera‘s party forged a nexus between these active and masculine 
personae to protect the nation from the last vestiges of British colonialism. 
In short, in the years between 1932 and 1938
3
 the socio-political and economic 
constructs of Ireland were reimagined by the conscious nationalist thrust of Fianna Fáil. 
The recasting of Irish republicanism under the guise of de Valera‘s party coalesced 
around its larger discourse, such that all aspects of the Irish polity came to be viewed in 
direct relation to the renascent movement. While the previous chapters have 
demonstrated the manner in which the party reconstituted its gendered discourse as well 
as how it harnessed and re-imagined the role of women in Ireland, the present chapter 
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depicts the party in its more aggressive and activist economic policies. Joe Lee notes that 
―the annuities controversy provided the focal point of Anglo-Irish conflict in 1932. The 
issue fused emotional and economic appeal in an optimum electoral manner for de 
Valera.‖4 Having then been twice elected into government in 1932, Fianna Fáil seized its 
opportunity and initiated an economic campaign that sought to promote Irish industry 
through protectionism, in turn weakening ties to Britain and thus invalidating the entire 
purpose of the Free State.  
This approach by Fianna Fáil complemented the party‘s view of women, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, for the party‘s rhetoric regarding women showed 
how the party sought to refocus their energies in the interests of the republic. Although a 
far cry from the revolutionary thrust of such groups as Cumann na mBan and Inghinide 
na hÉireann, there was nevertheless an attempt to reconcile the role of feminine activity 
within Fianna Fáil‘s party rhetoric. Most important were the lengths to which the party 
went in order to establish a gendered discourse clearly marking what was acceptable and 
thus worthy of inclusion in the republican model which it was in the process of creating. 
Further, the promotion and fetishization of Irish goods underscored the party‘s overall 
economic approach in the years after 1932. As we have seen, Fianna Fáil positioned 
women in such a manner that they were still servants to the masculine. 
An analysis of Fianna Fáil‘s economic program for the period between 1932 and 
1938 reveals a parallel effort to construct a new nation upon a masculine, aggressive, and 
activist base. Using the palingenetic model as a prism, we find that the party—unlike its 
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political opponents—bridged the chasm between primordial nationalism and modernist 
nationalism. That is to say there was a balance struck between the cultural Gaelicism that 
had already taken root in Ireland and the realities of modernity. Fianna Fáil set out to 
combine the two—the glance to the past justifying the push toward the future. Such an 
approach also positioned its opponents as either reactionary or passive. In light of 
Ireland‘s postcolonial struggles, as well as the larger socio-economic conditions of 
Europe and the world following the Great War, Fianna Fáil‘s rhetorical frameworks 
reflected the same anxieties and solutions to the problems facing other nationalistic 
movements of the time. As such, the party adopted gendered means of clearly 
establishing what was deemed acceptable (male, active) and unacceptable (feminine, 
queered/othered) for the state that it was constructing.  
In looking at Fianna Fáil‘s economic program during the Formative Era, many 
historians have tended to focus on the party‘s protectionist policy or its propensity to 
misrepresent the effectiveness of its legislation.  For example, Mary Daly‘s article ―An 
Irish-Ireland for Business?: the Control of Manufactures Acts, 1932 and 1934,‖ 
demonstrates that Fianna Fáil‘s public rhetoric of protectionism and overall effort to 
ensure that Irish-funded businesses were given a clear path to success.
5
 While Daly 
examines the failure of the party‘s efforts to limit—if not eliminate—foreign capital in 
the name of promoting Irish industry, she does not go far enough to wed the relationship 
between legislation and party rhetoric. Viewed simply as legislative initiative, the Control 
of Manufactures Acts, ―only served to artificially boost a protected Irish capitalist class, 
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who benefited from the profits of a protected market, but were incapable of using these 
profits to underpin genuinely innovative investment.‖6 Where the acts were more 
successful, however, was the manner in which they underscored Fianna Fáil‘s activist 
economic ambition. It is impossible to distinguish between the party‘s legislative activity 
and its nationalist ambitions. In light of earlier assertions regarding Fianna Fáil‘s 
envisioned role of women as republican consumers of native-produced goods, it is thus 
clear that the party‘s push toward an independent republic and its legislative actions 
existed symbiotically. 
 Indeed, for many historians, Fianna Fáil has remained elusive and difficult to 
define—was the party capitalist? Was it socialist? Speaking of the interwar global 
economic malaise, Roy Foster has noted the fine line trod by political entities and ―how 
to approach the problems of recession in a manner that provided an alternative both to 
failed free-market capitalism and untried by alarming totalitarianism.‖7 Daly, meanwhile, 
has written that de Valera‘s economic ―agenda was an amalgam of nationalist and quasi-
socialist policies often stolen from the manifestos of left-wing republican organizations, 
tempered by Gaelic antiquarianism and Catholic social teaching as found in papal 
encyclicals such as Rerum Novarum or Quadragesimo Anno.‖8 Meanwhile, Lee has noted 
that ―while de Valera liked to dwell on the idea of a ‗balanced‘ economy, [Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, Seán] Lemass pursued a policy that was neither balanced nor 
unbalanced, but simply improvised.‖9  
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Essentially, Fianna Fáil was tasked with overseeing Ireland‘s economy in a period 
in which the nineteenth-century liberal/Marxian divide was deemed by inter-war 
nationalist groups as either ineffective or incompatible with the challenges of modernity. 
As was the case with many nationalist parties elsewhere in the interwar period, Fianna 
Fáil forged a third option either as a means of economic correction or out of political 
expediency. The improvisational skills of Lemass, as well as the rejection of capitalistic 
passivity and Catholic hostility to fundamental Marxism, encouraged Fianna Fáil to seek 
alternative paths. In this sense, the party was willing to embrace modernist approaches to 
economic thought in a manner akin to what was happening on the Continent. While 
capitalist dogma stressed the invisible hand and Marxian ideologies advanced classism, 
neither was necessarily conducive to the socio-economic and political nationalism of 
Fianna Fáil. As such it is important to situate the party‘s economic ideology within the 
larger trends of the 1920s and 1930s, in order to gain greater insight into how the party 
forged this inseparable link between party, people, and policy. 
Brian Girvin notes that the Fianna Fáil‘s economic and political policies were 
mutually inclusive, and that the Economic War ―provided the opportunity to reduce 
Ireland‘s dependence on the United Kingdom and to reorganize the economy along lines 
more congenial to (Seán) Lemass‘s developmental nationalism.‖10 ―Fianna Fáil,‖ he 
contends, ―provided an interventionist framework within which Irish sovereignty could 
be asserted in economic and social policy.‖11 Daly supports such an assertion, noting that 
the promotion of native industry and entrepreneurial investment advanced by The Control 
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of Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934 were promoted despite ―no evidence that 
hostility to foreign capital investment in Ireland predated the establishment of the Irish 
Free State, perhaps because the scale of such investment was insignificant.‖12 While 
much of Girvin‘s work analyzes the level of success to which the republicans in power 
attained economically, my concern is the way in which Fianna Fáil utilized its economic 
positions as means to advance their nationalistic cause.  
 
 „The Damn Fool Business‟ of the Ottawa Economic Conference of 1932 
 Like many nationalist projects of the early twentieth century, Fianna Fáil policy 
and propaganda were largely constructed upon a binary in which activity and passivity 
were delineated within gendered constructs. In essence, it is my contention that the Irish 
Republic that emerged in the latter 1930s was a Fianna Fáil construct; a product of the 
party‘s efforts to recast Ireland‘s socio-political and economic frameworks. However, 
Fianna Fáil‘s intended path toward an Irish Republic would have been fruitless had it not 
been for the democratic foundation established by the Free State. The same democratic 
constructs that had invalidated Sinn Féin‘s physical force methods enabled the 
reconstitution of republicanism as advanced by Fianna Fáil. As such, it is important to 
reiterate that nearly everything Fianna Fáil did during the Formative Era was part of a 
larger effort to discursively dismantle the perceived connections between the Free State 
and Great Britain with the ultimate goal of creating an independent Irish state. This is not 
to say, however, that Fianna Fáil was absolutist in their self-aggrandizement, especially 
after its time in government beginning in 1932, for the party did effectively govern the 
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Free State at the same time that it continued its nationalistic push. This paradox was not 
lost upon the members of the party, and as chapter two demonstrated, it was a key factor 
in their appeal to the Irish voter. 
 The Ottawa Economic Conference of 1932 marked the beginning of the 
transformation of Britain‘s empire from a military-political empire into that of an 
economic union where the playing field was clearly put in favor of John Bull. It also 
afforded members of the Empire an opportunity to openly defy and question British 
policy.
13
 The April conference was held less than two months after Fianna Fáil‘s 
remarkable electoral gains ushered in the party‘s first coalition, resulting in a whirlwind 
of activity from the party. It played host to the visit to Ireland by a Papal Legation 
marking the 1,500
th
 anniversary of St. Patrick‘s mission to Ireland; it spearheaded 
legislation to remove the Oath of Allegience from the Free State
14
; its hardened stance 
against the payment of land annuities heightened tensions between Ireland and Britain; 
and it began to debate in the Dáil the party‘s first budget (passed 12 May 1932).15 As 
such, the conference took place at a time when the delegation that was to represent 
Ireland in Ottawa was explicitly and aggressively challenging the nature of Britain‘s 
authority over the island. To be certain, tensions between Ireland and Britain were high, 
and Fianna Fáil‘s intransigence played a significant role in shaping the two countries‘ 
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diplomatic efforts. Indeed, Fianna Fáil‘s attacks on the Oath yielded responses from the 
prime ministers of New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa.
16
 
The Ottawa conference had been called to reassert England‘s primacy in 
regulating tariff rates, which had grown markedly due to interwar economic anxieties and 
complicated by nationalist stirrings among the nations united in the empire. The central 
point of confluence was the Import Duties Act of 1932 that resulted in a ten percent 
increase of import rates. Exempted permanently were colonies, while Dominions were 
granted conditional rights on products coming into their nation from Britain. D.K. 
Fieldhouse writes, ―The implied condition was that Britain would expect new or 
increased preferences in Dominion and colonial markets.‖17 Despite the best intentions of 
the British delegation, the conference was ―confused and generally ill-tempered,‖18 a 
sentiment no doubt due in large part to the aggravation of the Irish delegation comprised 
of Fianna Fáil republicans emboldened by their electoral victory just months prior. In 
regard to the Anglo-Irish divide, the conference at Ottawa marked a watershed in the 
Economic War—a ―conflict‖ fought between an increasingly distracted British 
government and an electorally-emboldened Fianna Fáil. 
It is a rather difficult task to summarize the origins and the nature of the 
Economic War between Ireland and Britain, for the conflict represented an attempt to 
rectify to a long-simmering debate regarding annuity payments. Beginnings with its 
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inception, Fianna Fáil sought to end the payments of the land annuities to Britain—
payments by Irish farmers on loans granted by the myriad land acts passed between 1891 
and 1909. Terence Dooley notes that the ―annuities question allowed de Valera to link 
once again the land question with Irish nationalism.‖19 Further, the annuity question 
justified Fianna Fáil‘s economic self-sufficiency and protectionist policies to be advanced 
from party rhetoric to national endeavor. The so-called ―war‖ comprised of legislative 
action including British duties on Irish imports as well as Irish duties on coal and other 
British goods. Writing in 1934, Henry Harrison, O.B.E. observed: 
‗Economic War‘ is trade war and, as such, something of a contradiction. It is 
waged not by successful trade operations, but by the destruction and suicide of 
trade. Trade is a human activity resting upon the incentive of mutual advantage. 
The usual trade or ‗economic war‘ arises out of a conflict as to the apportionment 
of that mutual advantage between the respective trading communities, and is 
marked by its diminution pending reconciliation. But a trade or economic war, 
waged to achieve a non-trading or non-economic purpose, involves inevitably a 
lavish cutting-off of domestic noses in order to spite foreign faces. Mutual loss 
instead of mutual benefit is pursued in the pious hope that it will prove more 
painful and more dangerous to one‘s opponent than to oneself. 
 
The economic war against the Irish Free State was started by Britain in July, 
1932, with the enactment of the Irish Free State (Special Duties) Act, 1932, and 
the imposition of special import duties to be levied upon the Irish imports and 
upon Irish imports alone.
20
 
 
Harisson later declared Ireland the initial victor in the conflict—at least in the short-
term—but his most keen observation comes from the war as being a purely political 
conflict. 
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The Economic War with England is a central example of party policy that was 
rooted in nationalist aims. Although the Economic War and its core issue regarding 
annuity payments owed to England had rhetorical origins in early Sinn Féin policy, the 
―war‖ began in earnest shortly after the Ottawa Conference. Using the private 
correspondence of Sean T. O‘Ceallaigh21 as a guide, it appeared as if the British were 
willing to make economic concessions, so long as Ireland chose not to pursue its 
aggressive political agenda. It is thus clear that the whole sequence of events was 
politicized so as to be a key component of Fianna Fáil‘s economic rhetoric. The sticking 
point between the two sides was indeed political, thus enabling the economic split to 
fester as the decade wore one, and making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
the political and economic questions. Further, this allowed de Valera and his followers to 
make a tariff issue into a larger, national issue of republicanizing Ireland, where 
economics, politics, and Irishness became intermeshed. Of course, other political groups, 
such as Sinn Féin, Saor Éire, and the Irish Labour Party, were largely constructed around 
economic aims. The question becomes, therefore, how was Fianna Fáil able to parlay its 
economic policy into political gain. 
 Writing from the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa on 8 August 1932, O‘Kelly 
penned a letter marked ―Personal & Confidential.‖ Although not explicit, it can be 
                                                        
21
 In keeping with the policy of using Anglicized rather than Gaelicized names in the text, 
all future references to Sean T. O‘Kelly shall use such associations, but when referring to his 
collection of papers at the National Library of Ireland, I shall maintain said entity‘s usage. Sean 
T. O‘Kelly (1882-1966) began his career as a Gaelic nationalist, serving as national secretary of 
the Gaelic League, and was a founding member of Sinn Féin. O‘Kelly was imprisoned for his role 
in the Easter Rising, and after siding with the anti-Treaty side, he travelled to the United States as 
envoy for de Valera, returning in 1926 to be a founding member of Fianna Fáil. After the 1932 
election, O‘Kelly served as Cabinet Minister for Public Health, Vice-President of the Executive 
Council, as well as Tánaiste (Deputy Taoiseach). Patrick Maume, ―Seán Thomas O‘Kelly,‖ 
Dictionary, Volume 7, 615-19. 
166 
 
assumed that the letter was intended for de Valera, as it is similar in scope and tone to 
others written at the same time. In the letter, O‘Kelly sought to give a ―brief resume of 
my impressions of the discussions with Stanley Baldwin and John Thomas
22
, as far as 
they have gone.‖23 The ensuing letter detailing diplomatic maneuverings revealed a 
certain level of understanding between the representatives of Ireland and Britain 
regarding the political considerations of their economic dispute. In reference to the Oath, 
O‘Kelly implied that the British were willing to bury the issue assuming that Fianna Fáil 
suppressed its republican/nationalistic efforts. O‘Kelly wrote that in his talks with British 
diplomats ―the question of the Oath was never once mentioned,‖ and ―perhaps it may be 
no harm to mention also that one night at dinner a couple of weeks ago, Mrs. Runciman, 
wife of the British Minister, said to [Sean] Lemass that they (the British) did not care a 
damn about the Oath, but that they did not intend to let us get away with the land 
Annuities.‖24 The implication was that the British were willing to acquiesce to Fianna 
Fáil‘s political efforts, thus demonstrating that the symbolic importance of the Oath was 
more of an Irish concern, but that the practical matter of the annuities mattered more to 
the British.  
 In the same letter, O‘Kelly sought to convey Britain‘s position in regard to the 
fight over tariffs and the land annuities. Referring to a discussion with Baldwin, O‘Kelly 
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wrote that the Tory leader considered that ―this present dispute…was a ‗damn fool 
business‘. He could not see any profit coming out of it on either side.‖25 He continued:  
It seems to me, neverthless [sic], that they feel that, now that the fight is on, they 
have us in a position where they can squeeze us to advantage for political 
purposes. I get the impression that they regret now their haste in imposing the 
tariffs, but they say to themselves, the unwise step having been taken, we may as 
well go forward now and get some profit out of it on the political side. It appears 
to me that, if they could get some even slight political profit of the nature of a 
statement or declaration by you that we would only progress nationally in a 
constitutional way, they would be prepared to make what we might regard as a 
reasonable settlement on the financial issues. Of course, I know that if they got 
the political statement they are looking for, they would immediately harden on the 
financial side. If, therefore, there be any thought of making a statement such as 
they would regard as satisfactory from their point of view, this should not be done 
until we had driven them to the utmost limit on the financial side. We should also, 
in my opinion, use the situation to settle the position of the Governor General to 
our satisfaction.
26
 
 
There is rather clear evidence from this letter that both sides sought to take advantage of 
the worsening economic situation for their own political gains; for Ireland it meant the 
ability to make a greater push toward republicanism and the dissolution of annuity 
payments, and for the British, it appeared that they could use the economic conflict as a 
means to persuade Fianna Fáil to scale back this same political agenda.  
 The Economic War was a construct—that is to say, something that developed 
knowingly and purposefully, as opposed to something which was a long-developing, 
multi-faceted series of complex events—and part of the nationalist creation of Fianna 
Fáil. This is not to say, however, that Fianna Fáil ―created‖ a conflict with Britain over 
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land rights and annuity payments nor that Britain‘s imposition of tariffs on Irish cattle 
occurred at the direction of Fianna Fáil. Still, in another undated letter likely to have been 
written by O‘Kelly at Ottawa he appeared confident that the British might be willing to 
negotiate the land issue with Fianna Fáil, but that they were hesitant to concede to the 
party‘s political aims. In the letter O‘Kelly noted that ―The British are much more 
interested in the Constitutional portion than the financial position…Again and again it 
was suggested that a deal over the Land Annuities, satisfactory won [sic], would be made 
if E[amon] deV[alera] would make a declaration on the political issue satisfactory to the 
British.‖27 O‘Kelly continued, noting that the British would concede the annuity issue if 
de Valera would accept a position commensurate with other members of the 
Commonwealth. Further, he wrote, ―the main anxiety of [the] British on constitutional 
position arose from [de Valera‘s] statement that he would seek [a] mandate for [a] 
Republic at [the next] Election.‖28 Even here, we find the fundamental and immutable 
link between Fianna Fáil‘s economic and political agendas. Indeed, the two were 
intermeshed and mutually inclusive.  
 In a letter dated 25 July 1932, D. O‘Donovan commented on the strengthening of 
Ireland‘s position in the nascent economic conflict with England.29 He noted:  
It is astonishing to hear within so short a time so many people express the fear 
that England will agree to unrestricted arbitration. There is a growing feeling that 
we are strong enough to take an uncompromising stand: accept England‘s last 
decision as final; apply the annuities and other moneys to defensive and 
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development purposes; and negotiate no more. That line would probably make 
your position in Ottawa untenable but I should imagine it is almost that already. 
Comments on your attitude and work over there are very favourable.
30
 
 
The last line in this paragraph emphasizes that Fianna Fáil was taking a very calculated 
risk in its entering into a prolonged economic ―battle‖ with England, with public opinion 
and electoral support being the prize. Indeed, there was the matter of principle in 
retaining the annuity payments, but in terms of electoral popularity and the overall thrust 
toward an independent state, such a premeditated position was far more tenable with the 
knowledge of electoral support. Further support for the party‘s stance regarding the 
annuities was the knowledge that England had no desire to engage with Ireland beyond 
the effort to prevent it from leaving the Commonwealth to form an independent state. In 
the same letter, O‘Donovan wrote: ―Judging by my own contacts I think the main fear is 
that England will climb down too soon—before we get under way the defensive measures 
from which greater hardening of feeling and many at home regard this as a providential 
opportunity to achieve a real unity.‖31 In light of the conflict being waged as a means to 
build and expand Fianna Fáil policy, the party sought the issue to remain at the fore of the 
public‘s attention. After all, this was Fianna Fáil‘s conflict. 
 While on board the S.S. Laurentic en route to Ottawa, O‘Kelley had pondered 
Ireland‘s goals at the conference, most notably the aggressive position of a policy of 
isolationism. In a letter addressed to ―A hUachtaran a Chara32,‖ (de Valera) he weighed 
the consequences of policy on economic realities—another example of Fianna Fáil‘s 
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break from the idealistic economic stances of Sinn Féin. However, like their former 
brethren, there was a clear concern regarding the viability of such an economic policy as 
a measure toward the advancement of an independent state. Again, the matter of public 
opinion and electoral concerns came to the fore. Regarding the the impact of British 
tariffs against Irish goods, O‘Kelly wrote: 
The great danger, of course, is the effect of the British action on public opinion. I 
suppose you have considered bringing the constitutional special powers clause 
into operation. If there is any deliberate attempt to produce a panic, it should be 
done, but consider first whether it would not appear a sign of weakness on our 
own part. 
 
I think that the present situation, if right handled, can prove of permanent benefit 
to the Free State if our people are prepared to stick out the transition stage. We 
can alleviate hardship by the Relief expenditure already provided for any 
additional expenditure which can be made possible by a rearrangement on the 
Budget or, if necessary, by borrowing…The situation calls for wide powers of 
action and freedom of movement in the hands of the Government…33 
 
Once more we find reference to the importance of a sustained conflict to the fortunes of 
de Valera‘s party. Further, the correspondence between Ottawa and Dublin reveals a 
foundational policy that further wed economic strategy and nationalistic ambitions. 
 The concern with public response—seen in both the O‘Donovan and O‘Kelly 
letters—is similarly reflected in a cablegram written by de Valera, sent on 9 August 1932. 
In it, he stated:  
The Treaty or Secession not involved in Government attitude towards the Oath 
and Empire Tribunal. Whether in favour of remaining within the Commonwealth 
or not Government attitude towards Oath and Empire Tribunal would be the 
same. 
 
The future will depend on the state of public opinion within Ireland. Given a free 
choice between a united Ireland within the Commonwealth in a position of full 
co-equality with Britain and a separate independent Republic, it would be difficult 
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to prophesy what the people‘s decision would be…With Ireland as an 
Independent Republic I believe that desire is more likely to be realised than with 
Ireland forced against its will to be part of the Empire. This personal view, 
however, matters little. It is the public opinion of the future that will count and no 
man can tell in advance what that will be.
34
 
 
In this short excerpt, one can glean the duplicitous, if not genius, position taken by de 
Valera. In response to Britain‘s balking at Fianna Fáil‘s push toward a republic, de Valera 
offers the Irish position as being out of his hands; instead the decision was to be made by 
the electorate. In diplomatic terms de Valera was forging a new style of abstention, 
stating that the matter of the Republic should be left to the machinations of the Free State 
democracy—a democracy constructed in part by the British. In the meantime, Fianna Fáil 
would still maintain its intransigence regarding the annuity payments. Meanwhile—as 
will be demonstrated in the chapter below—de Valera and his party would use an 
electoral rhetoric rooted in manhood for securing Ireland‘s independence via the 
destruction of the Free State. Simply put, de Valera was having it both ways: on the one 
hand, he was the head of a nationalistic party founded on the principle that an 
independent state as its ultimate aim diplomatically, and on the other, he was playing coy 
with the British regarding the possible declaration of a republic.  
Such sentiment is supported by a telegram sent from the Dominions Office to the 
High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada, dated 15 August 1932. The 
lengthy cipher revealed that the British were spying on de Valera‘s wife, but more 
importantly that the Irish President was unwilling to place the issue of a republic as an 
explicit goal in terms of Ireland‘s relations with England. This was evidenced by the 
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author, who claimed: ―Generally, de Valera desired friendship with [the] United 
Kingdom; although personally in favour of [a] Republic he was not prepared to lead the 
people in demand for one while Great Britain regarded it as an hostile act. His desire for 
[a] republic ‗did not affect relationship of I.F.S. to the British Commonwealth.‘‖35  
 This brief analysis of the perceptions of Anglo-Irish relations at the Ottawa 
Economic Conference—at the very beginning of the Economic War—demonstrates three 
points: first that the Irish instigated the Economic War with the knowledge that Britain 
was willing to concede the annuities so long as Ireland did not actively seek an 
independent republic; second, the Economic War was a Fianna Fáil construct aimed at 
further advancing their nationalistic aims; and third, that such a position was a diplomatic 
gamble rooted in a larger effort to attain electoral gain. All told, these factors contributed 
to the seemingly aggressive economic policy that Fianna Fáil would advocated as part of 
its larger socio-political rhetoric. Most important, however, was the fact that Fianna Fáil 
headed into a prolonged economic conflict based on the conceit that Britain was willing 
to concede many of the points for which Ireland was ―fighting.‖ Having established 
operable boundaries in terms of its relations with England, Fianna Fáil was free to pursue 
a hyper-masculanized economic nationalist thrust. Stated simply, this ―conflict‖ with 
Britain was a calculated gamble.  
 
A Logical Attack on the Annuities 
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 Having triumphantly deflected claims of being harbingers of renewed violence 
and conflict with Great Britain, Fianna Fáil now restarted its fight against the land 
annuities.  The annuities totaled about £5 million per year, and, Kevin O‘Rourke points 
out, were a significant part of the Free State‘s ―GNP of roughly £150 million annually.‖36 
In language similar to the logical and pacifistic tomes used in its early years, Fianna Fáil 
couched its rhetorical battle against the annuities with appeals to law, national tradition, 
and reason. Distinguishing Fianna Fáil‘s public discourse on the annuity issue was an 
underlying sense of manly activism and guardianship that would become increasingly 
evident throughout the party‘s economic efforts in the years between 1932 and 1938. 
Instilled with confidence that resulted from its experience at Ottawa, the party 
aggressively—but cautiously—sought to sell the Economic War to the Irish people.  
 Published late in 1932, Fianna Fáil issued a pamphlet that laid out the logic for its 
opposition to these payments. This document made clear the ties between the party‘s 
nationalist platform and its economic policies. Further, one finds that the party‘s socio-
cultural ideal was so interlocked with its economic policy that one aspect served the 
other, so that no one single element could be removed from the larger effort. For 
example, refusing to pay the annuities was presented as both a simple matter of principle 
and as a stimulus to native Irish industry.  Continuing on this trajectory, Fianna Fáil 
argued that this money would be a boon to the Irish worker, giving jobs to the Irish male, 
and—as seen in the previous chapter—providing an outlet for the ideal Irish republican 
woman. There was also significance to the fact that Fianna Fáil was suggesting that they 
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could turn the annuity ―tax‖ into Irish capital. Stated simply, this rhetorical fight was both 
self-serving and self-aggrandizing. 
Such sentiments are reflected in the opening paragraphs of the imaginatively titled 
―Ireland‘s Right to the Land Annuities,‖: 
The amount paid to Britain in respect of Land Annuities is £3,000,000 a year. The 
total amount so paid since the Treaty is just £20,000,000. These Annuities are not 
legally or morally due to Britain. ‗Northern Ireland‘ retains the Annuities arising 
in the Six Counties. [The] Free State is equally entitled to do so. 
 
We cannot afford to make Britain a free gift of £3,000,000 a year. To do so means 
continued emigration for our young people. It means unemployment and 
impoverishment for those who remain at home. If this money were kept at home 
it would be sufficient to relieve agricultural land and buildings of the entire 
burden of local rates (stated by Mr. Blythe to be £2,000,000), and there would 
be £1,000,000 a year left for general economic development. 
37
 
 
This passage implies that payment of the annuities was an act of capitulation by those 
who paid them—namely Cumann na nGaedheal—and also an act of betrayal to the Irish 
people in the sense that it contributed to the centuries-old problems of emigration and 
domestic poverty.  
Whereas Cumann na nGadheal did not necessarily condone the payment, they did 
take a dramatically different approach to the annuities. For Cosgrave and his ministers, 
the annuities were viewed more as an obligation whose repayment would ensure Ireland‘s 
future solvency. Such was seen in Cumann na nGaedheal‘s Fight Points for Cumann-na-
nGaedheal Speakers and Workers, General Election 1932, which explained the annuities 
thusly: 
Land purchase is therefore a purely business affair governed by the same 
principles of morality and good faith as obtain in the cases of similar transactions 
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in everyday commercial life. The farmer received the loan to buy out his farm 
from private individuals who took up the Land Stock guaranteed by the British 
Government and is bound to repay the loan first as he would be bound to repay a 
loan from his Bank for the Agricultural Credit Corporation. 
 
The land annuities, in other words, represent debts which purchasers under the 
Land Code in this country have contracted to pay other individuals for value 
received. They are not a tribute like German Reparations of a contribution 
to any Government.
38
 
 
Far from being the weak-willed supplicants to British whims, Cumann na nGaedheal‘s 
position more or less was grounded in maintaining the Free State‘s solvency—not to 
mention the fear of upsetting Ireland‘s largest trade partner—and any position otherwise 
would represent a ―Communistic Proposal.‖39 Regarding Fianna Fáil‘s policy of 
retention, Cumann na nGaedheal held the position that ―nothing could do more to destroy 
the credit of the country, the national character of the people, or their confidence in each 
other, than the proposal to evade the payment of a debt, honourably and openly entered 
into.‖40 To back out of such payments would be irrational and tantamount to 
―communism,‖ or at the very least, a basis for renewed conflict with England. 
 For a party that willingly entered the legal political constructs of the Free State, 
Fianna Fáil‘s approach to the annuities was decidedly political. Such an issue was raised 
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in one particular section of the pamphlet introduced with the question ―Free State 
Ministers ask why Fianna Fáil does not proceed against them in the Courts for illegally 
exporting the Annuities.‖41 Given their willingness to enter the political fray of the Free 
State Dáil, it is somewhat surprising that the party would invalidate the machinations of 
the entity within which they operated. However as seen above, Fianna Fáil often couched 
its contrarianism in democratic terms. In response to its own question, the position of 
Fianna Fáil regarding its extra-legal stance on the annuities was stated as follows:  
The answer is that they [the Cumann na nGaedheal ministers] and their 
Parliamentary majority are the makers of the law, and they have safeguarded 
themselves by inserting in the Land Act of 1923 a provision entitling them to 
hand over the Annuities. While the provision remains, no redress can be obtained 
against them in the Courts. Section 12 of the Land Act of 1923 must be repealed; 
but it will never be repealed until Cumann na nGaedheal and its supporters are 
placed in a minority in the Free State Parliament. 
 
Fianna Fáil‟s appeal, therefore, is not to the Courts, but to the electorate.42 
 
However dubious this position might be, the importance of this stance lay in the manner 
in which Fianna Fáil sought to invalidate all aspects of Cumanna na nGaedheal‘s 
policies—a position that was promoted by the party from its inception, most notably in 
the arguments regarding entrance into the Dáil. Although undated, Fianna Fáil‘s 
pamphlet seemed largely intent on justifying actions underway or about to be taken—
such as the holding of the annuities, as well as references to Cumann na nGaedheal, 
which would cease to exist after merging with the Blueshirts and the National Centre 
Party to form Fine Gael in 1933—indicate that these documents were published after the 
1932 election but before the January 1933 election. 
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 Despite their rejection of the validity of the Free State Constitution and its legal 
frameworks, Fianna Fáil nonetheless appealed to a legality that transcended such 
constraints. For example, it is stated in the pamphlet that 
Six of the most imminent [sic]lawyers in Ireland (including five senior counsel), 
some after months of deliberations, have publicly stated their opinion that the case 
for the retention of the Land Purchase Annuities in the Free State is legally sound. 
The legal advisers of the Government have not replied. Their silence is an 
admission of the weakness of the Government‘s case. Unable to answer the legal 
case, Cumann na nGaedheal is trying to confuse the issue by raising cries of 
‗embezzlement‘ and ‗repudiation of just debts.‘ There is no embezzlement in 
retaining what is legally and morally one‘s own.43 
 
While labeling Cumann na nGaedheal as silent and weak—hallmarks of passivity and 
timidity—Fianna Fáil also advocated passive-aggressive means to retain the annuities, in 
light of their opponents‘ acquiescence to the will of the British. As the manly 
embodiment of Irish nationalism, Fianna Fáil grounded its arguments in legal opinion, 
further exemplifying its departure from its Sinn Féin past. Additionally, Fianna Fáil was 
not advocating the end of annuity payments per se, but rather the party sought to change 
the bank to which the monies would ultimately be deposited. Thus, for the landholder, the 
annuity issue was being reduced to a choice between paying ―us‖ or ―them.‖  
Adding greater complexity to its argument was the usage of parliamentary 
commissions to justify the party‘s cause. Such was exemplified by the following passage 
that reads, in part: 
Two British Government Commissions—the Childers of 1896 and the Primrose 
Committee of 1912—unanimously reported that Ireland had been grossly 
overtaxed for many years. The Primrose Committee (appointed when Home Rule 
was in contemplation) recommended that the proposed Irish Parliament should 
retain the entire proceeds of Irish taxation, and that Ireland should receive from 
the British Government £3,000,000 a year to pay the existing Old Age Pensions[.] 
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The Committee recommended a further British contribution if this were not found 
sufficient.
44
 
 
Significant in this argument is the notion that the Irish people owed no debt because of 
their having overpaid on earlier taxation, enough that the advances given to buy farms 
was already ―Irish‖ money.  Once again, the implication was that Cosgrave‘s party acted 
as enablers for Britain‘s duplicity regarding the draining of wealth from Ireland, not to 
mention the monies being robbed from the elderly. Lastly, it is worth noting that on the 
first page of the pamphlet Fianna Fáil presented a laundry list of items that the retention 
of annuities would pay for. The party claimed, for instance, that the monies saved could 
solve unemployment, aid in the distribution of land, end emigration, provide for the 
infirm and elderly, and undo any other problem primarily attributed to the British 
presence in Ireland. Reading such a list, one wonders, just how thin Fianna Fáil was 
willing to spread these monies. However, reality and political rhetoric are never mutually 
inclusive. 
This choice of ―us‖ or ―them‖ underscored the notion that the retention of the land 
annuities would undo what was presented as a centuries-long rape of the soil of Ireland 
by the British invader. The pamphlet reads, in part:  
The Land Purchase Annuities are unquestionably our property. On the 
grounds of natural justice we have a right to them as part of the revenue of the 
land of our own country. 
 
We have a right to them as partial restitution for the over-taxation of Ireland by 
Britain (which during the period between the Act of Union and the Treaty 
amounted to several times the capital value of the annuities), as compensation for 
the destruction of Irish industries and for the various other financial and economic 
losses we have suffered as a result of English rule… 
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It is only just that Great Britain should pay for land purchase in Ireland. In the 
past she confiscated the land of Ireland to reward the soldiers and adventurers 
who served her against Ireland. When she bought out the interests of the landlords 
she was merely changing into cash for the descendants the rewards which she had 
previously given to their ancestors. That is entirely her affair, as the British 
Parliament admitted in the Home Rule Act of 1920. It is fantastic to maintain that 
Ireland is under a moral obligation to recoup England for the wages of her 
Cromwellian and Williamite soldiers. That, however, is, in effect, the contention 
of Cumann na nGaedheal.
45
 
 
The retaking and rebuilding of Ireland are recurrent themes in the arguments presented 
here. The appeal to Irish nationalism that was such an elemental and foundational aspect 
of Fianna Fáil was evident as well. De Valera‘s party was clearly making the case for the 
undoing of the wrongs of history—the resetting of the primordial order so as to realign 
the natural trajectory of Irish history blocked by Cumann na nGaedheal. 
 Returning to the legal arguments that comprised the bulk of the pamphlet elicits 
two responses: first, Fianna Fáil was rhetorically positioning Britain and Cumann na 
nGaedheal as conspirators working against Irish interests, portraying one as colonial 
aggressors, and the other as passively enabling the prolongation of the colonial condition, 
thereby creating a vacuum of masculinity which de Valera‘s party could fill; secondly, 
Fianna Fáil vacillated between positions that either validated or invalidated the legal 
frameworks of the Free State in a manner that best suited their needs at a given time. This 
latter point recapitulated the party‘s reluctance to portray themselves as ardent 
revolutionaries intent on declaring a new Irish republic at the Ottawa Conference. Played 
either way, Fianna Fáil found its position bolstered by the electoral victories—however 
narrow—in February 1932 and again in January1933. 
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 In regard to the Cumann na nGaedheal-British axis as advanced by Fianna 
Fáil, the so-called ―Ultimate Financial Settlement‖ between Ernest Blythe—Free State 
Minister for Finance—and the Chancellor of the British Exchequer, Winston Churchill 
was tantamount to an act of treason. Citing the Boundary Agreement of 1925, which 
―relieved of liability in respect of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom,‖46 therefore 
cancelling Ireland‘s obligation to pay the annuities to Britain was meant to portray 
Cumann na nGaedheal as passive and ineffective. However, in what was portrayed as an 
act of villainous treason, Blythe and Churchill secretly forged an agreement that ensured 
the payment of the annuities to Britain. Additionally, it was claimed ―Mr. Blythe‘s 
agreement was kept secret from the Free State Parliament for eight months after it was 
signed, and even then Mr. Blythe refused to give the Senate access to the documents, or 
in any way facilitate enquiry into the transaction.‖47 Therefore, according to Fianna Fáil, 
the promise to pay the annuities was done in a manner that undermined the Irish cause 
and gave further proof that Cumann na nGaedheal was working against the interests of 
the people of Ireland. This supports Girvin‘s claim that ―Fianna Fáil‘s charge against 
Cumann na nGaedheal was that their economic policies, however well intentioned, 
allowed economic policy to be formulated outside the state.‖48 The pamphlet concluded 
with the following exhortation underscored by bold typeface: ―Mr. Blythe and his 
colleagues may believe to be bound by the „Ultimate Financial Settlement.‟ You are 
not. That Dail has never ratified it. No future Government will be bound by it. The 
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Land Annuities are rightfully ours, and Fianna Fail [sic] stands for keeping them in 
Ireland.‖49  
Fianna Fáil‘s aesthetic push toward the reclamation of Irish land for the Irish was 
often accompanied by Fintan Lalor‘s refrain, ―Ireland Free, Ireland Irish.‖ It should not 
be construed, however, that Fianna Fáil was the originator of land-based nationalist 
agitation, for Ireland has a long history of land agitation. Rather, Fianna Fáil was indeed 
singular to the Irish Free State in its ability to construct a large, nationally based political 
program that enveloped all aspects of Irish society. All of which was buttressed by the 
socio-economic condition of the interwar years, not to mention the democratic 
frameworks of the Saorstát. Indeed Fianna Fáil was aided and emboldened by this long 
tradition of reclamation efforts to redistribute land to the people of Ireland. As Timothy 
G. McMahon notes, the issue of land reclamation was part of a larger, ―revolution of 
rising expectations…that fueled the push for full separation from the United Kingdom.‖50 
Whereas much of what McMahon argues took place during a period in which popular, 
―bottom-up‖ movements were a larger threat—and indeed, more palpable—Fianna Fáil 
seized these energies, enveloping the cause into its larger, all-encompasing nationalist 
schmea. As McMahon writes, ―Fianna Fáil party seized upon the [land] issue, 
reconfiguring yet again how one defined ‗the land for the people‘ in modern Ireland, and 
deploying the land issue for its own political gain.‖51 Like previous nationalist 
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movements such as the National League and the Sinn Féin of the 1910s, land reclamation 
served as a central point of contention, but as will be shown below, it was not the only 
raison d‟être for the party, for the elevation of industrial development and economic 
growth with positive results for social conditions in Ireland.  
 
“They Call This Progress”—The Aesthetics of the Economic War 
 
 To push an assertive, masculine economic nationalism proved advantageous to 
many political movements in the wake of the Great War and Great Depression.
52
 In an 
Irish context, Fianna Fáil offered an alternative to the liberal/Marxian framework with a 
blistering attack on the status quo, which the party portrayed as yet another Anglo-Free 
State construct. Operating as iconoclasts of sorts, Fianna Fáil‘s activist economic rhetoric 
can be viewed both as a means to rescue Ireland from stagnation as well as a final push to 
break the centuries-long supplication to England. In a study of the electoral ephemerae of 
Fianna Fáil, three themes become evident: a dialectical discourse in which the party‘s 
activist stance contrasted with the passivity of Cumann na nGaedheal‘s free market 
capitalism; the portrayal of Fianna Fáil as dynamic agents of growth marked by the 
party‘s embodiment of the male; and finally, the party as the protectors of Ireland—both 
symbolic and literal—from the trappings of depression and colonialism. Within this 
rhetorical push, one found conversations on land, the fetishization of both Irish products 
and manly work, imagery of insemination and reforestation, glorification of industry 
coupled (ironically) with a romantic view of Irish pastoralism, and the effort to heal and 
offer shelter for the sick and the weak. As was the case with many fascistic entities, there 
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occurred a dualistic glorification of both the past and the future—an embracement of 
modernity built upon the glorification of a racial primitivism. Like the Fascist‘s embrace 
of Futurism and its glorification of speed, industry, and Roman iconography, Fianna Fáil 
trumpeted the glories of progress and movement whilst maintaining the backward gaze 
toward Ireland‘s mythical racial heritage. While the party did not engage in the martial 
vagaries seen in Italy, Germany, or Spain, there was a kinship of sorts in how Continental 
parties and Fianna Fáil developed—that is, they were products of new thinking that 
rejected the tenets of the previous age, but more importantly, were better served to deal 
with the anxieties specific to the age in which they were created. Fianna Fáil was built 
upon a narrative in which past and present coalesced, so that progress was justified by its 
racial uniqueness. 
 
 
Fianna Fáil Frames the Economic Discourse—Active v. Passive 
A handbill from 1927 offers an introduction to one of the many underlying 
themes present in the party‘s economic message—that Fianna Fáil was a party seeking to 
move the nation forward, advancing beyond the stagnation wrought by imperialism and 
capitalism. The handbill featured text divided in two columns; on the left was the header 
1918, and on the right was 1927. ―In 1918,‖ the text read, ―The Irish People were faced 
by a terrible Menace: Conscription. They looked to Eamon de Valera to save them. And 
he did.‖53 To the right of this simplistic over-statement was a rather boastful yet 
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optimistic claim: ―In 1927 The Irish People are again faced by a terrible Menace: 
Bankruptcy and Starvation. They are looking to Eamon de Valera to save them. And he 
will.‖54 This is but one example of the economic rhetoric created by the party to 
emphasize Fianna Fáil as a bulwark against financial calamity. In terms of economic 
policy, during its first decade Fianna Fáil—cast itself as a dynamic, indeed, manly, agent 
of growth and revival in stark contrast to the inactive, passive Cumann na nGaedheal. A 
similar message pervaded still another handbill from the same period. Appealing to the 
―Workers, Fathers of Unemployed Sons and Daughters,‖ the pamphlet presented readers 
with two choices: on one side you had Cumann na nGaedheal as represented by P.J. 
McGilligan, Free State Minister for Industry and Commerce, who was quoted as saying: 
―It is not the function of the Dáil to provide work, and the sooner that is realised the 
better…people may have to die in this country in starvation.‖55 On the other side, under 
the heading ―Party of Work,‖ Fianna Fáil was represented by a quote from de Valera, 
which read, ―I hold it is the primary duty of a modern state to ensure that every man who 
is able to and willing to work will have work, so that he may earn his daily bread.‖56 As 
the economic conditions in Ireland deteriorated—both from historical forces and those 
aggravated by the Depression begun in 1929, the passive/active dialectic soon became the 
central, if not dominant, component of Fianna Fáil‘s self-portrayal. Examining this 
dialectic sheds light on the alternative economic structures embraced by de Valera‘s 
party.  
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 An undated and uncategorized Fianna Fáil handbill for James Geoghegan in 
Longford-Westmeath demonstrates how the party used land redistribution to portray 
Cumann na nGaedheal as timid in its efforts to reclaim Ireland from the British. 
Extending the land issue beyond the question of annuities, the republicans attempted to 
portray land reclamation and distribution as an ongoing project to be undertaken with 
immediacy and aggression. Thus, Geohegan‘s opponent was well-intentioned but all 
together too slow to act. The handbill featured the title ―They Call This Progress,‖ and it 
was filled with examples of how Cumann na nGaedheal‘s torpid stance to land 
redistribution had impacted the farmers of Longford-Westmeath.
57
 Raising the issue of 
untenanted land, the handbill notes ―From 1923 to 1929 the number of Acres acquired 
and distributed was…17,374. The number of Acres yet to be distributed is…32,338. So it 
will take the Land Commission 21 years to vest all the Tenanted Land, and 11 years to 
divide the Untenanted Land in Longford-Westmeath.‖58 Regarding tenanted land, the 
handbill claimed that under Cumann na nGaedheal only 16,268 acres were vested, while 
57,585 were yet unvested, costing the farmers of Longford-Westmeath £3,807 per 
annum.
59
 If one were to analyze only this portion of the handbill, much could be said 
regarding the characterization of Cumann na nGaedheal and its inability to initiate 
genuine land reformation. However, the handbill specified the amount of money being 
lost each year by Geoghegan‘s potential constituents. Its text continued, ―The Cosgrave 
Government think nothing of £3,807. They give the Governor-General £3,000 to their 
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army officers to become Cumann na nGaedheal candidates. They give Lord Glenavy a 
pension of £3,692 6s. 1d. per year. They give the Automobile Association £3,000 to 
cover its losses on motor races in Phoenix Park.‖60 In this short passage we find charges 
that Cumann na nGaedheal was using what could have been land rent monies to bolster 
its electoral support, as well as to pay for the pensions of a British lord, not to mention 
support for the decidedly un-Gaelic motor races in Dublin. The handbill concluded with 
this damning statement: 
What does that Government care whether the Longford-Westmeath Farmers lose 
£3,807 a year through the shameful laziness of the Land Commission[?] 
If you think Longford-Westmeath can do something better with £3,807 a year than 
having it stolen by the Land Commission. 
 
WORK AND VOTE FOR JAMES GEOGHEGAN 
THE FIANNA FAIL CANDIDATE
61
 
 
Essentially, two characterizations of Cumann na nGaedheal can be culled from this 
handbill: first, that the party was slow, lazy, inactive—in a word, passive; second, that the 
party blithely wasted Irish monies on British interests. Both were acts that were deemed 
intolerable to the active Fianna Fáil candidate.  
 The transition of land ownership from ―British‖ control to Irish ownership was a 
centerpiece of Fianna Fáil‘s early economic platform. In another election flyer produced 
that same year, Fianna Fáil sought to highlight what it felt was the slow-paced effort to 
reacquire and redistribute the land for the Irish citizenry, as well as to promote its agenda 
in advance of the January 1933 election: 
The total area of land acquired by the Land Commission during the year ended 
March 31
st
, 1931, amounted to 38,570 acres, while the land in process of 
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acquisition on that date amounted to 139,058 acres, and the area of land inspected 
reached 232,147 acres. Hence, it is clear that the present rate of progress it will 
take the Land Commission ten years to complete the acquisition of the lands now 
on their hands. 
 
But there were over 413,000 acres which were the subject of enquiry by the Land 
Commission on the same date…[and] at the present rate of progress the Land 
Commission will not have completed their present programme and divided the 
untenanted land available in less than 21 years.
62
 
 
The flyer goes on to note that beginning in 1929 Fianna Fáil had introduced legislation to 
appoint a day to finalize the tenancies, but the bill was rebuffed by Free State Ministers 
as being impossible. However, once in government, Fianna Fáil—according to the 
handbill—was able to streamline the process, resulting in a ―speedy vesting of the lands 
[so] that to-day practically all the tenants in the Twenty-six Counties have their lands 
vested and have been placed on an annuity basis with reductions from 5 per cent. to 10 
per cent. in their annual payments. Fianna Fail can speed up the work of acquisition and 
division in the same way.‖63 The message was clear that the party intended to rapidly and 
actively return ownership of land to the Irish citizenry, not to mention reduce and 
eventually eliminate the annuity to Britain. This promise to build upon what they had 
already done was best summarized by a refrain oft-repeated throughout the period 
between 1932 and1937: ―Put out the Laggards. Vote Fianna Fáil.‖64 
 The notion of active land reclamation coalesced with the party‘s economic 
intransigence on the annuity issue. Further, the party promoted a rhetoric that not only 
encouraged the reclamation of land, but, when combined with the protectionism of the 
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Economic War, a sense of industriousness in regard to the usage of the land. In other 
words, Fianna Fáil was not just advocating for the reclamation of land, but it would also 
aggressively promote legislation that facilitated its usage. For example, an article/party 
advertisement appeared in the June 1937 edition of the Fianna Fáil Bulletin. Titled ―We 
Couldn‘t—But We Did,‖ it proclaimed that ―in 1931 we ‗couldn‘t mill our own flour‘—
but With [sic] the development of our mills under a Government which said ‗WE 
MUST‘—the flour imports fell from £1,662,402 [in 1931] to £74,816 [in 1936].‖65 Most 
notable was the claim that it was the Fianna Fáil government that was largely responsible 
for the construction of modern flourmills, which resulted in 4,014 mill workers in 1936—
an increase from the 2,417 employed in 1931.
66
 Underscoring these claims was the 
exclamation that ―Fianna Fail Will Keep The Wheels Turning!‖67 Present throughout the 
article were examples of activism and aggressive tactics in regard to the Irish economy. 
For instance, there appeared a series of points noting ―Eleven Other Benefits to Farmers,‖ 
most of which were designed to counter claims that the Economic War was damaging 
Irish agriculture and industry by stunting trade with England, the largest consumer of 
Irish-produced goods. This, the eleventh point, claimed that Fianna Fáil had actively 
pursued new markets in Germany and Belgium, and that ―the export of cattle to these 
new markets had a beneficial effect on the market price for cattle as a whole by removing 
part of the surplus of exportable cattle at relatively high prices.‖68 Also highlighted were 
the benefits of land reclamation legislation which had increased acreage devoted to beet, 
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tobacco, potato, swine, and vegetable production, aided in large part to the reduction of 
the land annuities, giving ―relief to the Farmers of over £2,000,000 each year.‖69 Further 
adding support to the agricultural-industrial nexus was the championing of a government-
funded canning factory in Waterford that produced ―canned meat in sufficient quantities 
to meet the needs of the country, and such products as meat extracts, canned tongue, 
casings, etc., are also produced…The farmers are being relieved of old and useless cows 
which are being converted into meat meal at Roscrea.‖70 As far as can be seen, Fine Gael 
ceded to Fianna Fáil the leadership in the canned tongue market. 
 The notion of proactive, aggressive economic legislation falls in line with the 
third-way economic theories of John Maynard Keynes. A hallmark of Keynesian 
economics was the importance of an activist government ―priming the pump‖ through 
aggressive policy. This sentiment was not lost upon Minister of Finance Seán MacEntee 
who highlighted the following phrase in his personal copy of Keynes‘s The Means to 
Prosperity: ―But in present circumstances this would be true of only a small proportion of 
the additional consumption, since the greater part of it could be provided without much 
change of price by home resources which are at present unemployed.‖71 MacEntee noted 
in the margins ―Precisely why the fuller employment of men and machines. At present 
only partially employed.‖ 72 
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As with all economic theories, there was a divergence between dogma and 
practice, as was seen in Keynes‘s comments regarding the situation in Ireland however 
positive his intonations.
73
 As a result, Fianna Fáil defied categorization within the 
traditional modernist economic definitions of liberalism and socialism. By navigating the 
third way between capitalism and socialism, the party cherry-picked elements of both 
systems without having to raise the banner of either—a factor that contributed to the 
decline and marginalization of Cumann na nGaedheal and Saor Éire. Such a stance 
demonstrated that Fianna Fáil was not fearful of modernity; in fact, it was quite the 
opposite. The party, by embracing the third way between capitalism and socialism (as 
well as between liberal democracy and totalitarianism), was in the vanguard of the 
welfare states that developed in post-World War II Europe. While many nations, such as 
the United States with Franklin Roosevelt‘s New Deal, embraced Keynesian-style policy 
as a means to combat economic depression, Fianna Fáil and its European counterparts 
used this approach as a means of nation-building, and, in the case of Ireland, as a unique 
means to dissolve its colonial ties.  
Such is seen in another piece of party propaganda from the June 1936 edition of 
the Fianna Fáil Bulletin. Encouraging readers to vote for the party‘s candidates, the 
article read in part ―You have the choice of voting for a party most of whose policy is 
second-hand[,] Most of whose leaders are far from united in their views[;] or for a party 
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with a definite policy and a record of achievement in nation-building. Your help is 
needed to complete the work.‖74 Implicit within this paragraph are a number of points, 
including the notion that the party‘s opposition was incapable of providing the leadership 
necessary to increase Ireland‘s independence. Most importantly, however, was the claim 
that Fianna Fáil was a party united in message, working for the entire nation and its 
implied destiny of complete independence. The message was that the party was working 
for the people and by the will of the people.  
In the same article, Fianna Fáil trumpeted claims that it was responsible for ―the 
building of an Industrial Arm‖; placing ―as many families as practicable on the Land‖; 
―Re-Housing the Nation‖; providing ―Work or Maintenance for the Unemployed‖;  
ensuring ―The improvement of roads, drainage, water supplies…‖; and finally, watching 
over ―The control of prices of essential commodities.‖75 This last point had in fact been 
advocated at least as early as a party handbill from 1932 that read: 
 LISTEN! 
 
While Free State Ministers creep over to England and in all humility, kneel down 
and beg for the rich man‘s crumbs, Fianna Fail [sic] asks you to consider our own 
home market. Your Government has no power to regulate or demand a price on 
the British market. But the Dail [sic] can and must confine the home market to 
Irish agricultural produce. Further, if necessary, it can legislate for a fair price. If 
the Government creates a demand at home for fair-priced Irish produce (which it 
undoubtedly can) Fianna Fail [sic] knows that the Irish farmer will supply that 
demand! 
  
And now P.T.O.!
76
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For the reader of such propaganda there was no doubt about Fianna Fáil‘s commitment to 
activist economic policy, with top-down approaches that were part and parcel of its 
Keynesian leanings. 
 Moreover, the advocacy of manly, industrial work was a key element in Fianna 
Fáil‘s economic aesthetic. Elevating the status of the Irish worker while carefully not 
appearing to be Marxian classists, Fianna Fáil nevertheless forged a connection between 
the modern laborer and government policy. For the republicans, protecting the polity 
meant the construction of industry and reclamation of land, creating markets for Irish 
products and resulting in work for the men of Ireland. As seen in the previous chapter, 
Fianna Fáil sought to channel the energies of republican women as well, in order to 
reconstitute the notion of Irish femininity and to buttress the party‘s economic and 
political aims. In a similar fashion, Fianna Fáil fetishized notions of manly work and the 
value of labor to the Irish land and people.  
An electoral flyer from 1932 addressed the unemployed of Ireland, claiming 
―There‘s work for you. Plenty. Right here at home in Ireland!‖77 Again, Fianna Fáil 
presented a circuitous logic in which work would make the man, the man would make the 
nation, and Fianna Fáil would make the work. Thus, in the very next line of the flyer one 
reads: ―Making the clothes, growing the food, building the houses—doing a hundred 
other things for your fellow Irishmen—doing the work that is to-day being done for us by 
foreigners. We can do it all ourselves…You can do it!‖78 Once more, Fianna Fáil 
advanced a seamless and symbiotic policy in which the Irish male would produce the 
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goods that the Irish woman—or the Belgian or the German—would purchase to stock 
their Irish home or to feed their children. The next line of the flyer erased any doubt 
about who would be providing such work: ―THERE IS NO WAY OF ENDING 
UNEMPLOYMENT EXCEPT BY PROVIDED WORK. THAT‘S THE SURE POLICY 
OF FIANNA FÁIL.‖79  
 Fianna Fáil‘s advocacy of an activist economic agenda was omnipresent in the 
years leading up to the 1937 election that resulted in the enactment of a new Irish 
constitution. For example, in a typed summary of a stump speech given by MacEntee 
during the Dublin campaign, the Fianna Fáil minister demonstrated the importance of a 
power that elevated action and effective policy above calls for party balance and 
governmental constraint. The official summary of MacEntee‘s speech read, in part: 
The Government of a country was a serious business. The task of reviving the 
economic life of the country was a heavy one. It was one which would never be 
fulfilled if the workers regarded the present political situation as a child‘s game of 
see-saw, in which their primary duty was merely to put someone in the middle to 
keep a balance, while the other two parties went up and down at the end of the 
plank. Progress would never be made that way. Let the workers and producers 
make up their minds that they wanted the Fianna policy [sic] and then give the 
candidates who stood for that policy the swinging majority which would enable 
them to put in into practical operation without doubt, hesitation, or delay. If they 
were going to give their succeeding preferences to candidates of the Labour Party, 
Mr. MacEntee asked his audience to make sure to give them to real labour men.
80
 
 
In this speech MacEntee walked a fine line between liberal democracy and socialism—
even totalitarianism—in the way he asked for the people to give power to an aggressive 
strong-willed party. Such was the nature of third-way politics. Further, note the effort to 
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marginalize the Labour Party, insinuating that they were not truly representative of the 
Irish laborer, exhorting the voter to choose men who were true ―labour‖ men. MacEntee 
meant, of course, that his party was comprised of candidates most true to the cause of the 
laborer, as evidenced by the party‘s ability to enact legislation through its electability and 
practicality. Such a policy was to be enacted swiftly without bureaucratic delays resulting 
from constitutional or party see-sawing. For MacEntee and his peers, active economic 
policy and aggressive rhetoric were part and parcel to Fianna Fáil‘s calls to ―Keep the 
Wheels Turning.‖ 
 
Fianna Fáil as the Active Agents of Growth 
In the January 1937 edition of the Fianna Fáil Bulletin, a political cartoon 
appeared that embodied the party‘s effort to forge masculanized economic rhetoric. 
(Figure 4.1) On the right half of the image a number of workers are depicted walking to 
work in what appears to be new and fully functional factories and shipyards. The sun, 
rising from the sea, exudes rays of light, in which the words ―GROWTH‖ and ―1932-
1937‖ are intermeshed. This image of streamlined progress is juxtaposed with that of a 
tombstone marked ―DECAY 1649-1932 A.D.‖ at which William T. Cosgrave—dressed 
in his dandyish dark-tailed suit and spats, with a top-hat and black umbrella beside him—
lays a wreath with a sympathy card inscribed with the message ―From U.I.P [United Irish 
Party, precursor to Fine Gael], R.I.P.‖ The  dates refer to the conquests of Oliver 
Cromwell up through Fianna Fáil‘s electoral victory. Offering condolences to Cosgrave is 
a very haggard and decisively elderly depiction of John Bull. Atop the tombstone is a 
trophy of sorts labeled ―Cup of Bitterness,‖ filled with scrolls marked ―Oath of 
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Allegiance,‖ ―Privy Council Appointments,‖ and ―Senate.‖ Draped over the edge of the 
cup is what appears to be a coat and beret. Underscoring the cartoon is the caption ―Time 
Marches On!‖81 The themes of progress, growth, insemination, activity, industry, and 
achievement were the hallmarks of Fianna Fáil‘s socio-economic rhetoric from its 
inception, and grew stronger into the 1930s. Within this portrait, these themes 
exemplified the careful attention paid to the aesthetics of masculinity so central to Fianna 
Fáil‘s thrust toward an independent Irish Republic. While Cumann na nGaedheal—not 
unlike proponents of capitalism worldwide—preached patience to allow the market to 
correct itself, Fianna Fáil combated both depression and the remnants of Ireland‘s 
colonial ties with Britain through an economic policies that sought to streamline and 
modernize the nation.  
Much of the party‘s electoral propaganda was rife with language tinged with 
allusions to insemination and punctuated by rather phallic imagery—in essence utilizing 
the visual to further blur the lines between party and nation in an effort to 
―symbolically…settle social and economic struggles while it simultaneously promotes 
the charismatic image of strong and unified political action.‖82 Numerous examples of 
subliminal, although rather obvious, usage of phallic imagery can be seen in propaganda 
from the Fianna Fáil Bulletin. One instance, entitled ―Fianna Fail Achieves ‗The 
Impossible,‘ included a depiction of five wheat piles representing acres devoted to wheat 
production in the years between 1932 and 1937. (Figure 4.2) The amount of growth—
ranging from 21,000 acres in 1932 to 254,000 in 1937—were marked by piles of wheat 
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increasingly engorged by greater production.
83
 One need not read much further to find 
who was responsible for such an excitable spurt of output, for the party presented itself as 
the carriers of the seed that allowed for such an increase of product. It was noted that ―in 
1931 under Fine Gael [sic] we were not producing sufficient wheat to given even a crumb 
of bread per head per day to our population. After only five years of Fianna Fail 
administration we are producing sufficient to give a third of our requirements.‖84 
Exhorting readers to ―Vote Fianna Fail and Reap the Harvest,‖ it was implied that the 
continued governance of Fianna Fáil would result in the continued insemination of Irish 
land further increases in wheat production. 
Such themes were not exclusive to agricultural growth as was evidenced in 
another piece from the June 1937 edition of the Bulletin. Highlighting the construction of 
new factories and workshops, the ad claimed that the party had ―reorganised the 
economic life of the nation and the success of its industrial policy is ending forever the 
absolute dependence of our people on foreign made products.‖85 There was no question 
as to who was responsible for laying the seed of growth, as the ad further heralded that 
―800 New Factories and Workshops Give Employment to Over 78,000 People.‖ An 
illustration charting the growth of increased net output accompanied the claims that 
Fianna Fáil was responsible for priming the pump of industrial growth and fuelled by an 
increase in agricultural output, which had resulted from the reclamation and 
dissemination of land to the Irish farmer. Such statements were not surprising from a 
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party that had advocated in its 1933 election materials: ―as principle that it is the duty of 
the State, up to the limits of its power, to provide or induce the provision of work for 
workless citizens of the State.‖86 Further, the party claimed, ―the work has barely started, 
however. Much remains to be done and Fianna Fáil will do it. Sufficient has been 
accomplished to justify in the full the policy of Fianna Fáil.‖87 Not only was this rhetoric 
evocative of action and progress, what distinguishes this particular rhetorical thread was 
the sublimation of the republican party as being completely responsible for the growth of 
industry and arable land within Ireland. The party positioned itself as one that stood in 
direct opposition to those that had stunted growth, and that was enacting policy that led to 
the regeneration of Irish industry.
88
 
Another election flyer underscored the general message that Cumann na 
nGaedheal had kowtowed to Britain while Fianna Fáil was ready to work to bring 
manufactures and industry to Ireland : 
While Free State Miniters creep over to England and in all humility, kneel 
down and beg for the rich man‘s crumbs, Fianna Fail asks you to consider your 
own home market. Your Government has no power to regulate or demand a price 
on the British market. But the Dail can and must confine the home market to Irish 
agricultural produce. Further, if necessary, it can legislate for a fair price. If the 
Government creates a demand at home for fair-priced Irish produce (which it 
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undoubtedly can) Fianna Fail knows that the Irish farmer will supply that 
demand! 
 And now P[ut]. T[hem]. O[ut]!
89
 
 
A similar theme appeared in an electoral ad from the pages of the Irish Press which 
claimed ―Fianna Fáil has a plan...‖90 This ad was particularly striking for the connections 
made between work and security: ―For the worker [Fianna Fáil‘s plan] means continuous, 
well-paid employment for an additional 80,000 men, the ending of the downward 
pressure on wage rates produced by the present huge volume of unemployment, a better 
standard of living, better houses, better food, better clothes, It means Security.‖91 (Figure 
4.3) 
In an example of early environmentalism, Fianna Fáil noted the purchase of 
―58,500 acres acquired for forestry since 1932‖—a fact punctuated by an illustration that 
used a sapling to represent land bought by Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael, and a 
mighty fir to demonstrate the immense growth under Fianna Fáil. (Figure 4.4) These 
figures were heralded by the headline: ―Fianna Fail take the land from the Bullock and 
gives it back to the people.‖92 Once again there appeared themes of party-based 
insemination of the Irish land accompanied by distinctively manly imagery of mighty 
trees—with Fianna Fáil being the more virile in comparison to Fine Gael‘s inadequate 
effort. Not only was Fianna Fáil reclaiming the land for the people, but they were also 
reinvigorating Ireland by actively contributing to the growth of the nation. 
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Fianna Fáil as the Protectors of Irishness  
 
 The Anglo-Irish Economic War—in its essence—was a conflict centered upon the 
long-festering question of land ownership, annuity payments and market share. To what 
extent did the Irish ―owe‖ the British for land rights? Already granted a semblance of 
political independence, the issue regarding the land annuity payments was framed by 
Fianna Fáil as the last great vestige of the British colonization. Further, the complicity of 
Cumann na nGaedheal (and by extension its later incarnation as Fine Gael) in the 
payments of the annuities enabled Fianna Fáil to cast itself as the true protectors of the 
Irish nation—a nation conceptualized as being older and greater than the Free State. A 
second threat to the nation was the aforementioned global economic depression. Fianna 
Fáil, like many other nationalist projects, buffered their electoral strength by offering an 
economic alternative to the nineteenth-century liberal/socialist framework, instead 
offering a socio-economic model that vacillated between modern and primordial—
agriculture and industry. The nation was to be expressed not through work or class, but 
rather through the production and ingestion of national symbols in the guise of Irish 
factories and Irish-produced goods.  
 In a party flyer from 1932 soliciting subscriptions, Fianna Fáil made clear the 
connection between economic freedom and an independent republic. Noting that the 
annuity payments stripped Ireland of £5 million per annum, the flier positioned Britain—
as well as Cumann na nGaedheal—as the source of Ireland‘s economic woes. But, of 
particular interest was the sheer number of phrases evoking the idea of growth or 
increased activity—the rhetoric of action and movement and protection—which were 
associated with Fianna Fáil. The flyer reads 
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Because Fianna Fáil stands for the Protection of Irish Industries against unfair 
foreign competition and thus ensure the production at home of the goods required 
by the Irish people; 
 
Because Fianna Fáil has endeavoured to benefit Old Age Pensioners and to raise 
the level of Social legislation; 
 
Because Fianna Fáil has a constructive programme for the development of 
agriculture, including the derating of Lands and buildings, the provision of a 
guaranteed market and fixed prices for Wheat, and the direct encouragement of 
tillage; 
  
Because Fianna Fáil is the only Party which has a clearly-defined policy for 
dealing with the evil of Unemployment by the provision of work on schemes of 
public utility; 
 
Because Fianna Fáil desires to abolish the horrors of bad housing by the 
establishment of a National Housing Board, financed by the Government, and 
fully empowered to ensure the production of 50,000 houses within a period of ten 
years;  
 
Because Fianna Fáil stands for the traditional policy of complete Independence 
and Unity. 
 
You do your part and Fianna Fáil will do the rest.
93
 
 
Fianna Fáil was constructing a socio-political narrative clearly reinforcing the notion that 
the party was there to protect the Irish citizenry from the iniquities of unfair competition, 
where the more powerful British had stacked the odds in their own favor. A similar 
document was published at about the same time aimed to raise money for the Fianna Fáil 
Headquarters Fund for the constituency of Dublin City North. The letter read in part:  
Fianna Fáil is THE Organization of the People—fighting the People‘s battle…It 
has placed in power a Government pledged to secure the complete political and 
economic Independence of the Nation. It seeks to unite the People by the abolition 
of the memory of all past dissensions, and thereby to provide the Government 
with the moral support so necessary for Peace and ordered Progress. 
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The work is going ahead. Keep it going. Fianna Fáil will not cease its efforts until 
it has completed the task for which it was founded.
94
 
 
In one of the starkest representations of the party‘s constructed role as protectors 
of the nation, a Fianna Fáil Bulletin cartoon entitled ―Ward Off the Arrows of 
Adversity!‖ portrayed Fianna Fáil as an ancient Irish shield guarding the island itself. 
(Figure 4.5) Accentuated with the name ―Fianna Fáil,‖ the shield represented a nexus 
between the primordial, in the sense that one was to connect the modern republican party 
to the ancient Fianna. The caption underneath the picture read: ―The Fianna Fail Majority 
is the Nation‘s Shield Against National Surrender and Social and Economic Decay.‖ This 
notion was more specifically represented in the cartoon as arrows aimed at Ireland, 
labeled with such phrases as: ―Attacks on Workers Holidays & Conditions, Official 
Indifference to Unemployment‖; ―Attacks on the Home, Ill-Nourished Children‖; 
―Dumped Industrial Goods‖; ―Derelict Factories‖; ―Insanitary Rural Houses‖; ―Oaths of 
Allegiance to Foreign Kings‖; ―Secret Financial Agreements‖; ―‗Damn Good Bargains‘‖; 
―Declining Tillage‖; ―Dumped Agricultural Produce‖; ―Lack of Food, Fuel, Etc.‖; 
―Houseless Agricultural Labourers‖; ―Dictated Constitutions,‖ and ―Neglected Widows 
& Orphans.‖95  
 In 1937 Fianna Fáil marked its fifth year in government by trumpeting its 
economic advances, including, as we have seen, the growth of new industries and farms, 
as well as the expansion or renovation of old manufactures. As noted in a Fianna Fáil 
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Bulletin editorial, ―Fianna Fáil has changed the face of the Country—and provided a 
strong line of economic defence against World depression and war.‖96 While the struggle 
over land annuities was a manifestation of its conflict with Britain, the effort to ward off 
the impact of economic depression enabled Fianna Fáil to further advance its position as 
protectors of Ireland‘s journey toward political and economic growth. The article 
continued, with a ―before‖ and ―after‖ snapshot of Ireland‘s economic status: 
Then—Before 1932 most of our towns were mere distribution centres. The cattle 
went out—the foreign goods came in. The towns were without modern sewerage 
and water systems, lined with ugly insanitary shacks. There was nothing for the 
people to do (except in the large cities) but send out the cattle and sell the foreign 
goods. 
 
—And Now. With the Coming of Fianna Fail practically every town of size 
secured a new industry, giving employment, increasing the spending power of the 
people, creating a large market for the adjoining farmers, adding to the number of 
workers in subsidiary trades, building up the revenue of the railway, bringing the 
breath of life and prosperity to the urban centres. Industries, which had 
disappeared in the previous decade, were revived—existing concerns extended 
production—and to-day the wheels are turning with increasing speed and 
efficiency. Most of these factories produce goods of necessity. No matter what 
happens outside this island, they provide a bulwark of economic stability to the 
nation.‖97 
 
 For Fianna Fáil, the Economic War was an extension of its overarching autarkic 
economic policy that included the development and extension of the party‘s larger, socio-
political discourse. While much has been written on the varying level of success of 
Fianna Fáil‘s economic program, little has been done to contextualize its policies as part 
of a larger, nationalistic thrust; melding the intersections of process and rhetoric. Viewing 
such activity through the prism of gender and power as part of a nation-building effort 
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elucidates the manner in which Fianna Fáil sought to renegotiate socio-political 
frameworks in Ireland. The examples given here represent a larger corpus of material 
demonstrating Fianna Fáil‘s activist, masculine effort to construct an independent Irish 
Republic. 
 After a half-decade in government Fianna Fáil advanced an even more aggressive 
rhetoric, and in turn abandoned the largely repressed calls for an independent state. The 
abandonment of the position taken in the wake of the Ottawa Economic Conference in 
1932 had been alluded to but was elevated to the fore in the effort to construct a new 
constitution for Ireland. A piece of Fianna Fáil propaganda entitled ―The Advance of the 
Republic‖ heralded: ―The Next Step Will Be The New Constitution. It will be a 
Constitution consistent with Ireland‘s historic claims and one which every Irishman can 
accept without dishonour. It will consolidate the national advances already made and will 
place no barrier between the people and the achievement of their ultimate ideal.‖98 The 
piece further argued that ―Fianna Fail has already made ten decisive irrevocable steps to 
National Independence. Steps that no party dare retrace, a definite advance towards 
ending all foreign control.‖99 As evidence, the ad trumpeted the abolition of the Oath, 
forging ―a peaceful method [that] exists for resolving all political differences,‖ the 
marginalization of the Governor-General and Senate, the holding of the annuities for the 
people of Ireland, and a ―Programme of Economic Self-Sufficiency [that] is far 
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advanced.‖100 Indeed, Fianna Fáil was speeding the wheels—at least rhetorically, 
anyway. Attention will now be paid to the effort to end foreign control. 
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Figure 4.1: “Time Marches On!” Fianna Fáil Bulletin, January 1937, 7. 
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Figure 4.2: "Fianna Fail Achieves 'The Impossible," Fianna Fáil Bulletin, June 
1937, 13. 
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Figure 4.3: “Fianna Fáil Has a Plan,” Irish Press 15 February, 1932, 5. 
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Figure 4.3: "Fianna Fáil Takes The Land From The Bullock And Gives It Back To 
The People," Fianna Fáil Bulletin, June 1937, 9. 
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Figure 4.4: "Ward Off the Arrows of Adversity!," Fianna Fáil Bulletin, June 1937, 
16. 
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Chapter Five 
“Queering” John Bull—Fianna Fáil and the Effort to Reify Republican 
Heteronormativity 
 
Salaries of £1,500 had to be paid so that representatives of the Irish Free State 
abroad might squat like the nigger when he put on the black silk-hat and the 
swallow tail coat and said that he was an English Gentleman. 
 -Martin Corry
1
 
 
The previous chapters have done much to explain how Fianna Fáil established 
heteronormative means of inclusion within its envisioned republic.
2
 From the clear 
definitions of feminine agency within the republican movement to the idealized 
notion of manliness with which the party cloaked itself, Fianna Fáil essentially 
sexualized Ireland. This is not to say, however, that the party was explicitly concerned 
with coitus per se, but rather that it utilized gendered tropes as the basis for 
reconstituting republicanism. Much has been said about Fianna Fáil‟s efforts to define 
what was inclusive in light of its corrective discourse, but this raises the question as to 
what was done with things that did not “fit.” In her definition of gender, Judith Butler 
had argued that it is “a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit 
collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as 
cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions—and the 
punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in them.”3 It is the contention here 
that while Fianna Fáil was largely successful in constructing agreeable gendered 
frameworks, it also queered those elements of society and politics that could not be 
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reconciled with its push for an independent state. Politically, these efforts were 
specific to Ireland‟s postcolonial condition, where the Irish cultural nationalist ideal 
clashed the legacies of British colonialism. 
Nikki Sullivan has written that “queering popular culture, then, involves 
critically engaging with cultural artefacts in order to explore the ways in which 
meaning and identity is (inter)textually (re)produced.”4 As demonstrated above, there 
was little distinction between politics and popular culture in Fianna Fáil‟s vision of 
Ireland, for the party‟s aestheticization of politics in the Irish Free State left the two 
mutually interdependent. Sullivan has argued further that the queer “could be 
described as moments of narrative disruption which destabilise heteronormativity and 
all the meanings and identities it engenders, by bringing to light all that is disavowed 
by, and yet integral to, heteronormative logic.”5 The effort to queer was not unlike 
what Edward Said described as “Othering,” and the similarities speak to anti-
hegemonic aspects of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist efforts.6 While not explicitly taking 
action against homosexuals per se, queering as defined here was tantamount to Fianna 
Fáil clearly delineating the Other. More than anything, this effort was about 
establishing a rhetorical narrative in which opponents of Fianna Fáil republicanism 
were portrayed as neutered and impotent, therefore asexual, neither as active agents of 
republican industriousness (male), or of passive-aggressive support (female).  
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For all of its efforts to withdraw Ireland from the British Empire, one fact 
remained immutable for Fianna Fáil: no amount of party aesthetic or gendered 
discourse could fully remove the remnants of British influence in Ireland. While the 
purpose of the previous chapters had been to examine Fianna Fáil‟s effort to construct 
a nationalist discourse of heteronormativity the present chapter seeks to briefly cite 
examples of how it reconciled remnants of Britishness in Ireland by relegating them 
to a tertiary status outside of  the party‟s male and feminine ideal. Politically, the 
party affected a political rhetoric that effectively disarmed the pro-Treaty Cumann na 
nGaedheal and its successor party, Fine Gael, by portraying them as submissive to the 
whims of London, thereby emasculating the party. Culturally, Fianna Fáil sought to 
solidify the primacy of Irishness, by affording favored status to those expressions 
deemed most suitable to the party‟s envisioned Ireland. 
 
“A Group of Men in Dark Coats”—The Eucharistic Congress of 1932 
In June of 1932 a Papal Legation visited Ireland as part that year‟s Eucharistic 
Congress, and they were greeted by a delegation of Fianna Fáil ministers led by party 
founder Eamon de Valera. Because Fianna Fáil had been in government for only a 
few months, the Eucharistic Congress had largely been organized under the auspices 
of Cumann na nGaedheal, yet de Valera‟s party seized the opportunity to turn the 
Congress into a Fianna Fáil spectacle. De Valera was to greet the delegation in Dublin 
Castle—the symbol of British colonialism described in the Irish Press as “that stout 
Birmingham Tower that had looked down on ages of sufferings, even to our own 
day.”7  The Irish Press also noted the significance of the former prisoner, now 
president, greeting the delegation within the castle‟s walls: “He whom the holders of 
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Dublin Castle had pursued was now within those walls, not as prisoner, but as 
master.”8 Wearing a standard business suit, as opposed to the more formal coats with 
tails and top hats preferred by the opposition, de Valera spoke, saying “Míle mile 
fáilte romwhat, a Ard-Fhlaith na hEaglaise, a fhear-ionaid an Athar Naofa, go 
talamh iath-ghlas na hÉireann!”9 (Figure 5.1) De Valera continued briefly in Irish 
before addressing the audience in Latin. His message was that this was an Irish 
Ireland, free of British influence. Absent were the silk top hat and coat and tails, as 
was the Béarla.
10
 A member of the Papal Legation recalled their entrance into Dublin 
harbor, where he saw that a “group of men in dark coats and soft hats whom we had 
taken for detectives” waited to meet the men.11 These “detectives” were 
representatives of the Fianna Fáil government.  
 De Valera‟s opening remarks were significant in the way he positioned the 
burgeoning Irish state as being on par with notable Christians who had struggled with 
oppression in the past. Clearly de Valera was referring to Britain when he stated in 
Latin: 
My eminent lord, the records of centuries past bear eloquent testimony to the 
loving zeal with which the Apostolic See has ever honoured our nation. That 
special affection was ever the more amply given, in proportion to the 
sufferings of Ireland. Repeatedly, over more than three hundred years, our 
people, ever firm in their allegiance to our ancestral faith and unwavering even 
unto death in their devotion to the See of Peter, endured in full measure 
unmerited trials by war, by devastation and by confiscation. They saw their 
most sacred rights set at naught under an unjust domination. But repeatedly 
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also did the successors of Peter most willingly come to our aid, in the persons 
of Gregory XIII, Clement VIII, Paul V, Urban VIII, Innocent X and many 
others of the line of Roman Pontiffs to the present day.
12
 
 
The Fianna Fáil spectacle had essentially begun with the above statement, which 
effectively placed Britain and, by implication, the pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal, 
outside of the acceptable norms of Catholic Ireland. From windows adorned with 
Irish-manufactured candles to streets lined with “Episcopal purple”13 and nationalist 
green to de Valera‟s snubbing of the governor-general, Fianna Fáil machinations 
regarding the occasion of the visit by the Papal Legation served to illustrate the means 
by which the party marginalized that which did not fit within its gendered 
nationalistic binary.
14
 
 Finín O‟Driscoll has referred to the visit by the Papal Legation as an “event 
[that] transcended the religious celebration to become a manifestation of triumphant 
Irish catholic [sic] nationalism.”15 The Eucharistic Congress was more than just an 
attempt to express the nation‟s Catholicity; additionally it afforded Fianna Fáil three 
important opportunities. First, it enabled the party to demonstrate that it had 
completely shed its outward associations with physical force insurgency as a means to 
garner a republic. When combined with the peaceful transfer of power from Cumann 
na nGaedheal in early 1932, Fianna Fail‟s hospitality toward the Vatican‟s legation 
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demonstrated that the party had accepted the Pope‟s anti-revolutionary position. 
Second, the Congress gave Fianna Fáil its first opportunity to publicly defy elements 
of British authority, from their choice of clothing, to de Valera‟s greeting statement 
made in Irish, to the barbed tone of his statements as they related to Ireland‟s history 
of subjugation to Britain. Further, the choice to have a state reception for the 
delegation on the grounds of Blackrock College—de Valera‟s alma mater—avoided 
“the embarrassment of the state function being associated with the Vice-Regal Lodge 
or with the representative of King George V.”16 Finally, Fianna Fáil was able to 
demonstrate that it was capable of seizing the reins of the Free State so as to fashion it 
in the party‟s own image. Thus, the Eucharistic Congress of 1932 marked the first 
opportunity for Fianna Fáil publicly to reify its gendered constructs of acceptability as 
well as defining what would not fit within their envisioned Ireland.  
 
“Gael,” “Celt,” and “Socaro”—Fianna Fáil and Gaelic Sport 
 Perhaps the most obvious and explicit form of queering the British came in the 
juxtaposition between the violent, aggressive forms of Gaelic athletics and the more 
proper British sports. Mike Cronin cites the example of the creation of modern 
Aonach Tailteann—“the Irish olympiad [sic], of 1924, 1928 and 1932”—as a cultural 
nation-building event advocated by Cumann na nGaedheal.
17
 Emerging at roughly the 
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same time as the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Aonach Tailteann drew support 
from across the nationalist spectrum, including from Sinn Féin and the “outlawed Dáil 
Éireann…[which] began arguing for the renewal of the games, and leading figures 
such as Eamon de Valera threw their weight behind the campaign.”18John Turpin 
notes that the advocacy of the Aonach Tailteann by the new Free State government 
represented a “manifestation of Cultural Revival ideology…attempting to create a 
modern political entity, distinct from Britain, with its own cultural events and 
emblems.”19 Despite this sentiment, Cronin adds that Cumann na nGaedheal was 
“hesitant to fund Aonach Tailteann, at any level considered excessive.”20 Support for 
the games disintegrated when Fianna Fáil “was not prepared to continue funding a 
festival whilst government loans remained unpaid. Also, the government viewed the 
whole event as one that had been set up by their political opponents and which 
represented the Irish state as imagined by the leadership of Cumann na nGaedheal.”21 
Not surprisingly, Fianna Fáil instead aligned itself with the GAA, which was still 
republican-nationalist in origin, but as a private body, it remained largely free from 
associations with the Free State. Further, and more importantly, the types of sport 
endorsed by the GAA were more in line with the nationalist vision advanced by 
Fianna Fáil.  
Although Fianna Fáil was not the first to claim the Gaelic Athletic Association 
as their own, the very fact that it was able to envelop the anti-British facet of the GAA 
into its own rhetoric speaks to the party‟s success at aligning itself with its 
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nationalistic predecessors.
22
 Patrick F. McDevitt has noted that “male supporters of 
Gaelic games often connected images of British men with those of women or neutered 
men. The effeminization of the enemy here displays male Irish attitudes not only 
toward British men but also toward women and themselves.”23 McDevitt further noted 
that Gaelic sport “reinforced the image of political unity, namely a brotherhood of 
Gaels which, with their women in concomitant subordination, would reclaim their lost 
nation from a feminized oppressor.”24 Thus, it is of no surprise to find members of 
Fianna Fáil—many of whom had previously participated in GAA-sponsored 
competitions—making appearances at GAA events, promoting the uniquely Irish-
manly and Irish-feminine elements of such sports as Gaelic football, hurling, and 
camogie.
25
 Following the period in which elements of Irish nationalism became 
associated more with the perceptively Anglophillic Cumann na nGaedheal-run Free 
State, Fianna Fáil‟s rhetorical alignment with the GAA, was akin to McDevitt‟s 
description that “the growth of hurling and Gaelic football as propagated by the GAA 
was instrumental in the restructuring of an Irish nationalist manhood. The power to 
oppose British games and reclaim independence of action one sphere at a time marked 
the first dramatic steps toward greater freedom from English control.”26 
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 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Fianna Fáil economic rhetoric was 
rooted in the ability to paint Cumann an nGaedheal, and later Fine Gael, as passive 
and therefore outside of the acceptable gendered norms of the Free State. At first 
blush, such an effort appeared similar to the process described by McDevitt, but in the 
Formative Era, the Othering of Britain evolved due to the political transformation that 
had resulted from the creation of the Saorstát. McDevitt‟s description of the GAA as 
an anti-imperialist organization held true in an era when republicanism was 
synonymous with physical-force insurgency, yet in the Formative Era, Fianna Fáil 
republicanism was as much hegemonic as it was anti-hegemonic. Therefore, the 
alignment by Fianna Fáil with the Gaelic Athletic Association was as much about the 
queering of Britishness and its perceived remnants within the new Ireland as it was 
about the reification of its gendered nationalist frameworks. Where aestheticization of 
Fianna Fáilism was tantamount to a corrective force, the aspect of its alignment with 
the GAA was representative of its effort to create a general distaste for lingering 
Britishness in the new Ireland. 
 Along with its prominent page devoted to women, the Irish Press’s coverage 
and promotion of GAA sport was nothing less than groundbreaking. The level of 
primacy granted to hurling and Gaelic football helped to elevate national awareness of 
these sports in Ireland, which in turn, “proved very popular and obliged the Irish 
Independent to respond in kind.”27 Granted, such English-associated sports as rugby, 
football, and horse racing were covered also; however, they were afforded a 
secondary status on the sports pages of the Irish Press. Quite literally, Fianna Fáil 
utilized its house organ to visually construct a sense of preference regarding sport in 
Ireland. A fine example can be found in the sports page from the 3 September 1932 
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issue where authors “Gael” and “Celt”28 covered the up-coming All-Ireland hurling 
final. (Figures 5.2 and 5.3) Contrasted with a large image depicting the members of 
the Kilkenny and Clare hurling sides, were much smaller stories covering results in 
the Walker Cup—where the poor showing by the British was highlighted in the 
headline—and the Free State soccer league.29 (Figure 5.3) Equally significant was the 
positioning of these later articles on the fringes of the page, while the eye was directed 
to the prominent, central photographs and headlines dedicated to Gaelic athletics. 
Although it is not uncommon to find rhetoric evocative of militaristic 
engagement in the coverage of all sports, the sportswriters of The Irish Press made 
certain to elevate connections to the traditional aspects of Gaelic athletics. One such 
example can be found in the nom-de-plumes adopted by the sportwriters and the 
descriptions used to capture the fixtures: “Gael” and “Celt” covered GAA sports, 
while “The Sport” and “Socaro” covered horse racing and soccer, respectively. Take 
for example the article entitled “The G.A.A. Provides Living Example of Perpetual 
Motion,” where the author, Celt, wrote “scarcely has one county or inter-county 
competition concluded than another is started and, when championship activities die 
down, the National Leagues come into operation.”30 The implication was that the 
reiteration of Irish cultural nationalism as represented by traditional sport was 
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incessant; therefore, the unceasing cycle of manly action and movement were a 
constant salvo in the nationalist press.   
 The elevation of Gaelic sport to a level of primacy by Fianna Fáil fit well 
within its dualistic, palingenetic discourse, for the party forged a nexus between the 
traditional and the modern. This was done by using elements of modernity—mass-
produced newspaper, heraldry by a modern political machine and eventually radio 
broadcasts of major fixtures—and combining them with element of a primordial 
Ireland, however imagined. By associating with Gaelic sport, as well as by using its 
political and cultural influence to influence popular tastes, Fianna Fáil was in a 
position to incorporate games into its notions of heteronormativity. Anglo-tinged 
sports, while certainly popular, were relegated to a peripheral presence within Fianna 
Fáil‟s envisioned Irish republic.  
 
“They Never Look Out the Window”—Queering Cumann na nGaedheal 
As was shown in chapter two, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s efforts to feminize the 
republican cause led Fianna Fáil to advance its own logical, masculine political 
rhetoric. Cumann na nGaedheal was, of course, better positioned to shape opinions as 
the party of majority, which was largely due to the spoils of victory in the early Free 
State. As the 1930s progressed, Fianna Fáil benefitted from a similar process, 
enabling it to direct Ireland‟s socio-economic and political trajectories. As such, the 
republican movement had come full circle. The renascent movement under the guise 
of Fianna Fáil had gained legitimacy because of its ability to combat Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s othering efforts, and now de Valera‟s party worked to define what was 
acceptable and what was not. Thus, to cement its status as the new fulcrum in Ireland, 
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the party queered not only its political opposition, but also those tropes associated 
with British rule. 
 Apart from depicting their opponents as passive and ineffectual leaders of 
Ireland, Fianna Fáil‟s rhetoric was rife with allegations that Cumann na 
nGaedheal/Fine Gael were cowardly supplicants bending to the will of Britain. In the 
early 1930s, Fianna Fáil‟s internal strategy document, Scheme of Election 
Organisation, stated: 
The next matter is the personalities of the candidates of other parties. 
Although it is very inadvisable to indulge in personal attacks on opponents, 
nevertheless it is quite legitimate to examine their public records and draw 
attention to anything which would make them undesirable as a public 
representative. In this connection it is important to note the necessity of 
examining and dealing with the position of special classes or economic 
interests in relation to those candidates. 
 
Needless to remark, the nature of our opponents‟ campaign will have a direct 
influence on ours. The literature issued by, and speeches made on behalf of 
our opponents, should, therefore, be carefully noted and all false allegations 
and misrepresentations dealt with.
31
 
 
Fundamental to Fianna Fáil‟s efforts to “correct” Ireland was the notion that both 
Britain and the Irish Free State had somehow shifted the nation away from its true 
destiny. Elements of this strategy were evident as early as 1927. Thus, a handbill from 
that election claimed that it was 
Now or Never! 
 
The scales of Justice is [sic] badly balanced, and you will shortly be asked to 
cast your vote for one side or other. We confidently appeal to you to cast your 
vote on the side of JUSTICE and RIGHT. There are only two sides—they 
are:-  
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For Ireland: Those who love Ireland and would serve her. 
 
Against Ireland: 
Imperialists. Unionists. Free Masons. [sic] Job-hunters. Ex Black and Tans. 
Bailiffs. Those Who gave away Six Counties. Those who agree to pay Six 
Millions yearly to England. Ex-Judges. 
 
Could we doubt your answer?
32
 
 
Fianna Fáil‟s rhetorical flourish blackened their domestic opponents, depicting “those 
who agree to pay,” i.e., Cumann na nGaedheal, as akin to imperialists, Unionists, and 
Freemasons, supplicants to the British, and it built on rhetoric already current in the 
mid-1920s. Daly has argued that, “the Cumann na nGaedheal government was forced 
to adopt a pro-British attitude on political matters and a conciliatory economic 
policy.”33 Pointedly, another Fianna Fáil handbill portrayed Cumann na nGaedheal as 
cowards who agreed to “pay Pensions to the „Black and Tans‟ for Destroying Your 
Homes and Shooting Down Your Countrymen,” and colluded to “Pay an Annual 
Tribute of Over £5,000,000 to England.”34  
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 The accusation that Cumann na nGaedheal consistently acquiesced to the 
whims of Britain continued to appear in propaganda that emerged from the office of 
Fianna Fáil minister Frank Aiken. Another pamphlet, for instance, depicted Cumann 
na nGaedheal as inherently anti-Irish, and therefore pro-British, having “stopped at 
nothing to bring about the downfall of Fianna Fail.[sic]”35 Thus, in a pamphlet, likely 
to have been printed in 1932, with the lengthy title “Fianna Fail[sic] Kept Their 
Promise, A Survey of the Great Work Done in Louth, How Drogheda Fared: Great 
Industrial Revival,” Fianna Fáil depicted itself  as “gallant,” pro-Irish, and advocates 
of policy commensurate with the wishes of the Holy See.
36
 In regards to the Church 
and Fianna Fáil‟s economic program—namely their housing schemes—the text 
claimed that “documentary proofs of this, the age-long policy of the Popes, is found in 
all the decrees issued by  the Holy See from the reign of Innocent III to Pope Pius 
VII.”37 The logic being presented was that Cumann na nGaedheal was being rather 
ungodly regarding housing, and therefore had no place within the devoutly Catholic 
Ireland. This rhetorical strategy aligned with Fianna Fáil‟s anti-British clothing 
choices worn at the Eucharistic Congress in 1932. Both Cosgrave‟s party and the 
Seanad (Senate) were equated with “Exporters, importers, the various personages, 
political and financial, who have made it their aim for months past to play the part of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
there existed an example of propaganda that portrayed Cumann na nGaedheal as the 
harbingers of violence, a rather fascinating inversion of rhetoric. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Fianna Fáil, Fianna Fáil Kept Their Promise, A Survey of the Great Work Done in 
Louth, How Drogheda Fared: Great Industrial Revival, c. 1932, Aiken Papers, UCDA, 
P104/1575 (1).   
37
 Ibid. 
224 
 
England and hamper the onward march of the nation.”38 (Figure 5.4) Following many 
accusations of Cumann na nGaedheal dishonesty, the pamphlet alleged that 
Cosgrave has been most accommodating to every country but his own. He, 
being a broad-minded man, accommodated himself, too, in a generous way to 
all the requirements of the alien. He will ever be remembered by the Masonic 
Lodges as one who was a „Good Sport‟ and struggled „manfully‟ to make 
capitalistic Imperialism, respectable to the „ignorant Irishry.‟ He will be 
remembered as the „traitor‟ statesman who made „a damned good bargain‟ 
over the enslaved bodies of half a million Irish Nationalists, sealing his 
shameful bargain with the annual tribute of 5 ¾ millions of Irish money. 
 
Despite this opposition, despite the lying Press, despite the whole 
machinations of West Britonism, Fianna Fáil got to work.
39
 
 
These damning accusations, recalling turn of the century Gaelic revival denunciations 
of West Britonism, solidified the party‟s assertions that Cosgrave and his party were 
simply British puppets perpetuating the colonial ties that had been so detrimental to 
Ireland. Further, the language contained in the pamphlet insinuated that Fianna Fáil‟s 
opposition was involved in a struggle of sorts with Britain, whereas Cumanna na 
nGaedheal assumed the position of the passive to Britain‟s active, thereby sexualizing 
the Anglo-Irish Free State association.  
 By the time that Fianna Fáil had secured a place within the political dialectic 
of the Free State, it had begun championing associations between the Treaty—and 
therefore the Free State and Cumann na nGaedheal—with Britain. This association 
placed Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael outside of its republican vision and was 
reinforced in electoral literature and other party publications. For example, a Fianna 
Fáil handbill from 1927 presents Cumann na mGaedheal as benefitting from its 
associations with Britain—via the Treaty—in a manner that undermined Ireland. The 
handbill, in large, bold letters queries: “Why wouldn‟t they? The Free State Ministers 
                                                          
38
 Ibid. For a cartoon depicting “the people‟s” response to Seanad intransigence, see 
Figure 5.4. 
39
 Ibid., 2. The emphasis in the quotation is my own. 
225 
 
are Enthusiastic Upholders of the „Treaty‟. Why Wouldn‟t They Be? Since they came 
into power they have netted the following sums in personal salaries:-- Mr. Cosgrave 
(12,000) […].”40 After listing other notable members of the government, the flyer 
closes with the refrain: “If the jobs secured by both Ministers and Deputies for their 
relatives and friends are added, we need not wonder at the eagerness with which these 
men appeal for re-election nor at the bitterness with which they malign all who stand 
in their way.”41 By intoning that a “Vote for the Fianna Fáil Candidates [would] End 
this Colossal Jobbery!”42 the Irish voter was meant to accept the notion that members 
of Cumann na nGaedheal were underhandedly—so very unmanly—reinforcing their 
supplication to Britain for their own political and economic gain. As such, the 
Treaty‟s supports and the Free State regime were somehow engaged in an illicit 
relationship with John Bull. 
 Themes of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s impotency took on a more explicitly 
sexual tone when contrasted to the activist economic policies of Fianna Fáil. One such 
example came from a party leaflet from 1932 that decried Cumann na nGaedheal‟s 
inability to “even make their own policy a success!”43 But as early as 1927, a flyer 
accused Cumann na nGaedheal of “Five Years of Poverty and Panic.”44 The handbill 
accused Cosgrave and his party of being “Unable to answer the damning facts and 
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figures” of what Fianna Fáil claimed to be five years of ineffectual—impotent—
rule.
45
 The most interesting aspect of this pamphlet can be found toward the end when 
the phrase—underscored in bold print—“It was Panic” was used no less than seven 
times to illustrate examples of how Cumann na nGaedheal submitted to the whims of 
British control because of its insecurities.  
It was Panic which drove them to attack the Four Courts in 1922, and thus 
start the Civil War… 
 
It was Panic which made them surrender to Britain and the Carsonite leaders 
on the Boundary Question, and, by agreeing to Partition, hand over the 
defenceless Six-County Nationalists and Catholics to the Orangemen.  
 
It was Panic which made them enter into the Secret Financial Agreement of 
March, 1926, by which £5,000,000 a year of the impoverished Irish people‟s 
money was handed over to the British Treasury… 
 
It was Panic which made them agree at the Imperial Conference that the Free 
State Army should become the tail of the British Army whenever “these 
islands” were attacked. “It is perfectly obvious,” Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald 
(now Minister for Defence), said on February 17
th
 last, “That our Army must 
co-operate with the British Army”—thus involving this nation in every British 
War… 
 
That is the National Record of the Free State party—a Record not of courage, 
but of PANIC!
46
 
 
Many of the points raised in this piece of propaganda appeared again in a speech 
made by Frank Aiken on 30 July 1932 in Market Square in Dundalk, where Aiken 
claimed—among other things—“Unfortunately Cumann na nGaedheal were either 
foolishly or deliberately playing England‟s game. Their talk about the illegality of the 
Free State‟s claim to the annuities was playing into Britain‟s hands, and furnishing 
arguments which Britain herself would be ashamed to put forward.” 47 To put it 
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simply, Fianna Fáil—like “true men”—did not panic. They did not submit themselves 
to the will of the colonial oppressor. 
The themes explored above are seen further in visual representations of 
Cumann na nGaedheal in Fianna Fáil party propaganda. One example necessitates a 
return to the cartoon that appeared in the January 1937 Fianna Fáil Bulletin, “Time 
Marches On!”, discussed in Chapter Four. In this case, using queering as a prism, the 
themes of Britishness and subjugation to the Crown are readily apparent. In the 
reading from the previous chapter, the picture was representative of Fianna Fáil‟s 
efforts to couch their party as a masculine endeavor, bringing economic rebirth via 
industrial growth to Ireland, while William Cosgrave mourns the loss of decay.
48
 
(Figure 5.5) Viewed through the perspective of queering, the image elicits a different 
response, for the artist took care to highlight that Cosgrave, in his dandy attire—coat 
with tails, spats, and coiffured hair—was juxtaposed with the idealized, yet faceless 
Irish workers adorned in the clothes of the laboring man. More important was the 
depiction of Cosgrave bowed down in a pose that explicitly depicts mourning, but that 
implicitly evokes images of sexual passivity to the active master (a grotesque 
representation of John Bull) who was adorned in a similar fashion. This visual 
essentially recapitulated the rhetoric explored above. 
 Indeed, many representations of Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael ministers 
highlighted their dandyish attire—a critique that was not only meant to depict them as 
snobbish and out of touch with the Irish working man—but that also evoked 
connotations of them as servants, or perhaps poseurs, dressing up in the “drag” of the 
British upper class. It also spoke to the recurrent accusation that members of Cumann 
na nGaedheal had actively profited from their association with the Crown. These 
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themes were readily apparent in a dual-paneled cartoon from the 9 June 1932 edition 
of the Irish Press (Figure 5.6), where Patrick McGilligan, Minister of External 
Affairs, Industry and Commerce, and Cosgrave stood beside a stereotyped “Higher 
Civil Servant.” Certainly, it was widely appreciated that many civil servants in the 
1920s had retained their positions from prior to the formation of the Free State, and 
thereby they could be readily portrayed as having a British lineage. In the “Then” 
panel, the three stood in a room, dressed in rather clubbish attire, ignorantly turning 
their backs on the unemployed Irish workers adorned in simple suits and newsboy 
hats most associated with workingmen who stood outside the window. The unnamed 
“Higher Civil Servant” stood butler-like beside Cosgrave and McGilligan, who were 
labeled as “The Ministers,” and were quoted as saying: “The Country is so 
prosperous!” 49 The “Then” panel, which was meant to be representative of Cumann 
na nGaedheal‟s time in government, was juxtaposed with a “Now” panel that 
emphasized Fianna Fáil‟s activist economic policy, surprising the ex-ministers 
because of their trusted civil servant has had his salary reduced. Such is shown by the 
civil servant who appeared unaffected by the image of the once idled workingmen 
busily at work, but expresses shock because Fianna Fáil “Cut my £1,600!”50 As such, 
the artist quite literally positioned Cosgrave and his supporters outside of the 
heteronormative Ireland where the workingman labored in factories and on 
construction sites thanks to the seed planted by Fianna Fáil‟s economic policies. 
Further, in reference to the title “They Never Look Out the Window,” the artist was 
certain to place the civil servant and Cumann na nGaedheal ministers inside a 
building, enclosed in their own world outside Fianna Fáil‟s heteronormativity. Their 
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light-colored pants would have most certainly been ruined by the dirt and grime of 
construction had they ventured outside. 
 Another cartoon from 1932 by the same artist, Bee, depicted a roomful of 
British ministers sitting around a table at Downing Street, where “they turned on the 
radio and smiled again.”51 (Figure 5.7) Divided into two panels, the cartoon on the left 
depicted British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald conferring with his colleagues, 
who included his second in command Stanley Baldwin seated at the far right of the 
panel. “Gentlemen,” MacDonald declared, “we cannot unseat this new Irish 
Government. Lets [sic] come to terms.”52 Before the cabinet could accede to 
Chamberlain‟s wishes regarding the recently triumphant Fianna Fáil, Baldwin says 
“Hold on a little while—something may happen yet.”53 Situated ominously behind the 
four men—all of whom were dressed in formal coats and ties, one adorned with a 
banker‟s monocle, all with expressions of consternation—was a large wireless radio. 
In the next panel, the following phrases emitted from the radio: “Mr. Cosgrave:- 
„England is Right‟”; “ Mr. Blythe:- „De Valera has no case‟”; “Mr. McGilligan:- „The 
Land Annuities are Britain‟s‟”; Mr. Fitgerald-Kenny:- „England must get them‟”; and 
most threatening from the perspective of Irish farmers, “Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald:- 
„Pay or—‟”.54 As these words were transmitted, the British cabinet were seen to reply 
“Saved Again!”; “Attaboy!”; and “Ha! Ha!” while a smug Baldwin concludes, “What 
did I tell you!”55 Bee‟s cartoon clearly defined the pro-British aspects of Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟s policy in regard to its opposition of Fianna Fáil‟s Economic War against 
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Britain which had begun in earnest in June of 1932 when de Valera announced the 
party‟s plan to withhold payment of the land annuities. Further, the cartoon was 
printed shortly after the private discussions with Baldwin at the Ottawa Conference, 
and less than three months before the January 1933 election, thus providing another 
example of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist/party duality.  If, as argued in the previous 
chapter, Fianna Fáil was to represent the masculine, and was properly supported by 
appropriate feminine behavior—as shown in chapter three—then there was no place 
for Cumann na nGaedheal within the male/female heteronormative binary. Cosgrave 
and his supporters, therefore, were positioned outside of the acceptable republican 
realm. 
 In February 1936, the Fianna Fáil Bulletin, reprinted an article from the 
magazine New Statesman and Nation under the headline: “„Irish Housekeeping‟ 
British Writer on the Results of Fianna Fáil‟s Economic Policy.” The article 
highlighted the assertion that “The Cosgrave regime, it is true, for ten years carried 
good marks in the British Press by a docile acceptance of previous conditions. 
Ireland‟s role was to concentrate on animal husbandry, to supply Great Britain with 
meat, butter and eggs, importing in exchange most of the necessaries [sic] and 
luxuries of life.”56 While the piece did not originate with Fianna Fáil, its inclusion 
certainly reiterated the party‟s rhetorical portrayal of Fine Gael as having been 
subservient to Britain. Within sixteen months, however, the Bulletin  trumpeted Fine 
Gael‟s “slow conversion” to Fianna Fáil‟s economic approach. The article, entitled, 
“The Education of Fine Gael” heralded: 
The slow conversion of Fine Gael to the greater part of the Fianna Fail [sic] 
Economic Programme is proof of the overwhelming support of the people for 
the policy of National Self-Sufficiency and Security. Equally it reveals the 
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negative outlook of the Opposition and is the proof of their utter failure to 
think constructively or nationally. 
 
Three leaders have left Fine Gael. The desperate and unscrupulous attempt to 
create a Fascist movement fizzled out in miserable wire-cutting and free-
falling. Then followed the conversion—a conversion too late to deceive the 
Irish people.
57
 
 
Much of the article discussed “The slow and Pitiful Surrender to Fianna Fail” and 
demonstrated Fianna Fáil‟s growing confidence that it was now the hegemonic force 
that was driving the push toward a new nation. Further, this article serves as a marker 
of how the rise of Fianna Fáil had transformed Cumann na nGaedheal from a party—
with its own ideology—into one that was essentially reacting—and thereby 
acquiescing—to the new republican hegemony.58 Most interesting, however, was the 
depiction of Fianna Fáil as being the “National Educators” who would “teach Fine 
Gael that the people of this country want a Government that will lead them to 
prosperity through constructive effort and not a party which encourages their 
oppressors by prophecies of disaster—nor a party which threatens to „knock the hell 
out of them.‟”59  
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Figure 5.1: Eamon de Valera and the Papal Legation, The Irish Press 21 June 
1932, 1. 
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Figure 5.2: Sample sports page from The Irish Press, 2 September 1932, 8. 
  
234 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Sample sports page from The Irish Press, 3 September 1932, 8. 
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Figure 5.4: Bee, Untitled Cartoon, The Irish Press, 4 June 1932, 1. 
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Figure 5.4: “Time Marches On!” Fianna Fáil Bulletin, January 1937, 7. 
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Figure 5.5: Bee, “They Never Look Out The Window,” Irish Press 9 June 1932, 
1. 
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Figure 5.6: Bee, “At Downing St. They turned on the Radio and smiled again,” Irish 
Press, 31 September 1932, 1. 
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Chapter Six 
“Memory is a Rather Fleeting Sense”—The Curious Case of Pathé Films and the 
Cinematic Archive of the Militant Era 
 
I've been dreaming of a time when 
The English are sick to death of Labour, And Tories, 
And spit upon the name Oliver Cromwell, 
And denounce this royal line that still salute him, 
And will salute him forever. 
 -Morrissey
1
 
 
 In 1935, three years after taking control of the Free State government, certain 
Fianna Fáil ministers were made aware of an archive of film taken by the British 
studio Pathé in the years between 1919 and 1923. The studio had contacted the 
government in the hopes of getting approval for a possible film depicting the previous 
twenty-one years of Ireland‟s history. Over the course of three years, the 
administration debated internally about what to do with the film that eventually 
devolved into a conversation on how to suppress the footage.
 2
  There was an overall 
consensus that the film needed to be preserved, and the dialogues revealed a certain 
level of nostalgia for the period, as well as serving as a reminder that many prominent 
members of Fianna Fáil had been actively involved with the belligerence of the 
previous decades. Given the struggle to remove itself from the shadow of the gunmen 
by Fianna Fáil republicans in the period after 1926, it would come as no surprise that 
the party would seek to suppress a visual reminder of its militant origins.  
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 Noel Redican relates the story of James Montgomery‟s efforts to collect films of 
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During his search, Montgomery “collected all but one, a very important one about de Valera‟s 
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 It serves to engage this story in a history of the era between 1926 and 1932, 
for it stands as evidence that the party‟s effort to distance itself from its militant 
origins remained a prominent feature of its political discourse. Further, Fianna Fáil‟s 
effort in the 1930s to suppress the IRA and other militant organizations, including the 
fascist Blueshirts, while acting as the legitimate government of the state necessitated 
that the Irish people not be reminded of Fianna Fáil‟s origins. Thus, the fate of the 
film is particularly telling about the lengths the party went to in its effort to maintain a 
sense of independence and distance from Sinn Féin‟s physical force insurgency. 
 In June 1935, representatives of Pathé films wrote two letters to James 
Montgomery, the head of the Film Censor‟s Office in Dublin, making him aware of  
the Pathé archive.
3
 The first letter read, in part:  
The Minister for Local Government and Public Health desires me to send you 
enclosed film which has been handed to him by Mr. Dan O‟Donovan, his 
former Private Secretary. This film was taken in the early stages of the 
launching of the Second Dail [sic] Loan. Mr. O‟Donovan states that it was 
taken in the grounds of Saint Enda‟s and it has considerable historical interest. 
The Minister will discuss with you later what he wished done with the film. 
4
 
 
A second letter from an official at Pathé was sent ten days later: 
I have to transmit herewith, for safe custody two rolls of film, about 6” and 4 
4/5” in diameter, respectively, which were received here from the Minister for 
Local Government and Public Health. The film deals with the launching of the 
Second Dáil Loan, and is of considerable historical interest. It is thought that 
one may possibly be a continuation of the other, and if so, it is suggested that 
they might, if you so consider it desirable, be rewound into one roll.
5
 
 
In response to these letters, Montgomery wrote: 
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I have received for inclusion in our Historical Collection the two rolls of film 
which you sent me. I have had them rewound into one roll. There is already a 
nucleus of a historical collection and I am trying—with the help of the Film 
Trade—to keep it up to date by the addition of news reels [sic] of national 
importance from time to time. Some effort should be made very soon to edit 
the earlier films, so as to have an authentic record of the scenes and people 
portrayed.
6
 
 
Inherent in this conversation is the fact that there was some interest within the 
government to collect and preserve a film record of Irish history. This matter was 
private and thus leads one to conclude that it was the intent of the government to keep 
the matter private. The situation changed, however, on 31 August 1935, when an 
article was published in the decidedly anti-Fianna Fáil Irish Independent in which the 
presence of such films was made known. According to the columnist “J.A.P.”: 
In my notes last week I suggested that we were doing nothing in the matter of 
film archives. Well, I was wrong. During the last few weeks we have been 
doing something, thanks to the perspicacity and stalwart endeavour of our 
Film Censor Mr. Montgomery. As a matter of fact, the President has had his 
attention drawn to the matter quite recently, and as might have been expected, 
is very keen about it. Mr. Montgomery, who has had an eye to this part of his 
duties ever since he was appointed Film Censor, has carefully catalogued all 
films of national interest, and has made his own archive… 
 
What We Have 
 
I understand (being utterly without official knowledge) that there is a 
suggestion of an impartial committee to do the „cutting‟ of these historical 
films. Which will mean (I hope) that every side will get a square deal, and the 
subtitles (those that matter being all silent films) will be judiciously written. 
But when we have pruned these historic films so that they will give no offence 
to anybody, what are we going to do with them? Of course, we could show 
them in the schools—only that the vast majority of our schools have not 
electric light and could not show them unless an enthusiastic National teacher 
footed the bill for a battery projector out of his own pocket. I suppose that 
while the great bureaucratic brains that run the country in the shape of the little 
tin gods of the Civil Service are brooding about the matter[,] the films will still 
remain in Mr. Montgomery‟s charge And he, being also a civil servant, will 
get no thanks for looking at them.
7
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This particular article functioned in two ways: first to make public the fact that the 
Film Office retained footage of possible historical interest; and second that de Valera 
had known that the footage existed. From this point onward, all conversation from the 
government‟s offices included the caveat that no part of any film shall be shown in 
public. Further, it became a matter of great importance that all filmed depictions of 
the period between 1919 and 1923 be obtained by the Film Censor‟s Office.  
 In an anonymous letter for the Roinn an Uachtaráin (Office of the President), 
it was noted that: 
On Saturday, 2
nd
 inst. the Film Censor, Mr. Montgomery showed on the screen 
at his office in Molesworth St., a number of historical films to a small 
audience…[that] covered the incidents of the Anglo-Irish and Civil wars, the 
Peace negotiations in London, 1922, and the funerals of Gen. Michael Collins 
and Arthur Griffith. The idea is gradually to assemble a library of such films, 
which would be added to from time to time and kept as State records. The 
films shown to us were given to him on the conditions that they are not to be 
shown in public.
8
  
 
Although not present at this screening, de Valera, among others, was present at a 
similar screening on the 9 November 1935.
9
 
 In a letter written to Pathé‟s MacDunphy, Montgomery reiterated the 
importance of the Irish government‟s effort both to collect all footage from the era 
1919-23, as well as to ensure a certain level of privacy regarding said film. It reads, in 
full: 
Dear MacDunphy [sic], 
 
I enclose a list of subtitles from the copies of the Pathe [sic] Gazette which 
form the nucleus of the Historical Collection which I have been trying to form 
for some years. 
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Recognising the importance to posterity of such a collection, I got in touch 
with Mr. Gordon Lewis—who at that time was acting for Messrs Pathe, and 
he presented all the films in his possession dealing with the period of the 
Truce, the Treaty, and the Civil War, to Mr. W.T. Cosgrave, for the State, on 
condition that they were to be treated as historical records, were not to pass 
from the custody of the State, and were not to be shown in public. They are the 
only copies in existence—all the negatives were burnt in Messrs Pathes during 
„The Trouble‟. There must be other films of that period in the possession of 
private individuals, and every effort should be made to secure them—notably 
the O’Donovan Rossa funeral. 
 
When an incident of National importance appears in the news reels, I request 
the Renter to let me have it at the end of its run. Some Renters have complied, 
and there is a fairly good sequence in our possession. 
 
I feel that the films covered by the list enclosed should be more fully 
documented. You could see yourself, from the screening given the other day, 
to a few who should have an intimate knowledge of the names of the persons 
portrayed, that the memory is a rather fleeting sense, and that in a few years 
many identities will be utterly forgotten—this is a strange irony; but 
unfortunately true. 
 
I therefore suggest that it would be a good idea to get a group together who 
could see the films, and arrive at an agreed list of subtitles, with the necessary 
names of the parties in each section. When these subtitles are added, these 
valuable records should be securely sealed and stored in a safe place. I have 
shown them very rarely fearing injury to the celuloid.[sic] 
 
Is mise le meas, 
 
J. Montgomery, Scurdoir na Scannan 
 
In addition to the enclosed list we also have a sound film entitled „Pathe [sic] 
Jubilee Retrospect‟ dealing with historical Irish events, and the film record of 
the „First Dail Eireann Loan Issue‟ which you sent me.10 
Again, it is rather clear that Montgomery wanted to ensure that all elements of 
the filmed historic record—at least of this period—were to remain in the hands of the 
government and not to be shown in public. Included in the cache of films referenced 
by Montgomery were such titles as: “Sinn Feiners in Downing Street. Mr. De Valera 
and Mr. Lloyd George and peace prospects are bright”; “Presidential Tour ends in 
Peace. President De Valera accompanied by Mr. Cathal Brugha (Minister of Defence) 
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and Mr. R.J. Mulcahy (Chief of Staff) reviews the Western Division of the Irish 
National Army”; “Dublin Castle. Symbol and citadel of British Rule in Ireland for 
centuries surrender to Sinn Fein Provisional Government. English Troops mount 
guard for the last time. The official entry was singularly undramatic though a moment 
that will live forever in Irish minds”; “Republican Campaign Opens. Huge 
demonstration in O‟Connell Street”; “Pilgrimage After the Poll. Prominent Anti-
Treaty Republicans at the grave of Wolfe Tone at Bodenstown. General Mellowes 
declares that election results do not mean the death of Irish republicanism”; “The 
Battle of the Four Courts. Exclusive pictures by our Staff Cameraman.”11 In light of 
the effort by the Free State Government—notably Cumann na nGaedheal—in the 
period between 1922 and beyond to portray de Valera and his followers as instigators 
of the Civil War, such evidence could certainly be used against Fianna Fáil. Further, 
with the party in the midst of the Economic War with Great Britain, it was potentially 
dangerous for the Irish citizenry to be shown images of the British “evacuating” 
Dublin Castle ten years prior at the same time they were being told that they, as a 
people, were struggling under the yoke of British colonialism. And, as Montgomery 
wryly noted, the screening of the film was intended in part to privately secure a 
historical record, so that names would not be forgotten, yet publicly every effort was 
made by Fianna Fáil to forge a public amnesia. Such was the nature of the socio-
political landscape of Ireland in the Formative Era.  
Of further interest in Montgomery‟s letter is the revelation that Cosgrave was 
presented with this same material, and despite the opportunity the film provided to 
further portray de Valera and his followers as militants, the Cumann na nGaedheal 
leader never did so. One may only offer conjecture as to why Cosgrave and his party 
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opted to keep this archive in secret. However, two possibilities may be explored 
briefly. First, the film contained images of Cumann na nGaedheal ministers 
participating in acts of violent rebellion that they had spent much of the 1920s 
decrying. On a related note, it might have been deemed dangerous for members of 
Cumann na nGaedheal—a party that was busy forging a working relation with 
Westminster—to be shown participating in rebellion against Britain. Secondly, the 
film also depicts Cumann na nGaedheal ministers serving a leadership that was 
comprised largely of men and women that would comprise the anti-Treaty/Sinn Féin 
cadre. Indeed, both parties had something to lose had the Pathé film been shown in 
public after 1927. Thus, it is of no surprise that the film was suppressed by both 
Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil. 
 Another brief exchange of letters between Montgomery and Gordon Lewis of 
Pathé exposes the efforts by the government to secure the cinematic record from the 
period. The matter at hand was whether or not Pathé could secure film stock from 
Ireland in order to “issue a film of the past 21 years of Irish history in the near future 
for public exhibition.” The project, Lewis claimed, “would prove invaluable as it 
[would] provide a living history of Ireland‟s fight for freedom in the last quarter of a 
century.”12 It is great importance to note that the Fianna Fáil government had great 
interest in censoring a good portion of the “fight for freedom,” ensuring that the 
public fight for freedom was—at least for the party—something that began with the 
formation of Fianna Fáil in 1926, and that the previous generation was a distant, if not 
forgotten, memory. 
 Montgomery‟s response exposed a few facets of the government‟s position—
notably that they sought to secure more footage than what was listed (note the 
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reference to Black and Tans), as well as his implicit effort to secure some level of 
editorial control over Pathé‟s production. Montgomery, in part, wrote: 
Today we handed you our list of the films, which you so kindly presented to 
the State as the nucleus of a historical collection. There are also valuable 
pictures of the issue of the First National Loan at St. Enda‟s, and the funeral of 
Thomas Ashe. Please return the list as soon as possible. 
 
I was always under the impression that these copies were unique, but in your 
letter of July 18
th, you mention „negatives in our Library‟. Does this mean that 
the negatives of these films are in existence? Does it also mean that you hold 
records of the Black and Tan period? 
 
On [the previous letter] you state that your firm intends to issue, in the near 
future, a film of the last twenty one years of Irish history. Could arrangements 
be made so that this publication would meet our requirements, and obviate the 
need for the special production of a film for the State from the records 
presented by you? [Which] according to the terms of your presentation, could 
not be shown to a General Audience, in public, and could only be used as an 
archive, for exhibition occasionally to a limited audience.
13
 
 
Lewis‟ response demonstrated his and Pathé‟s willingness to acquiesce on the subject, 
going so far as to say that “when this film is produced I have no doubt that my 
Company will be prepared to sell copies to the Government for preservation as a 
historical record and for exhibition to a limited non paying audience.”14 Further, there 
is no indication that Pathé ever created the film in which they intended to produce.  
 Two months later in October of 1938, Montgomery wrote to Commissioner 
Cleary: 
Some years ago Mr. Gordon Lewis, representative of Messrs Pathe [sic] 
Pictures, gave us a number of old news reels [sic] covering the Truce Treaty 
and Civil War periods, to form the nucleus of a National Historical collection 
of films. The conditions were that they were to be kept by us merely as 
archives; they were not to be reproduced without Pathe’s permission, and they 
must never by shown to the general public. They are of course, very valuable 
records. An Taoiseach [de Valera] saw them, and suggested that a series of 
sub-titles or a running sound commentary should be added for the benefit of 
posterity, but at present this is not feasible. However, there is a danger which 
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must be guarded against, that is—fire—and it is proposed that a duplicate 
should be made and stored, say in the Museum.
15
 
 
Most interesting is the assertion—made second-hand—by “An Taoiseach” that a 
running commentary should be included in any possible future manifestations of the 
film. It is difficult to believe that the approved commentary would depart from Fianna 
Fáil‟s overall effort to reconstitute history in such a manner that might connect 
members of the party to the unrest depicted in the newsreels.  
 Unfortunately, the fate of the film was not to be decided by the Irish 
government. Correspondence from 1943 between P. Ó Cinnéide, secretary to de 
Valera, and the Department of Justice reveals that Montgomery‟s fear of fire had 
come to fruition. On 24 April 1943, Ó Cinnéide wrote, “I am to refer to the recent fire 
in the Film Censor‟s Office and to inquire whether the collection of Irish historical 
film which it is understood were stored in that Office was damaged and if so to what 
extent.”16 In response, Justice officials informed him, “as a result of the recent fire at 
the Office of the Official Censor of Films, the following are the only items of Irish 
historical interest now available in that Office: Irish items from the new reels for the 
period from the 26
th
 January, 1941 to the 31
st
 of December, 1942, five items for the 
month of January, 1943, and six reels from the film „Man of Aran.”17 So it went for 
the filmed record of Ireland‟s history in the years between 1919 and 1923.  
                                                        
15
 Scrudoir Na Scanna (J. Montgomery), letter to Commissioner Clearly, 10 October 
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 The new departure for the republican movement under the guise of Fianna Fáil 
demanded that all necessary steps were taken to ensure that the party could not be 
saddled with that which made Sinn Féin republicanism so distasteful to the Irish 
people in the early 1920s. In essence, de Valera‟s party was attempting to reconfigure 
the public conception of the republican cause, thereby keeping at arm‟s length his and 
his cohorts‟ connection to the militancy of the previous decade. Yet, for Fianna Fáil, 
to control the memory of 1916 and 1919 and 1922 was seen as a necessary cause belle 
in its overall effort to construct a new socio-political masternarrative for the 
envisioned Irish Republic.  
 By shaping the forms of mass media, Fianna Fáil thus attempted to position 
itself in such a way that it could control and focus the backward, historical gaze of its 
citizens. Herein lay one of the great ironies of Fianna Fáil‟s nationalist project. It 
emphasized connections to a glorified Gaelic past, yet its key members chose to 
downplay, if not erase, their connections to the more recent events in which they had 
played important roles. In their successful effort to censor the visual record depicting 
them as revolutionaries—gunmen indeed—they were partaking in an explicit effort to 
control the shared memory of Ireland‟s recent past for their own gain. What we see 
occurring privately in regard to the Pathé collection encapsulated the core principles 
exerted by Fianna Fáil in the period from its formation in 1926 well into the 1930s.  
In a larger sense, Fianna Fáil‟s suppression of the historical films of the 1919-
23 era encapsulated the direction that the party was headed in during its early days. To 
put it simply, the party attempted to construct a palingenetic nationalist discourse, 
whereby it built upon the primordial nationalism espoused by the Gaelic Revivalists, 
but also one that embraced such notions of modernity as industry, modified 
Keynesian economic models, and modernist artistic and political ideologies. The 
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problem with such an approach—something that hindered its efforts to firmly 
establish its new departure—was the issue of the events of 1916-22. In essence, it was 
a generational issue, that is, a political struggle of a new, transitional era, fought 
among the participants of the previous era. As such, the contests between Cumann na 
nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil were as much about notions of memory and identity as 
they were about legislation and governance. In this early phase, the discursive conflict 
was centered upon Fianna Fáil‟s effort to erase the recent past from the minds of the 
Irish people, and for Cumann na nGaedheal, every effort was made to remind the 
same Irish people of Fianna Fáil‟s militant past. This latter point led de Valera and his 
party to create a new socio-political masternarrative built upon gendered lines. To 
accomplish this, the party found it necessary to reset its gendered identity where 
notions of heteronormative masculinity and femininity were clearly defined. As has 
been demonstrated above, Fianna Fáil was a national movement—faced with the 
challenges of modernity; recipients of an unfinished decolonization from Britain; 
willing inheritors of the republican tradition; pacifistic rebels; occupants of the very 
house that they sought to destroy—intent on forging a truly modern nation. The level 
to which the results of Fianna Fáil‟s policy equaled its lofty aspirational rhetoric is 
largely irrelevant when examining the Formative Era, for the wake of the party‟s 
actions were yet to be felt. There is little doubt, however, that Fianna Fáil‟s plan for a 
new republic was appealing enough to attain a majority of support in the 1930s. 
Despite its contradictions and inherently paternalistic approach—factors that most 
assuredly contributed to the social and economic woes faced by the country following 
World War II—Fianna Fáil‟s renascent republicanism  forged a modern nation built in 
its own image.  
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